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# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Vladislav Ishmuratov,

No. CV-25-01366-PHX-JAT (ESW)

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITIONER'S MOTION

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Petitioner,

V.

David R. Rivas, et al.,

Respondents.

FOR DISCOVERY

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#### INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is a habeas case in which Petitioner claims his detention pursuant to a final removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is prolonged and unconstitutional as defined by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The lone and demonstrably false allegation Petitioner asserts in support of his habeas petition is that he is allegedly "stateless" because Russia does not recognize him as a citizen—therefore, because the government cannot remove him there, there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and he is entitled to release under Zadvydas. Id.; see Doc. 1.

However, the clear and undisputed facts establish that he is indeed a native and citizen of Russia. See generally Doc. 25, Exhibit A. His birth certificate states that he was born in Russia. Id. The government of Russia has issued him a passport. Id. Though his

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parents' birth certificates indicate their nationality is Tatar, which is a region of Russia, they too were born in Russia and are Russian citizens. *Id*.

Petitioner entered the United States on his Russian passport with a B-2 visitor visa indicating that his nationality is Russian. Doc. 25, Ex. A ¶ 9. He overstayed his visa in violation of United States immigration law and has remained unlawfully in the United States until the present time. *Id.* ¶ 11. Since overstaying his visa, Petitioner has been convicted of several crimes. *Id.* ¶ 12. As a result of his criminal convictions, he was placed in removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge (IJ) who ordered him removed from the United States to Russia in 2017. *Id.* ¶ 13. The removal order became administratively final when Petitioner waived appeal of the IJ's order on December 13, 2017. *Id.* ¶ 14. Therefore, Petitioner was detained pursuant to the final removal order as of December 13, 2017 under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. On August 20, 2018, Petitioner was released on an order of supervision. *Id.* ¶ 17. Petitioner remained under supervision until March 26, 2025, when ICE re-detained Petitioner following Petitioner's drug related offenses and an arrest which violated his order of supervision. *Id.* ¶ 24. Petitioner has remained detained since March 26, 2025 (approximately two months) while ICE arranges for the required travel documents from Russia to execute the final removal order. *Id.* ¶¶ 24-28.

In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court defined six months as a presumptively reasonable period of detention for aliens, like Petitioner, who are detained under section 1231(a). Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701-702. Zadvydas places the burden on the alien to show, after a detention period of six months, that there is "good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." *Id.* at 701. If the alien makes that showing, the government must then introduce evidence to refute that assertion to keep the alien in custody. *See id.*; *see also Xi v. I.N.S.*, 298 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner's motion for limited discovery in the context of this habeas petition is based on the sheer speculation that with limited discovery Petitioner could establish that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future on the

basis of his unsupported assertion that he is "stateless" and not a Russian citizen. The Court should deny the motion for several reasons. First, Petitioner is not entitled to discovery in the context of a habeas petition and fails to establish good cause to conduct discovery where the uncontroverted evidence establishes that he is in fact a Russian citizen. As stated, Petitioner's passport was issued by Russia. Petitioner's birth certificate indicates he was born in Russia. Petitioner's visa indicates he is a Russian national. Petitioner's claim that Russia does not recognize him as a citizen is therefore demonstrably false. Petitioner has identified no additional discovery which would allow him to overcome the uncontroverted evidence establishing his Russian citizenship.

Second, the requested discovery into Petitioner's prior removal proceedings is not relevant and has no bearing on whether the government can currently execute the final removal order in the reasonably foreseeable future—which is the only issue in this case. Third, Petitioner's proposed discovery requests are overbroad and seek irrelevant and privileged information from Petitioner's Alien-File that would not change the outcome of this case or establish his entitlement to relief. Finally, even if Petitioner were entitled to all the discovery he seeks and could establish that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government has already rebutted such a showing by establishing that there is a likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future as it has continued to successfully coordinate with the Russian government to obtain Petitioner's travel documents. See generally Doc. 25.

For these reasons, any discovery—even limited discovery—would be futile and a waste of judicial resources. The Court should deny Petitioner's motion for limited discovery in this habeas case because Petitioner fails to establish good cause.

### **ARGUMENT**

 Discovery is not permitted in the context of a habeas petition absent good cause.

A habeas petitioner is not entitled to discovery "as a matter of ordinary course." *Bracy* v. *Gramley*, 520 U.S. 899, 904, (1997); see Campbell v. Blodgett, 982 F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th

Cir. 1993). Indeed, there is no general right to discovery in habeas proceedings. *See Campbell v. Blodgett*, 982 F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir.1993). Rather, Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that "[a] judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery." Rule 6(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254.

Whether a petitioner has established "good cause" for discovery requires a habeas court to determine the essential elements of the petitioner's substantive claim and evaluate whether "specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is...entitled to relief." *Bracy*, 520 U.S. at 908–09. Conversely, good cause "cannot arise from mere speculation" and "cannot be ordered on the basis of pure hypothesis[.]" *Arthur v. Allen*, 459 F.3d 1310, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006); *see also Farrow v. United States*, 580 F.2d 1339, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978) (denying further discovery because appellant failed to present more than conclusory allegations).

## II. Petitioner cannot establish good cause for discovery in this habeas case.

Establishing good cause for discovery in a habeas case turns on the essential elements of a Petitioner's claim and whether specific allegations have been made before the Court that, if these factual allegations were fully developed, the Petitioner would be able to demonstrate entitlement to relief. *Bracy*, 520 U.S. at 908–09. Because none of the requested discovery could possibly establish that Petitioner is not a Russian citizen and therefore entitled to the relief he seeks—release from custody—there is no good cause warranting discovery.

Here, the substantive elements of Petitioner's claim in this habeas petition requesting his release from custody is that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future such that his approximately two-month detention is unreasonable and unconstitutionally prolonged under *Zadvydas*. Doc. 1. To establish that there is no likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future Petitioner claims that he is "stateless" and Russia does not recognize him as a citizen and that accordingly

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because the government cannot return him there, there is no significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future.

Therefore, to establish good cause warranting discovery Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating to the Court that with the additional limited discovery requested Petitioner could demonstrate that he is "stateless" and not a Russian citizen such that no country will accept him and he is therefore entitled to the relief he seeks—release from custody.

However none of the discovery requested can establish that Petitioner is stateless in the face of the direct and uncontroverted evidence the government has provided to the contrary. Indeed, the government can establish that Petitioner is in fact a native and citizen of Russia. Doc. 25, Ex. A. Petitioner's birth certificate establishes he was born in Russia. Id. His parents were born in Russia. Id. Russia has issued him a passport. Id. The visa he received from the State Department indicates Petitioner is Russian. Id. No discovery is required for Petitioner to access his own birth certificate, visa and passport all of which establish that he is indeed a Russian citizen. Accordingly, none of the additional documents requested in Petitioner's motion for limited discovery can prove that he is stateless in light of this clear evidence to the contrary. Petitioner fails to establish good cause for discovery.

Specifically, in his request for limited discovery, Petitioner requests information related to the removal proceedings which resulted in the final order of removal which now provides the basis for his detention. Doc. 26 at p. 3 ¶¶ 1-3. He requests the application for relief from removal submitted to the IJ, transcripts of the proceedings and the notice to appear in removal proceedings. Id. None of these documents can establish, or are relevant, to Petitioner's sole allegation that his detention is indefinite under Zadvydas because he is stateless and cannot be removed to Russia. His underlying removal proceedings are simply not relevant to the sole issue in this habeas case—whether Petitioner currently can be removed to Russia in the reasonably foreseeable future. Further, it is highly unlikely that any information from Petitioner's removal proceedings would prove his allegation that he is not a Russian citizen, where the IJ ordered him removed to Russia. Doc. 25, Ex. A ¶ 13. There is simply no good cause for discovery where the information requested is not relevant and even if provided would have no bearing on Petitioner's entitlement to relief.

Next, Petitioner's request for the United States government's communications with the Russian government seek highly-sensitive privileged law enforcement and diplomatic communications. Doc. 26 at p. 3 ¶¶ 5-7. More importantly, given the fact that the Russian Embassy is currently coordinating with Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), and has not indicated that Petitioner is not a Russian citizen to ICE, it is unlikely that any information in these privileged law enforcement sensitive and diplomatic communications would prove that Petitioner is not a Russian citizen—certainly not in the face of the overwhelming record evidence indicating that he is in fact a Russian citizen.

Petitioner also requests records of his orders of supervision Doc. 26 at p. 3 ¶ 8. These orders have been provided to Petitioner and more importantly, do not contain any information that would bolster Petitioner's allegation that he is "stateless" and not a Russian citizen. Petitioner also identifies any and all documents related to Petitioner's custody reviews during the entire time he has been in ICE custody. *Id.* at ¶¶ 9-10. However, the only relevant time frame to Petitioner's habeas petition is during his current ICE custody since March 26, 2025. Further, any custody review is not relevant to, and does not contain information that could support, Petitioner's allegation that he is not a Russian citizen and is therefore not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. Finally, there has been no determination by ICE regarding whether there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future under 8 C.F.R. § 241.3. Doc. 26 at 4 ¶ 11. Rather, that is the issue before this Court and for all the reasons argued in the Response to Petitioner's habeas petition, the Court should find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. *See* Doc. 25.

In sum, the only issue before the Court raised by the habeas petition is whether Petitioner has established that his current approximately two-month detention is unconstitutionally prolonged under *Zadvydas*. The lone allegation that Petitioner makes in support of this contention is that he is "stateless" and Russia does not recognize him as a citizen. Because the uncontroverted evidence, namely Petitioner's passport, birth certificate and visa, all indicate the Petitioner is a native and citizen of Russian, there is no

Case 2:25-cv-01366-MTL-ESW	Document 29	Filed 06/02/25	Page 7 of 8

good cause for further discovery on this issue. The Court should deny Petitioner's motion for limited discovery in support of the habeas petition.

Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of June, 2025.

TIMOTHY COURCHAINE United States Attorney District of Arizona

s/Theo Nickerson
THEO NICKERSON
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on June 2, 2025, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and mailed a copy by U.S. Mail of the same to the following individual, who is not registered in the CM/ECF System:

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s/ Mary Simeonoff
United States Attorney's Office