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12	FOR THE CENTRAL D	ISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
13	Pedro VASQUEZ PERDOMO, et al,	No. 2:25-cv-05605-MEMF-SP
14	Petitioners-Plaintiffs,	RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER CARLOS OSORTO'S EX
14 15	Petitioners-Plaintiffs, v.	PETITIONER CARLOS OSORTO'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RELEASE
	v. Kristi NOEM, Secretary, Department of	PETITIONER CARLOS OSORTO'S EX
15	v.	PETITIONER CARLOS OSORTO'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RELEASE FROM IMMIGRATION CUSTODY Honorable Sheri Pvm
15 16	v. Kristi NOEM, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al,	PETITIONER CARLOS OSORTO'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RELEASE FROM IMMIGRATION CUSTODY
15 16 17 18	v. Kristi NOEM, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al,	PETITIONER CARLOS OSORTO'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RELEASE FROM IMMIGRATION CUSTODY Honorable Sheri Pvm
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I. INTRODUCTION

In an "extraordinary case[,]" a federal judge has the "authority to release detainees on bail while their habeas cases are pending." *Zepeda Rivas v. Jennings*, <u>445 F. Supp. 3d</u> <u>36. 41</u> (N.D. Cal. 2020). Petitioner fails to present such an extraordinary case here.

Respondents agree that Petitioner should receive a second bond hearing before the Immigration Court, and that there is jurisdiction for the Immigration Court to reach the merits of that bond hearing. Respondents oppose Petitioner's Application, however, insofar as it attempts to circumvent that bond hearing process in Immigration Court via an *ex parte* application ordering his release. Appreciating the Petitioner's concerns, while preserving the Immigration Judge's inherent authority over this process, the bond hearing should instead be held in the Immigration Court, as the parties have requested. That will ensure the proper process is timely followed, and that a bond hearing is held on the merits without requiring extraordinary interference with the Immigration Court.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 1, 2025, the Court "order[ed] that counsel must immediately advise the Court of any change in Petitioners' status, including with respect to bond hearings." <u>Dkt.</u> 15. Following this Order, the parties have filed Joint Notices. Dkts. 62 & 106. The only Petitioner still in custody is Mr. Osorto ("Petitioner").

On Wednesday, July 16, 2025, the Immigration Judge denied Petitioner's bond on the grounds that there was a lack of jurisdiction. *See* Declaration of Pauline Alarcon (Alarcon Decl. ¶ 2). The next day, the parties filed a Joint Notice providing, in relevant part,

Following a conference of the parties' counsel on the subject, Respondents will promptly request that Mr. Osorto receive an expedited bond hearing, and will agree there is jurisdiction for a bond hearing for him.

Dkt. 106.

On Thursday, July 17, 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security filed a motion to schedule a bond hearing for Mr. Osorto. Alarcon Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A. But that

Motion received a Rejection Notice from the Immigration Court, indicating that it had been "Incorrectly Filed (Wrong eROP)." *Id.*, Ex. B.

On Friday, July 18, 2025, Respondents' undersigned counsel received an electronic copy of the Department's renewed motion to schedule a bond hearing for Mr. Osorto in the Immigration Court, intended to correct the filing problem. Alarcon Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C. That motion indicates that the Department requests "a notice of hearing for redetermination of custody as soon as practicable." *Id.* Respondents' undersigned counsel understands that this renewed Motion has not yet been filed in the Immigration Court, however, due to a clerical processing issue, which the Department is working to promptly resolve. *Id.*

That same day of July 18, 2025, Petitioners' counsel filed a "Renewed Motion for Bond Redetermination Hearing Based on DHS Stipulation to Jurisdiction." Alarcon Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. D. That Renewed Motion is currently pending in the Immigration Court.

III. ARGUMENT

The Application improperly attempts to circumvent the pending bond process by requesting that this Court "grant his release from custody[.]" Application 2:14-15. The Application attempts to undercut this standardized bond process by extraordinary *ex parte* relief, as opposed to facilitating the proper functioning of the Immigration Court.

First, it is the Immigration Judge's responsibility to hold a bond hearing. See Immigration Court Practice Manual, § 9.3(e) Bond Proceedings, 2018 WL 4233170 ("In a bond hearing, the immigration judge determines whether the [noncitizen] is eligible for bond. If the [noncitizen] is eligible for bond, the immigration judge considers whether [the noncitizen's] release would pose a danger to property or persons, whether the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for further immigration proceedings, and whether the [noncitizen] is a threat to national security. In general, bond hearings are less formal than hearings in removal proceedings."). Here, by an ex parte Application, Petitioner is attempting to strip the Immigration Judge of this central authority and expertise.

As set forth in the Immigration Court Practice Manual, it is the Immigration

Judge's responsibility to determine whether Petitioner is eligible for bond, following established processes. By contrast, the Application fails to sufficiently address whether Petitioner poses a danger, is likely to appear for future immigration proceedings, and possesses a threat to national security—basic issues that would need to be considered to make any proper release decision. Moreover, the Application also fails to offer any support as to why \$5,000.00 would constitute a reasonable bond.

Second, Mr. Osorto's Renewed Motion for Bond Redetermination Hearing Based on DHS Stipulation to Jurisdiction is currently pending in Immigration Court (filed Friday, July 18, 2025), and the Department has in turn drafted a Motion to Schedule Bond Hearing to be filed in Immigration Court. Thus, this exact issue is already being raised in the Immigration Court by both parties. The Application fails to establish that the Immigration Court must be circumvented by ordering the same relief in another forum, especially on the basis of an incomplete ex parte Application record.

Third, to the extent Petitioner complains of delays in getting the bond hearing, the Application fails to establish that ordering Petitioner's outright immediate release would be a narrowly tailored injunctive remedy for resolving such delays. That is because it would not be narrowly tailored. Cf. Angel v. Duke, 2017 WL 11698492, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017) ("rather than granting release from detention, a bond hearing before an immigration judge is a more appropriate remedy").

As to Petitioner's stated health concerns, the information set forth in the Application is both conflicting and limited. *Compare* Application 9:6-7 ("[Petitioner] has a history of high blood pressure") with Decl. of Carlos Alexander Osorto ¶ 12 ("The doctor who screened me [at Adelanto ICE Processing Center] told me I have dangerously high blood pressure. I have never had high blood pressure before[.]"). Medication intended to help control high blood pressure is not normally hard to provide if it is genuinely appropriate and has actually been prescribed by a physician; it does not require release as the remedy. Moreover, the attorney declaration concedes that Petitioner has received medical care and medication during his detention. Decl. of

Michael Caleb Soto ¶ 3.

To the extent the Application raises concerns with Petitioner having high blood pressure, the Application does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that this issue has not been identified and is not being appropriately controlled. Indeed, to the extent Petitioner's declaration recounts his own understanding on this point, it suggests that his blood pressure was not identified or addressed with prescribed continuing medication prior to his arrest and detention, and that the medical processes in place at Adelanto are the first time Petitioner has received appreciable medical attention for such a condition. Certainly, the Application does not establish that he has a specific need in this context that is being subjected to deliberate indifference, much less a degree of indifference requiring immediate release via habeas jurisdiction as its proper remedy.

Accordingly, Petitioner's request for release on bond should be resolved by the Immigration Court, consistent with the parties' submissions on that point. During the second bond hearing, as it has previously stated, the Department "will agree there is jurisdiction for a bond hearing for him." <u>Dkt. 106</u>.

IV. CONCLUSION

Respondents respectfully request that the ex parte Application be denied.

19 Dated: July 22, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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