Darla Palacio Sambissa

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**FILED** 

September 16, 2025

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

D. Trujillo DEPUTY

Darla Palacio Sambissa Petitioner

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS **EL PASO DIVISION**

Darla Palacio Sambissa Christopher Sambissa

Petitioners,

VS.

Kristi Noem, in her official as Secretary, U.S. Department of

Homeland Security et al.

Respondents.

Case No.: 3:25-CV-00237 DCG

PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF **EMERGENCY INJUNCTION** (Regarding Jurisdictional Authority Under 8 U.S.C. §1252)

#### Introduction

The question before this Court is whether it has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §1252 to enjoin the Department of Homeland

Supplemental Briefing Regarding Jurisdiction

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Security ("DHS") from removing Mr. Cristopher Sambissa before it can rule on the merits of his pending habeas corpus petition.

Respondents assert that Mr. Sambissa, as a Visa Waiver Program (VWP) overstay, is statutorily barred from judicial review and is subject to expedited removal, with removal likely occurring before the Court can rule. However, this argument ignores the critical constitutional dimension of the habeas petition. Mr. Sambissa's claim does not contest a discretionary decision or the execution of a standard removal order but challenges the fundamental legality of his detention based on a potentially invalid waiver of rights. This is a core function of the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus, jurisdiction over which is preserved for federal district courts even under the restrictive framework of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

Because Mr. Sambissa's cognitive impairment potentially nullifies his purported waiver of judicial review, This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§2241 to hear his constitutional claim and the inherent authority to issue an injunction to preserve its jurisdiction while it considers the claim. To permit the government to remove him at this juncture would moot the habeas petition and deny Mr. Sambissa his constitutional right to due process.

#### II. Factual and Procedural Background

Mr. Christopher Sambissa entered the United States under the

VWP but overstayed his authorized period. After being arrested by ICE, he was placed into expedited removal proceedings, and DHS relied on his VWP entry as evidence of a valid waiver of his right to judicial review.

Petitioner subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. §2241 asserting that his detention was unlawful because he was not issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) and was not provided a bond hearing before an immigration judge,

In its response, the government raised the VWP waiver, which prompted Petitioner to raise the issue of Mr. Sambissa's cognitive impairment. See Exhibit A. This was not previously an issue because the government, through its actions, had not relied on the VWP waiver until its response to the habeas petition.

The government is now attempting to affect Mr. Sambissa's expedited removal before the Court can rule on the habeas petition. Petitioner filed an emergency injunction to prevent the removal. The Court ordered this supplemental briefing to address its jurisdiction to issue such an injunction under 8 U.S.C. §1252.

### III. Legal Argument

- A. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §2241 to consider Mr. Sambissa's constitutional challenge to his detention.
  - The Suspension Clause and habeas jurisdiction survive the . INA's jurisdictional stripping provisions.

The writ of habeas corpus is a fundamental constitutional right. While congress can regulate federal court jurisdiction, it cannot eliminate the core function of the writ. The Suspension clause of the Constitution states that "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it." The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that Congress must provide an "adequate and effective" alternative if it seeks to limit habeas jurisdiction. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); See also; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).

2. The INA preserves habeas jurisdiction for challenges to detention.

The INA's jurisdiction stripping provisions, particularly 8 U.S.C. \$1252, limit judicial review of certain immigration decisions but do not limit habeas jurisdiction for constitutional challenges to detention itself.

- INS v. St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289 (2001): The Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. \$1252(a)(2) did not repeal habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \$2241 to challenge final orders of removal based on legal errors. The Court recognized that eliminating such review would raise serious constitutional questions under the Suspension Clause.
- Demore v. Kim 538 U.S. 510 (2003): The Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. §1226(e, a jurisdictional bar, did

hearing.

Jennings v. Rodriguez 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018): The Supreme Court, while interpreting the INA's mandatory detention provisions, confirmed that the jurisdictional bars in

not preclude a constitutional challenge to the

lawfulness of mandatory detention without a bond

over constitutional challenges to the legality and constitutionality of immigration detention.

\$\$1226(e) and 1252 (b) (9) do not strip federal courts

- Nielsen v. Preap 139 S.Ct. 954 (2019): The Supreme Court
  affirmed the principle that constitutional challenges to
  detention are not barred by the INA's stripping
  provision.
- 3. Mr. Sambissa's claim is a constitutional challenge to his detention, not a review of a discretionary decision.

Mr. Sambissa is not challenging a discretionary decision by DHS to remove him. Instead, he is challenging the fundamental premise of his expedited removal: that his entry under the VWP constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to hearing. This is a due process claim regarding the validity of the waiver, which directly relates to the legality of his detention. The issue of cognitive impairment challenges the voluntariness and validity of that waiver, implicating fundamental due process rights.

B. This Court has inherent authority to preserve its habeas jurisdiction via an injunction.

## 1. The All-Writs Act and inherent power to issue injunctions.

Federal courts possess the inherent power to issue all necessary and appropriate writs to preserve their jurisdiction. The All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651, codifies this power. This power includes the authority to prevent the government from mooting a habeas petition by removing the petitioner before the court has an opportunity to rule on the merits.

The government cannot moot a habeas petition by removing the petitioner.

The Fifth Circuit and other circuit courts have consistently recognized a district court's ability to issue an injunction to maintain jurisdiction over a habeas petition.

- Perales v. Reno 516 U.S. 1043 (1996): The Fifth Circuit held that a district court has the power to issue an injunction to preserve its jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition. The Court noted that without this power, the government could unilaterally frustrate the court's jurisdiction by removing the petitioner, thereby nullifying the purpose of the habeas petition.
- Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678 (2001): The Supreme Court addressed the limitation of indefinite detention, underscoring the importance of judicial review over the legality of detention. The logical extension of this holding is that courts must be able to protect their ability to conduct such review.

3. The INA's jurisdictional bars do not preclude an injunction to preserve habeas jurisdiction.

While 8 U.S.C. §1252 contains provisions that limit judicial authority to enjoin removal, these provisions apply to challenges to the *merits* of a final order of removal, not to the court's authority to protect its own jurisdiction over a habeas petition.

- 8 U.S.C. \$1252(f)(2) states "no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law." This provision, however, does not preclude a court from temporarily staying a removal to address a constitutional challenge to the legality of the underlying detention via habeas corpus.
- The Supreme Court's decision in *Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez* 596 U.S. 543 (2022), which interpreted the limitations of \$1252(f)(1) on class-wide injunctive relief, does not impact a district court's ability to issue an injunction regarding an individual's habeas petition. A habeas petition is an individualized challenge to detention, not a class-wide injunction.
- C. Mr. Sambissa's cognitive impairment invalidates the VWP waiver, creating a colorable constitutional claim.
- A valid waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing and voluntary.

A waiver of fundamental rights, including the right to a judicial hearing, must be executed knowingly and voluntarily. The Supreme Court has long held that a waiver is not valid if it is not made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right abandoned and the consequences of the decision.

- 2. Cognitive impairment undermines the validity of the waiver.
  Where an individual lacks the mental capacity to understand the nature of their rights or the consequences of waiving them, the waiver is invalid.
  - Godinez v. Moran 509 U.S. 389 (1993): The Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining competency to waive a right, which requires that the person have a sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. This standard is relevant to whether Sambissa could have validly waived his rights under the VWP.
- 3. The government opened the door to the cognitive impairment issue.

While the issue of cognitive impairment was not initially raised in the habeas petition, it became central to the case when the government invoked the VWP waiver in its response. The government's reliance on the waiver made the validity of that waiver a relevant and necessary issue for the Court to consider. To deny the Court the ability to examine this

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issue would effectively reward the government for its tactic of raising and then seeking to remove Mr. Sambissa to avoid scrutiny of its validity.

#### IV. Conclusion

This Court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Sambissa's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2241because his claim concerns the constitutional legality of his detention, an issue that survives the jurisdictional limitations of 8 U.S.C. §1252. Furthermore, this Court possesses the inherent authority and statutory power under the All Writs Act to issue an injunction to prevent the government from mooting the habeas petition by removing Mr. Sambissa before the Court can rule on the merits.

The government's claim of a valid VWP waiver is directly challenged by Mr. Sambissa's cognitive impairment, and the Court must have the opportunity to determine the validity of that waiver. An injunction is necessary to prevent the irreparable harm of removal and to allow the Court to fulfill its constitutional duty to review the legality of Mr. Sambissa's detention.

#### V. Prayer for Relief

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court issue an injunction enjoining the government from removing Mr. Sambissa pending ruling on the merits of his habeas corpus petition.

Dated: September 11. 2025

Darla Palacio Sambissa

Petitioner

# **EXHIBIT A**

Mental Health Documentation


# Enika Brown MSW, CLC, PPSC Certified Life Coach & Counselor

# To Whom It May Concern,

7/30/25

I am writing this letter on behalf of Christopher Sambissa who is currently involved in immigration proceedings. I have been working closely with Christopher as a life coach and personal development counselor for the past 2 years, during which time I've come to understand the nature of his cognitive impairments and the sincere efforts he makes to function day-to-day despite these limitations.

Christopher lives with cognitive disabilities that include **limited short-term** memory, difficulty with executive functioning, processing delays, and language comprehension deficits. These challenges significantly impair his ability to complete forms, follow written instructions, and engage with bureaucratic systems that require high levels of reading comprehension, sequencing, and decision-making. He struggles to understand the nuances of the English language, particularly when it comes to formal or legal writing. As a result, he has misinterpreted important documents and misunderstood instructions despite having no intention of being non-compliant.



Christopher is a dedicated father and family member. His well-being is deeply tied to his relationship with his children and his wife. Removing him from this stable, familiar environment would cause serious emotional and cognitive distress and would also separate him from the very people who provide the structure and care essential to his functioning. His family not only supports his daily life but also anchors him emotionally and helps prevent isolation and mental deterioration.

I respectfully urge the immigration department to consider the full scope of Christopher's disability and the reality that his difficulties are neurological—not intentional. He requires ongoing support to maintain safety, structure, and well-being, and his family and community play a critical role in this support system. In my professional opinion, a

disruption to that structure would be significantly harmful to his mental and emotional health.

Please feel free to contact me if you need any further information or documentation.

Sincerely,


Enika Brown MSW, CLC, PPSC Certified Life Coach & Counselor

Trika Brown



To whom this may concern,

My name is Cherelle Grant, and I am a youth mentor at Aspiration Creation Elevation. I support young people who may experience difficulties in school, come from disadvantaged communities, or face challenging home environments.



Despite these challenges, Christopher is a determined and driven individual who consistently demonstrates resilience and a strong will to succeed. Should you require any further information or have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

Cherelle Grant

Cherelle@aceciteam.com

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Darla Palacio Sambissa, hereby certify that on this date, I filed this PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL BERIEFING IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY INJUNCTION. I will furthermore mail a copy by USPS Certified Priority Mail with Return Receipts to each of the following individuals:

United States Attorney's Office Attn: AUSA Angelica Saenz 601 NW Loop 410 San Antonio, Texas 78216-5597

Dated: September 13,2025

Tale Fals

555 East Dayman Street
Long Beach, California 90806

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 525 MAGOFFIN AVE ORIGIN ID: JBPA (213) 769-3039 DARLA PALACIO SAMBISSA Envelope AP ELPA Filed 09/16/725 Page 16 of 16 (250) 8843 5773 0953 EL PASO TX 79901 LONG BEACH, CA 90806 UNITED STATES US 555 E DAYTINH ST RM 105 Recycle me. Document 32 SCHEDNES AV BBIS SCREENED BY C&3 200 1 das SEP 15 2025 Case 3:25-cv-00237-DCG

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TO UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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