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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

PEDRO VASQUEZ PERDOMO; *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; *et al.*,

Defendants.

No. 2:25-cv-05605-MEMF-SP

DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE [ECF No. 129] AND OPPOSITION TO INTERVENTION [ECF No. 61]

Hearing Date: October 2, 2025
Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: First Street Courthouse
350 West First Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Courtroom 8B
8th Floor

Hon. Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong
United States District Judge

NOTICE OF MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on October 2, 2025 at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as it may be heard, Defendants United States Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, *et al.*, will, and hereby do, move this Court for (1) an order granting reconsideration of the Court's Order Granting Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 129) pursuant to L.R. 7-18; (2) an order rescinding, *nunc pro tunc*, the Court's July 29, 2025 Order (ECF No. 129); and (3) an order denying Intervenors' Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 61). This motion will be made before the Honorable Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, United States District Judge, First Street United States Courthouse, 350 West First Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Courtroom 8B, 8th Floor.

Defendants bring this motion to reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and L.R. 7-18(c), based on a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before the Order was entered. Additionally, Defendants' opposition to the motion to intervene is based on Intervenors' lack of standing and protectable interest, and for not meeting their burden for permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (1) (B), (3).

This motion is made upon this Notice, the attached Motion to Reconsider and Opposition to Intervention, and all pleadings, records, and other documents on file with the Court in this action, and upon such oral argument as may be presented at the hearing of this motion. This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, which occurred on July 29, 2025, with both Plaintiffs and Intervenors.

Dated: August 5, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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Counsel for Defendants

I. INTRODUCTION

In part of an ongoing effort to defy federal immigration law and undermine the Constitution's federalist principles, Sanctuary City Los Angeles and eight neighboring municipalities ("Intervenors") seek to intervene in this action. All of them lack standing and cannot satisfy the requirements for intervention. Intervenors' desire for tax revenues cannot trump federal law and Congressionally mandated immigration enforcement. Rule 24 does not permit litigation as a vehicle for state municipalities' policy disagreements with Congress or the executive branch. The Intervenors lack any legally cognizable interest and have not identified an Article III injury that is fairly traceable to the seizures challenged here or redressable by the relief Plaintiffs seek. Their effort to intervene fails for four independently dispositive reasons.

First, local governments may not sue the United States as *parens patriae*, because it is the federal sovereign—not Los Angeles County—that serves as "the parent of the people." *Massachusetts v. Mellon*, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923). Second, any claimed injury to the municipal tax base is far too attenuated from the challenged encounters to support standing; if a State cannot predicate standing on such remote fiscal effects, then municipalities certainly cannot. Third, the constitutional violations Plaintiffs allege do not themselves cause a decrease in tax receipts, defeating both traceability and redressability. Fourth, the Fourth Amendment confers an individual right that cannot be asserted vicariously by a city or county. Because the Intervenors cannot meet their burden to satisfy Rule 24's adequacy-of-representation and prejudice inquiries, intervention—whether as of right or permissive—must be denied. As a result, the Court should reconsider its order granting intervention. The Court must always assure itself of jurisdiction. And the government's mistake regarding the deadline for opposition does not change this.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case has proceeded at exceptional speed. *See* ECF No. 1 (original habeas petition filed June 20, 2025); ECF No. 16 (amended complaint filed July 2, adding parties and asserting broader constitutional claims); ECF Nos. 38, 45 (Plaintiffs' ex parte applications filed July 2 and 3); ECF Nos. 70, 71 (Defendants' oppositions filed July 8); ECF Nos. 81, 82 (Plaintiffs' replies filed July 9); ECF No. 114 (oral argument held July 10). A preliminary injunction was entered just over a week after the ex parte

applications were filed. ECF No. 87 (injunction granted July 11). The Ninth Circuit denied a stay on August 1. ECF No. 94 (Defendants' motion to stay filed July 14); and *Perdomo v. Noem*, No. 25-4312 (9th Cir.), Dkts. 6, 11, 36, (Ninth Circuit stay motion filed July 14 and 17; reply on July 23).

This pace of developments has required constant attention to evolving deadlines and procedural posture. On July 8, 2025, several localities and municipalities sought to intervene in this action. The Intervenors sought to enter this litigation based on their stated interest in protecting residents from immigration-related stops and preserving local tax revenues and tourism. ECF No. 61 at 1-2.[1] In response, Defendants began preparing an opposition brief, with the intention of filing it by July 31, 2025—the deadline calculated under Local Rule 7-9, which (generally) governs motion practice in this District. However, before Defendants filed their opposition, the Court granted the Intervenors' motion to intervene. ECF No. 129. In doing so, the Court excused the Intervenors' own failure to comply with Local Rule 7-3—a cornerstone of motion practice in this District and a foundational requirement in the Court's Standing Order (Part VIII.A).[2] Though no opposition had yet been filed, the Court provided a paragraph emphasizing that its Standing Order, not the Local Rules, controlled the deadline and required any opposition to be filed within 14 days of the motion's filing. *See* ECF No. 129 at 2 & nn.1-3. That explanation signaled that the Court understood the government's silence to be a function of a good-faith misreading of the applicable deadline.

Admittedly the government's opposition brief was not filed by the deadline set forth in this Court's Standing Order. That omission was the result of an honest oversight in the midst of fast-moving litigation and ongoing efforts to adapt to the Court's specific procedural rules, which differ in material respects from the Local Rules. Defendants calculated the deadline under Local Rule 7-9, which would have made the brief due July 31, 2025—21 days before the noticed hearing date. Defendants regret the

[1] The Intervenors' "Background" fact section is rife with legal conclusions and argumentative framing—e.g., characterizing federal actions as "unlawful" or "illegal." *See* Mot. at 2-5. But "[t]he 'fact' section of a brief is for facts; it is not an opportunity to engage in imaginative additions with wanton disregard for the record." *Hart v. Parks*, 450 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court should disregard those portions accordingly.

[2] Defendants note that they met and conferred with both Plaintiffs and Intervenors simultaneously before filing this motion.

error and respectfully submit this motion for reconsideration to ensure the Court has the benefit of full briefing on a threshold jurisdictional issue—standing—that must be addressed before intervention may be granted.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), an interlocutory order that "adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *accord United States v. Martin*, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a district court has the "inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter, or revoke" interlocutory decisions until final judgment is entered). As such, where a motion to reconsider concerns interlocutory rulings, Rule 54(b) "provides the proper vehicle for requesting reconsideration of the prior order." *Jaiswal v. Dickey's Barbeque Restaurants, Inc.*, No. 23-cv-1921 JGB (SPX), 2024 WL 4720874, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2024) (quotation omitted); *see Est. of Risher v. City of Los Angeles*, 2023 WL 5506005, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2023). In this district, motions for reconsideration are also governed by Local Rule 7-18. Under L.R. 7-18, a motion for reconsideration of a court's order on any motion or application may be made on the ground, *inter alia*, of "a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before the Order was entered." L.R. 7-18(c).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 24(a)(2), an applicant seeking to intervene as of right must demonstrate that four requirements are met: (1) the intervention application is timely; (2) the applicant has a significant protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately represent the applicant's interest. *Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass'n*, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011); *Prete v. Bradbury*, 438 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2006). Permissive intervention further requires an independent basis for jurisdiction and a showing that intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of original parties' rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B), (3).

As set forth below, the Intervenors cannot meet their burden for intervention as of right or permissively—both because their asserted interests are neither legally cognizable nor distinct from those already represented, and because, as a practical matter, forcing additional parties into breakneck, high-stakes constitutional litigation would disrupt the orderly resolution of core issues already before the Court.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. The Record Demonstrates a Manifest Showing of a Failure to Consider Material Facts Presented to the Court before the Order was Entered.

The Court should grant Defendants' motion to reconsider the Court's order granting Intervenors' motion to intervene (ECF No. 129) because of a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before the Order was entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) and L.R. 7-18(c).

First, the record demonstrates that the government has made a good-faith effort to comply with all applicable deadlines under L.R. 7-9. Under the Local Rules' calculation, it appeared that the opposition to the Intervenors' motion was due on July 31, 2025, i.e., within 21 days of the motion's noticed hearing date (August 21, 2025). ECF No. 61. However, under this Court's Standing Order, the motion in opposition was due on July 22, 2025, i.e., within 14 days of the July 8, 2025 motion being filed. Standing Order, Part VIII.B.

Second, notwithstanding the Government's honest oversight, the Court has an ongoing obligation to assess Article III standing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (h), (3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."). *Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.*, 546 U.S. 500, 506-07 (2006) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.") (cleaned up).As Defendants do here, Defendants would have argued that the Intervenors lack the necessary Article III standing to enter the present litigation, which precludes this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over their claims. *See infra*. Because each of these reasons reflects a failure to consider material facts in the record, the Court should grant Defendants' motion for reconsideration of ECF No. 129 pursuant to Rule 54(b) and L.R. 7-18(c).

B. The Intervenors Lack Standing and a Protectable Interest.

As previewed above, the Intervenors lack standing to participate in this action. Article III requires "standing of all would-be intervenors." *Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle*, 162 F.3d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1998). Intervenors bear the burden of alleging facts that establish the three elements that constitute the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing," *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)—namely, that they have "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision," *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). Intervenors cannot satisfy any of the three requirements. For the same reasons, at minimum, the Intervenors cannot intervene as of right because they lack a legally protectable interest as required under Rule 24.

The Intervenors assert two primary injuries or interests—first, a guardian-like role in protecting their residents from allegedly unconstitutional seizures, and second, an interest in protecting local tax revenues and tourism. Neither theory qualifies as a cognizable Article III injury nor a protected interest under Rule 24 for four independent reasons.

First, the thrust of their motion is that the municipalities must "protect their residents" from immigration enforcement actions. Mot. at 3, 17; *see id.* 5-17. But under long-settled doctrine, municipalities may not sue the United States in a *parens patriae* capacity because the citizenry is represented by the United States. *Mellon*, 262 U.S. at 485–86; *Gov't of Manitoba v. Bernhardt*, 923 F.3d 173, 181–82 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (recognizing this bar applies to claims brought under the Administrative Procedure Act). The Intervenors try to evade *Mellon* by characterizing themselves as proprietary litigants, *see* Mot. 14-16—an exception recognized under *Mellon* that afforded courts with jurisdiction for monetary losses. *See generally, Biden v. Nebraska*, 600 U.S. 477 (2023) (recognizing state standing based on direct financial harm to a public instrumentality, but only because the entity was created by and operated for the state itself, and suffered a concrete economic loss); *see also City of Sausalito v. O'Neill*, 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing municipal standing only where the city demonstrated concrete injury to its own land-use interests, and rejecting broader claims premised on general community impacts or environmental advocacy). Contrary to their characterization, Intervenors do not seek damages or

reimbursement for any direct municipal loss. Instead, they seek forward-looking injunctive relief on behalf of their residents. However, the Ninth Circuit has determined that such claims do not provide states or localities with standing. *See Washington v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.*, 108 F.4th 1163, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2024) (no state standing for injunction against FDA because "states do not have standing to sue the federal government in a third-party *parens patriae* capacity based on alleged injuries 'to an identifiable group of individual residents.'"). In that case, the Court reasoned that "with respect to the relationship between citizens and federal action, the federal government, not the states, is the sovereign entity that acts as the ultimate parent of the country." *Id.* (cleaned up; citing *Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez*, 458 U.S. 592, 600, 607 (1982); *Mellon*, 262 U.S. 485–86). The *parens patriae* bar applies here.

Second, the municipalities also argue that federal immigration enforcement—as challenged in this case—causes economic harm by discouraging consumer activity and thereby reducing municipal tax revenue. *See* Mot. 14-16. But this theory relies on a speculative, multi-step causal chain of events which, by its own essence, fails Article III's traceability requirement. *Arizona v. Biden*, 31 F.4th 469, 474-5 (6th Cir. 2022) (holding that states failed to make a strong showing that they had standing because they failed to "connect the dots" between their alleged harm and the challenged conduct). In a similar case raising a similar "injury," the Supreme Court found that Texas lacked standing to sue the federal government to enforce immigration laws even though Texas claimed it incurred expenses in dealing with more illegal immigrants. *United States v. Texas*, 599 U.S. 670, 676, 143 S. Ct. 1964, 1970, 216 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2023). If a sovereign state cannot rely on such an attenuated chain of causation, then a municipality certainly cannot. *See also City of Oakland v. BP*, 969 F.3d 895, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that municipal fiscal injuries were too indirect to support standing).

Third, even if the alleged tax losses were sufficient to satisfy the injury requirement, such loss is not "fairly traceable" to the alleged constitutional violations in this case. Municipal revenues depend on countless independent economic decisions. The allegedly unlawful stops Plaintiffs seek to enjoin have no direct connection to tax losses. At most, the Intervenor cities might lose some tax revenue if people within their city limits are detained for a long period or deported. But that will not be remedied by

enjoining the government from using certain factors to conduct stops. Though surely hampered by burdensome and intrusive orders, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement will still conduct investigatory stops, detain illegal aliens, and deport them. So it is totally speculative, if not completely unlikely, that a court order could redress the Intervenors' alleged injury. *See Dep't of Educ. v. Brown*, 600 U.S. 551, 561 (2023) ("it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.").

The Intervenor's alleged tax losses actually prove too much: if the relief this Court grants slows federal immigration enforcement *so much* that it has a noticeable impact on the Los Angeles City Treasury, then the Order is indeed overbroad and thwarts federal immigration law as Defendants have argued elsewhere. *See* Defendants' Ex Parte Application for Stay of Order, ECF No. 94 at 13-14. Even still, the relief is disconnected from the alleged harm because such relief would not compel anyone to shop, dine, vacation, or otherwise conduct business in the affected jurisdictions—except, perhaps, government attorneys. Intervenors would have a lengthy string of dots to connect in order to establish that the challenged conduct is connected to their alleged injury—a burden that they must satisfy in order to be able to participate in this litigation in the first place. Moreover, the Intervenors would have to show that countless other potentially overriding causal factors are somehow unrelated to their alleged tax losses. Notably, the Intervenors failed to quantify the alleged tax revenue losses sustained as a result of Defendants' immigration enforcement activities—which makes their alleged injury too speculative and conclusory to establish Article III standing. The Intervenors thus have failed to meet their burden of showing their alleged injuries are caused by the federal immigration enforcement actions at issue in this case and that such injuries can be redressed by this Court, as required for demonstrating Article III standing.

Fourth, the Intervenors cannot assert Fourth Amendment rights that belong only to the individuals who were stopped. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." *Alderman v. United States*, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); *see also Rakas v. Illinois*, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). And the Ninth Circuit has held that even a family member of the injured person lacks standing to bring an illegal search and seizure

claim. *See Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs.*, 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the Fourth Amendment does not allow for third party standing, especially to seek sweeping injunctive relief, given such relief is highly fact specific and individualized. *See* Orin S. Kerr, *The Limits of Fourth Amendment Injunctions*, 7 J. on Telecommc'ns & High Tech. L. 127, 129 (2009) ("Fourth Amendment doctrine is tremendously fact-specific: every fact pattern is different, and even the exceptions to the exceptions have their own exceptions. Courts are poorly suited to design broad injunctive relief in this setting.").

While the Ninth Circuit distinguished this precedent as focused on the exclusion of evidence or section 1983 suits, the cases make no such distinction. *See Microsoft Corp. v. United States Dep't of Just.*, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 912–13 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (collecting cases). Nor did the court point to contrary authority. Indeed, section 1983 is commonly used to seek injunctive relief against state actors. *See Price v. City of Stockton*, 390 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004). And the Second Circuit has long held that "an organization does not have standing to assert the rights of its members in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983" because it secures personal rights. *Knife Rts., Inc. v. Vance*, 802 F.3d 377, 387 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting *Nnebe v. Daus*, 644 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011)). That is doubly true for Fourth Amendment challenges to detentive stops, as reasonable suspicion is based on the "totality of the circumstances" and "individualized suspicion of the particular person to be stopped." *United States v. Bravo*, 295 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002); *United States v. Weaver*, 9 F.4th 129, 151 (2d Cir. 2021) (location supported reasonable suspicion because "individualized inquiry is always required in a reasonable suspicion analysis."). So there is no standing for an organization, much less municipalities, to bring Fourth Amendment claims on behalf of individuals.

Because the Intervenors lack any cognizable injury, much less a protectable interest, disposition of this action cannot legally impair them. *Prete*, 438 F.3d at 956. That alone defeats their claim to intervention as of right. Moreover, the United States adequately represents any remaining interest the municipalities might assert. Where, as here, the federal government is defending its own policies, adequacy of representation is presumed. *Perry v. Schwarzenegger*, 630 F.3d 898, 915 (9th Cir. 2011);

Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the Intervenors fail to satisfy the requirements under Rule 24 to intervene in this action.

Accordingly, the municipalities lack standing or a protectable interest, so intervention as of right is unavailable.

C. The Intervenors Have Not Met Their Burden for Permissive Intervention.

The Court should also decline permissive intervention because the municipalities lack standing (as explained *supra*), their claims do not promote common-question efficiencies, and their participation would prejudice the existing parties and disrupt the Court's management of this high-impact, fast-moving litigation.

Permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) requires three elements: an independent jurisdictional basis, a common question of law or fact, and a showing that intervention will not cause undue delay or prejudice to the existing parties. *Blum v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc.*, 712 F.3d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 2013). The municipalities satisfy none.

First, the municipalities cannot establish an independent basis for jurisdiction. As discussed above, they lack Article III standing—an essential prerequisite to permissive intervention. *Freedom from Religion Found. v. Geithner*, 644 F.3d 836, 844 (9th Cir. 2011). Their motion asserts that jurisdiction is satisfied under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Mot. at 21, but cites no authority holding that generalized economic concerns or asserted harm to non-party residents qualifies under Article III. Without a cognizable injury, their proposed claims cannot proceed in federal court.

Second, their participation would not streamline the resolution of any common question. The operative complaint concerns whether targeted immigration enforcement efforts violated the Fourth Amendment and whether organizational Plaintiffs' members have been impacted by the same. ECF No. 16. The municipalities, by contrast, seek to inject broader concerns about local policing priorities, city expenditures, and the effects of immigration enforcement on residents and businesses. ECF No. 61. These municipal concerns are not only broader in scope—they are fundamentally distinct from the individualized constitutional questions before the Court.

Third, far from promoting judicial efficiency, their intervention would expand discovery and briefing well beyond the scope of the TRO and preliminary-injunction proceedings, thereby causing undue delay and prejudice. Their motion attempts to undermine this risk, asserting without explanation that because they filed their motion early in the litigation, the parties would suffer no prejudice and that the intervention will not cause disruption or delay. Mot. at 20. But their own conduct belies that claim: they filed an ex parte application demanding that their motion be heard just days after filing, with briefing compressed into a single week. ECF No. 93. That attempt to accelerate proceedings underscores the procedural burden their participation would impose—not just on the government, but on the Court itself. Rule 24(b) does not require existing parties to absorb that disruption, especially where, as here, preliminary-injunction briefing and a stay motion are already pending.

Because the Intervenors lack standing, raise no genuinely common legal questions, and threaten to complicate and delay these proceedings, permissive intervention should be denied.

V. CONCLUSION

The Intervenors lack a cognizable Article III injury, have no legally protectable interest, cannot overcome the *parens patriae* bar, and are already adequately represented by the United States. Each of these defects independently precludes intervention under Rule 24. Accordingly, the Court should grant Defendants' motion to reconsider and rescind, *nunc pro tunc*, the July 29, 2025 Order granting the Intervenors' motion to intervene (ECF No. 129), so that the docket reflects that intervention was improperly granted.

Dated: August 5, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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Counsel for Defendants

L.R. 11-6.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that this filing is less than twenty-five (25) pages, which complies with L.R. 11-6.1 and this Court's Standing Order, Part VIII.C.

Dated: August 5, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Aniello DeSimone
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U.S. Department of Justice

Counsel for Defendants

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

PEDRO VASQUEZ PERDOMO; *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; *et al.*,

Defendants.

No. 2:25-cv-05605-MEMF-SP

[PROPOSED] ORDER ON: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE [ECF NO. 129] AND OPPOSITION TO INTERVENTION [ECF NO. 61]

Hon. Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong
United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's July 29, 2025 Order granting the Intervenors' Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 129). Having considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, and good cause appearing:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED;
2. The Court's July 29, 2025 Order granting the Intervenors' Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 129) is hereby RESCINDED *nunc pro tunc*; and
3. The Intervenors' Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 61) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HON. MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE