1	BILAL A. ESSAYLI		
2	Acting United States Attorney DAVID M. HARRIS Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Civil Division DANIEL A. BECK Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Complex and Defensive Litigation Section		
3			
4			
5	Chief, Complex and Defensive Litigation S RANDY HSIEH (Cal. Bar No. 312087) Assistant United States Attorney		
6			
7	Los Angeles, California 90012		
8	Telephone: (213) 894-6585 Facsimile: (213) 894-7819		
	Email: Randy.Hsieh@usdoj.gov		
9	Attorneys for Federal Respondents		
0			
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
12	FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
13	EASTERN DIVISION		
14			
15	GURKAN SOYKAN,	No. 5:25-cv-00877-DSF-AS	
	Petitioner,	FEDERAL RESPONDENTS' RETURN TO PETITIONER GURKAN	
16	V.	SOYKAN'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF	
17	SECRETARY OF THE	HABEAS CORPUS	
18	DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Kristi Noem; ACTING COMMISSIONER OF U.S.	[Filed Concurrently with the <u>Declaration</u> of Rogelio A. Torres]	
19	COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER	Honorable Alka Sagar	
20	PROTECTION, Pete R. Flores; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE	United States Magistrate Judge	
21	U.S., Pam Bondi; DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND		
22	U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES. Andrew		
23	IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Andrew J. Davidson; WARDEN OF ADELANTO ICE PROCESSING		
	CENTER, James Janecka,		
24	Respondents.		
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Gurkan Soykan ("Petitioner") brings this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his detention pending resolution of removal proceedings under <u>8 U.S.C.</u> <u>§ 1231(a)(6)</u>. <u>Dkt. 1</u> ("Petition" or "Pet."), Ex. A. The Petition should be denied because Petitioner fails to state a claim for habeas relief. Petitioner was and has been lawfully detained under <u>8 U.S.C.</u> <u>§ 1226(a)</u>, which authorizes the detention of aliens pending the resolution of removal proceedings. Petitioner appeared before an immigration judge ("IJ") who ordered his removal, which Petitioner is appealing before the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). Moreover, Petitioner was entitled to—and was afforded—a *Rodriguez* bond hearing during his removal proceeding, and the IJ found that Petitioner would pose a danger to the community due to his numerous driving under the influence of alcohol and other convictions. Pet., Ex. C. Thus, Petitioner has received all due process to which he is entitled and his continued detention pending the resolution of his removal proceedings to Turkey (Türkiye) is lawful. Respondents respectfully request that the Court dismiss and deny the Petition. The Respondents do not contend that an evidentiary hearing is needed to resolve the issues in this case.

II. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Petitioner's Entry into The United States And Criminal Convictions

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Turkey (Türkiye). Pet., Ex. B; <u>Declaration of Rogelio A. Torres</u> ("Torres Decl.") ¶ 2. He entered the United States in 2007 on an F-1 student visa. Pet. at 2; Torres Decl. ¶ 2. On April 3, 2011, Petitioner's student status was terminated. Torres Decl. ¶ 2.

On July 24, 2012, Petitioner was convicted in the Los Angeles Superior Court, Torrance Courthouse, for the offense of Loud or Unreasonable Noise, in violation of California Penal Code ("CPC") § 415(2), a misdemeanor. *Id.* ¶ 3. On or about April 21, 2013, Petitioner was arrested on a warrant for the charge of Embezzlement in violation of CPC § 503 and the charge of Loud and Unreasonable Noise. *Id.* ¶ 4.

On or about April 22, 2013, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") encountered Petitioner while conducting record checks on incarcerated individuals due to his criminal arrest on April 21, 2013, and ICE lodged an Immigration Detainer. *Id.* ¶ 5. On April 30, 2013, Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of California, Torrance, for the misdemeanor offense of Taking a Vehicle Without Owner's Consent, in violation of California Vehicle Code ("CVC") § 10851(A), and was sentenced to 20 days in jail and 3 years of probation. *Id.* ¶ 6. On or about May 2, 2013, the Immigration Detainer was honored and ICE arrested Petitioner upon his release from jail. *Id.* ¶ 7. That same day, ICE released Petitioner on an order of recognizance and served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him as subject to removal pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 237(a)(1)(C)(i) as alien who failed to comply with the terms of his non-immigrant status. *Id.* ¶ 8. On or about December 15, 2016, an IJ administratively closed the removal case pursuant to DHS' exercise of prosecutorial discretion ("PD"). *Id.* ¶ 9.

On July 25, 2024, Petitioner was convicted in Orange County Superior Court in three separate driving under the influence ("DUI") cases as follow:

- Case 22WM12169: two counts of the misdemeanor offenses of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, one count in violation of CVC § 23152(A) and one count of CVC § 23152(B). He was sentenced to 90 days of jail to serve concurrently with sentences of other DUI cases. *Id.* ¶ 10.
- Case 23WM03119: two counts of the misdemeanor offenses of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, one count in violation of CVC § 23152(A) and one count of CVC § 23152(B). *Id.* ¶ 11.
- Case 23WM01793: two counts of the misdemeanor offenses of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, one count in violation of CVC § 23152(A) and one count of CVC § 23152(B). Sentenced to 90 days of jail to serve concurrently with sentence for other DUI convictions on that day. *Id.* ¶ 12.

On September 6, 2024, Petitioner was convicted in the Orange County Superior Court, case 24WF2063, for the felony offense of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol

With Prior DUI conviction, in violation of CVC §§ 23550 and 23152(A), for the felony offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol With Prior DUI conviction in violation of violation of CVC §§ 23550 and 23152(B), and he was sentenced to 910 days in jail and 3 years of probation. *Id.* ¶ 13.

B. Petitioner's Removal Proceedings

On September 8, 2024, Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings and was charged with failing to maintain non-immigrant status in which he was admitted pursuant to INA §§ 237(a)(1)(C)(i). *Id.* ¶ 14. On September 11, 2024, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") re-calendared Petitioner's case due to his multiple criminal convictions (after the case was administratively closed in 2016 pursuant to DHS' exercise of prosecutorial discretion). *Id.* ¶¶ 9, 15. On November 19, 2024, an IJ found Petitioner removable as charged and Petitioner identified asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT") as relief from removal. *Id.* ¶ 16.

On December 2, 2024, an IJ denied Petitioner's request for bond pursuant to INA § 236(a), finding that Petitioner has not met his burden to show that he is not a danger to the community. *Id.* ¶ 17. On or about January 2, 2025, Petitioner filed an appeal of the IJ's bond decision with the BIA. *Id.* ¶ 19.

On February 11, 2025, Petitioner filed a Form I-589, application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under CAT. *Id.* ¶ 21. On March 19, 2025, an IJ denied Petitioner's bond request pursuant to *Rodriguez v. Robbins*, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), finding that DHS met its burden to show that Petitioner is a danger to the community. *Id.* ¶ 22; Pet. at 2, Ex. C. At the hearing, the IJ denied Petitioner's bond request because the government met its burden that if released, Petitioner would pose a danger to the community due to extensiveness of recency of his DUI convictions. Pet. at 2, Ex. C.

On or about April 18, 2025, Petitioner filed an appeal of the IJ's decision denying *Rodriguez* bond to the BIA. Torres Decl. ¶ 23. That appeal is pending. *Id*.

On May 14, 2025, the IJ denied Petitioner's asylum application because he did not meet the requirement of filing the application within one year of entry to the United States.

Torres Decl. ¶ 24. The IJ also denied Petitioner's application for withholding of removal and relief under CAT because he did not suffer any harm in Turkey and he had not demonstrated that he would suffer persecution or torture upon his return to Turkey. *Id*.

On June 5, 2025, the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal of the IJ's bond decision on December 2, 2024. *Id.* ¶ 26. On or about July 12, 2025, Petitioner filed an appeal of the IJ's decision on his I-589 asylum application to the BIA. That appeal is currently pending. *Id.* ¶ 27.

III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

Congress enacted a statutory scheme that provides for the civil detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings. *See Prieto-Romero v. Clark*, 534 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2008). Where a noncitizen falls within this statutory scheme affects whether his detention is discretionary or mandatory, as well as the kind of review process available to him. *Id.* at 1057. The statutory authority of the Attorney General to detain a noncitizen during removal proceedings, prior to a final order of removal, is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1226. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018) ("Section 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining [deportable noncitizens present in the United States] pending their removal.").

Under <u>8 U.S.C.</u> § 1226(a), the government may arrest and detain a noncitizen "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States." <u>8 U.S.C.</u> § 1226(a); *Diouf v. Napolitano*, <u>634 F.3d 1081</u>, <u>1085</u> (9th Cir. 2011) ("At all times before the removal period begins and mandatory detention is authorized by § 1231(a)(2), the [noncitizen] is subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a)."). The Attorney General¹ has the discretion to either (1) detain the noncitizen without bond or (2) release the noncitizen on bond of at least \$1,500 or on conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. §

Although immigration detention authority was transferred from the Attorney General to DHS, <u>6 U.S.C. § 251(2)</u>, immigration statutes have not been amended to reflect this change. Much of the Attorney General's authority has been transferred to the DHS Secretary and many references to the Attorney General are understood to refer to the DHS Secretary. *See Clark v. Martinez*, <u>543 U.S. 371, 374</u> n.1 (2005).

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1226(a). Every noncitizen arrested under this subsection is individually considered for release on bond. *See id.*; <u>8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)</u>. A U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officer assesses whether the noncitizen has "demonstrate[d]" that "release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for any future proceeding." <u>8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)</u>.

After the initial custody determination, the noncitizen may ask the IJ for a redetermination of the custody decision. <u>8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1)</u>, <u>1003.19</u>, <u>1236.1(d)(1)</u>. The Ninth Circuit has recognized a bond hearing before an IJ as an opportunity for a noncitizen to contest his detention "before a neutral decision maker." *Prieto-Romero*, <u>534 F.3d at 1066</u>, <u>1068</u>. An IJ's custody decision is reviewable by the BIA. *See* <u>8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(7)</u>, <u>1003.19(f)</u>, <u>1003.38</u>.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction under <u>8 U.S.C. § 1252</u>.

As a threshold matter, <u>8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g)</u> and <u>(b)(9)</u> preclude review of Petitioner's claims challenging the decision to take him into custody. Section 1252(g) deprives courts of jurisdiction, including habeas corpus jurisdiction, to review "any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to [1] *commence proceedings*, [2] adjudicate cases, or [3] execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter." <u>8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)</u> (emphasis added). Section 1252(g) eliminates jurisdiction "[e]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title." Except as provided in § 1252, courts "cannot entertain challenges to the enumerated executive branch decisions or actions." *E.F.L. v. Prim*, <u>986 F.3d 959, 964</u>–65

² Congress initially passed § 1252(g) in the IIRIRA, Pub. L. 104-208, <u>110 Stat.</u> 3009. In 2005, Congress amended § 1252(g) by adding "(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title" after "notwithstanding any other provision of law." REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 106(a), <u>119 Stat. 231</u>, <u>311</u>.

(7th Cir. 2021).

Section 1252(g) also bars district courts from hearing challenges to the *method* by which the DHS Secretary chooses to commence removal proceedings, including the decision to detain an alien pending removal. *See Alvarez v. ICE*, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016) ("By its plain terms, [§ 1252(g)] bars us from questioning ICE's discretionary decisions to commence removal" and to review "ICE's decision to take [plaintiff] into custody and to detain him during removal proceedings").

B. Petitioner Is Lawfully Detained Pending the Resolution Of His Removal Proceedings.

Petitioner cannot state a claim for habeas relief based on his detention pending the resolution of his current removal proceedings. <u>8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)</u> authorizes his detention "pending a decision on whether [he] is to be removed from the United States" on the current charge of removability. *Prieto-Romero*, <u>534 F.3d at 1059</u>. The Supreme Court has recognized that "detention during deportation proceedings [i]s a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process." *Demore v. Kim*, <u>538 U.S. 510</u>, <u>523</u> (2003). "Detention during [removal] proceedings gives immigration officials time to determine an [noncitizen]'s status without running the risk of the [noncitizen]'s either absconding or engaging in criminal activity before a final decision can be made." *Jennings*, <u>138 S. Ct. at 836</u>.

Petitioner's current removal proceedings are ongoing and progressing. He has filed an appeal of the IJ's denial of a *Rodriguez* bond denial of his I-589 relief and both are currently pending before the BIA. *See Soto v. Sessions*, 2018 WL 3619727, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 30, 2018) (concluding "no specter of indefinite detention" where noncitizen is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) pending removal). Petitioner's current detention comports with due process. *See Prieto-Romero*, 534 F.3d at 1065 (finding no constitutional violation in detention of more than three years under § 1226(a)). While Petitioner may prefer to be out of ICE custody in the current removal proceedings, Petitioner cannot establish a claim for habeas relief based on his detention pending the

resolution of his current removal proceedings.

C. Petitioner's Release Would Present a Danger to the Community.

At a bond hearing, the government is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien "is a flight risk or a danger to the community" to justify a denial of bond. Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011). While "criminal history alone will not always be sufficient to justify denial of bond...the recency and severity of the offenses" must also be considered. Id. at 1206. Indeed, in Perez v. Wolf, 445 F. Supp. 3d 275 (N.D. Cal. 2020), the court has found that an alien with five DUIs presented a danger to the community. Id. at 288. Moreover, Perez found that DUIs can form the basis of a dangerous determination. Id. at 289. Here, like in Perez, Petitioner has multiple DUI convictions, committed recently and after DHS has exercised its prosecutorial discretion and paused removal proceedings. and had his most recent (fourth) DUI conviction shortly before he was taken into immigration custody. See Torres Decl. ¶¶9-13. And like in Perez, Petitioner's most recent DUI was a felony, though he points out that it was not "aggravated." Id. ¶ 13. In total, Petitioner has been convicted of a crime on six separate occasions between 2012 and 2024 – four of which occurred in 2024. See id. ¶¶3-6, 9-13.

D. Petitioner Has Not Been Detained for an Abnormally Long Time.

At the time this action was filed, Petitioner had been detained for approximately seven months. *See* Pet. at 6. As of the filing of this motion, Petitioner has been detained for one year—a period significantly shorter than what courts have found to constitute unreasonably prolonged detention. Petitioner's own complaint undercuts his argument that continued detention is unlawful. First, he cites two Ninth Circuit cases to support his claim that the government must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is justified. *See* Pet. at 6–7 (citing *Diouf*, 634 F.3d at 1086–91 (entitlement to bond hearing); *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017) (requiring the government to prove that detention is necessary to prevent danger to the community)). Petitioner, however, received a *Rodriguez* bond hearing, as detailed above, and the IJ determined in a March 19, 2025 order that the "Government has met their burden to

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demonstrate that Respondent's release . . . would pose a danger to the community." *See* Pet. Ex. C. This directly contradicts Petitioner's assertion that he "has received none of these protections." *Id.* at 7.

Second, the Petition fails to support a claim of unreasonably prolonged detention. Petitioner cites three unpublished cases from outside this District—each involving detention periods longer than his own. See Pet. at 7 (citing Gutierrez Cupido v. Barr, 2019 WL 4861018, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2019) (16 months); Jamal v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 859 (D. Colo. 2019) (19 months); Doe v. Beth, 2019 WL 1923867, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 30, 2019) (2.5 years)). Petitioner's claim that "other courts across the country have agreed that even shorter periods of detention without meaningful review can violate due process" is unsupported. His current period of detention is materially shorter than the detention periods in each of the cited cases.

Petitioner also alleges that "[t]he government has offered no evidence that [he] presents a danger or is likely to abscond," but Petitioner confirms that he has several criminal convictions and is a repeated DUI offender. *See generally* Pet. Driving under the influence naturally poses a danger and threat to society. Petitioner has been convicted of DUI not just once, but *four* different times. *Id*.

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the Court deny the habeas petition and dismiss this action.

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1	Respectfully submitted,		
2	Dated: September 15, 2025 BILAL A. ESSAYLI		
3	Acting United States Attorney DAVID M. HARRIS		
4	Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Civil Division DANIEL A. BECK		
5	DANIEL A. BECK Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Complex and Defensive Litigation Section		
6	/s/ Randy Hsieh		
7	RANDY HSIEH Assistant United States Attorney		
8	Attorneys for Federal Defendants		
9	CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH L.R. 11-6.2		
10	The undersigned, counsel of record for the Respondents, certifies that this brief		
11			
12	contains 2,645 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.		
13	Dated: September 15, 2025 /s/ Randy Hsieh		
14 15	RANDY HSIEH		
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