


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI, FLORIDA



Smirnov Victor

Petitioner,

Vs

Kristi Noem, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security

Pamela Bondi , Attorney General of
the United States

Jose Sierra, Director of the Miami
Field Office

Respondents.

Alien #: A [REDACTED]
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241**

Petitioner respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of habeas corpus to remedy

Petitioner's unlawful detention by Respondents, as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner is currently detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") at the Miami Krome detention center pending removal proceedings.
2. Petitioner has been detained in immigration custody for over 10 months even though no neutral decision maker—whether a federal judge or an immigration judge—has conducted a hearing to determine whether this lengthy incarceration is warranted based on danger or flight

risk, the only two permissible bases for immigration detention prior to entry of an executable removal order.

3. Petitioner's prolonged detention without a hearing on danger and flight risk violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause.

4. Petitioner therefore respectfully requests that this Court issue a writ of habeas corpus, determine that Petitioner's detention is not justified because the government has not established by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of flight or danger in light of available alternatives to detention, and order Petitioner's release, with appropriate conditions of supervision if necessary, taking into account Petitioner's ability to pay a bond.

5. In the alternative, Petitioner requests that this Court issue a writ of habeas corpus and order Petitioner's release within 30 days unless Defendants schedule a hearing before an immigration judge where: (1) to continue detention, the government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of flight or danger, even after consideration of alternatives to detention that could mitigate any risk that Petitioner's release would present; and (2) if the government cannot meet its burden, the immigration judge orders Petitioner's release on appropriate conditions of supervision, taking into account Petitioner's ability to pay a bond.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. Petitioner is detained in the custody of Respondents at Miami Krome detention center.

7. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2241; the Suspension Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 2; and 5 U.S.C. § 702.

8. Congress has preserved judicial review of challenges to prolonged immigration detention. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, ___ U.S. ___, 2018 WL 1054878 at *7-*9 (Feb. 27, 2018) (holding that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(e), 1252(b)(9) do not bar review of challenges to prolonged immigration detention); *see also id.* at *44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). (“8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), . . . by its terms applies only with respect to review of an order of removal”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

9. Section 1252(f)(1) does not repeal this Court’s authority to grant the relief Petitioner seeks because, *inter alia*, Petitioner is in removal proceedings. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (exempting claims by “an individual alien against whom proceedings . . . have been initiated”); *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (Section 1252(f) “does not extend to individual cases”).

10. If Section 1252(f)(1) did bar the relief Petitioner seeks, it would violate the Suspension Clause.

11. Even if otherwise applicable, Section 1252(f)(1) does not bar declaratory relief.

VENUE

12. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because at least one Defendant is in this District, the Petitioner is detained in this District, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in this action took place in this District.

PARTIES

13. Petitioner, Smirnov Victor, is a noncitizen currently detained by Respondents pending removal proceedings.

14. Respondent Kristi Noem is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), an agency of the United States. She is responsible for the administration of the

immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). Secretary Nielsen is a legal custodian of Petitioner. She is named in her official capacity.

15. Respondent Pamela Bondi is the Attorney General of the United States and the most senior official in the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"). He has the authority to interpret the immigration laws and adjudicate removal cases. The Attorney General delegates this responsibility to the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), which administers the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). He is named in his official capacity.

16. Respondent Jose Sierra is the Field Office Director responsible for the Field Office of ICE with administrative jurisdiction over Petitioner's case. She/he is a legal custodian of Petitioner and is named in his official capacity.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

17. Petitioner is a noncitizen currently detained by Respondents pending immigration removal proceedings. Petitioner is pursuing the following application for Convention against Torture and withholding of removal.

18. Petitioner has been detained in DHS custody since April 25, 2024.

19. Petitioner has been detained by ICE for more than 11 months, yet has not been provided a bond hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine whether his prolonged detention is justified based on danger or flight risk.

20. Additional facts that support Petitioner's entitlement to relief are:

21. Petitioner has been **granted** Asylum Relief and pending BIA decision for DHS appealing his case. Petitioner have been had his case appealed by DHS from 9/19/2024

22. Petitioner have been waiting for six (6) months awaiting his decision for his appeal.

23. “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (quoting *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty” that the Due Process Clause protects. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); *see also id.* at 718 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Liberty under the Due Process Clause includes protection against unlawful or arbitrary personal restraint or detention.”). This fundamental due process protection applies to all noncitizens, including both removable and inadmissible noncitizens. *See id.* at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“both removable and inadmissible aliens are entitled to be free from detention that is arbitrary or capricious”).

24. Due process therefore requires “adequate procedural protections” to ensure that the government’s asserted justification for physical confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” *Id.* at 690 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the immigration context, the Supreme Court has recognized only two valid purposes for civil detention—to mitigate the risks of danger to the community and to prevent flight. *Id.*; *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 528.

25. Following *Zadvydas* and *Demore*, every circuit court of appeals to confront the issue has found either the immigration statutes or due process require a hearing for noncitizens subject to unreasonably prolonged detention pending removal proceedings. *See Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen.*, 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016) (detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)); *Reid v. Donelan*, 819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)); *Lora v. Shanahan*, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)); *Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez III)*, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)); *Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec.*, 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (8

U.S.C. § 1226(c)); *Diouf v. Holder (Diouf II)*, 634 F.3d 1081 (8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)); *Ly v. Hansen*, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)) (requiring release when mandatory detention exceeds a reasonable period of time).

26. Recently, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred by interpreting Sections 1226(c) and 1225(b) to require bond hearings as a matter of statutory construction. *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, ___ U.S. ___, 2018 WL 1054878 at *10 (Feb. 27, 2018). Because the Ninth Circuit had not decided whether the Constitution itself requires bond hearings in cases of prolonged detention, the Court remanded for the Ninth Circuit to address the issue. *Id.* at *10. The majority opinion did not express any views on the constitutional question, and left it to the lower courts to address the issue in the first instance.

27. Due process requires that the government provide bond hearings to noncitizens facing prolonged detention. “The Due Process Clause foresees eligibility for bail as part of due process” because “[b]ail is basic to our system of law.” *Id.* at *28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted). While the Supreme Court upheld the mandatory detention of a noncitizen under Section 1226(c) in *Demore*, it did so based on the petitioner’s concession of deportability and the Court’s understanding that detentions under Section 1226(c) are typically “brief.” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 522 n.6, 528. Where a noncitizen has been detained for a prolonged period or is pursuing a substantial defense to removal or claim to relief, due process requires an individualized determination that such a significant deprivation of liberty is warranted. *Id.* at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness” may be warranted “if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified”). *See also Jackson v. Indiana*, 406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972) (detention beyond the “initial commitment” requires additional safeguards); *McNeil v. Dir., Patuxent Inst.*, 407 U.S.

245, 249-50 (1972) (“lesser safeguards may be appropriate” for “shortterm confinement”); *Hutto v. Finney*, 437 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1978) (in Eighth Amendment context, “the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether [a] confinement meets constitutional standards”).

28. Consistent with this view, the federal courts have made clear that prolonged detention pending removal proceedings without a bond hearing likely violates due process. *See supra*; *Jennings*, 2018 WL 1054878 at *37 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (“an interpretation of the statute before us that would deny bail proceedings where detention is prolonged would likely mean that the statute violates the Constitution”). In addition, numerous circuit and district courts have expressly found that the Constitution requires bond hearings in cases of prolonged detention. *See, e.g., Diop*, 656 F.3d at 233; *Araujo-Cortes v. Shanahan*, 35 F. Supp. 3d 533, 544-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); *Monestime v. Reilly*, 704 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

27. Detention without a bond hearing is unconstitutional when it exceeds six months. *See Demore*, 538 U.S. at 529-30 (upholding only “brief” detentions under Section 1226(c), which last “roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal”); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 701 (“Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months”).

29. The recognition that six months is a substantial period of confinement—and is the time after which additional process is required to support continued incarceration—is deeply rooted in our legal tradition. With few exceptions, “in the late 18th century in America crimes triable without a jury were for the most part punishable by no more than a six-month prison term” *Duncan v. State of La.*, 391 U.S. 145, 161 & n.34 (1968). Consistent with this tradition, the Supreme Court

has found six months to be the limit of confinement for a criminal offense that a federal court may impose without the protection afforded by jury trial. *Cheff v. Schnackenberg*, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (plurality opinion). The Court has also looked to six months as a benchmark in other contexts involving civil detention. *See McNeil v. Dir., Patuxent Inst.*, 407 U.S. 245, 249, 250-52 (1972) (recognizing six months as an outer limit for confinement without individualized inquiry for civil commitment). The Court has likewise recognized the need for bright line constitutional rules in other areas of law. *See Maryland v. Shatzer*, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010) (14 days for re-interrogation following invocation of Miranda rights); *Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin*, 500 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1991) (48 hours for probable cause hearing).

30. Even if a bond hearing is not required after six months in every case, at a minimum, due process requires a bond hearing after detention has become unreasonably prolonged. *See Diop*, 656 F.3d at 234. Courts that apply a reasonableness test have considered three main factors in determining whether detention is reasonableness. First, courts have evaluated whether the noncitizen has raised a “good faith” challenge to removal—that is, the challenge is “legitimately raised” and presents “real issues.” *Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cty. Prison*, 783 F.3d 469, 76 (3d Cir. 2015). *(37) Second, reasonableness is a “function of the length of the detention,” with detention presumptively unreasonable if it lasts six months to a year. *Id.* at 477-78; *accord Sopo*, 825 F.3d at 1217-18. Third, courts have considered the likelihood that detention will continue pending future proceedings. *Chavez-Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 478 (finding detention unreasonable after ninth months of detention, when the parties could “have reasonably predicted that Chavez–Alvarez’s appeal would take a substantial amount of time, making his already lengthy detention considerably longer”); *Sopo*, 825 F.3d at 128; *Reid*, 819 F.3d at 500..

31. At a bond hearing, due process requires certain minimal protections to ensure that a noncitizen's detention is warranted: the government must bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to justify continued detention, taking into consideration available alternatives to detention; and if the government cannot meet its burden, the noncitizen's ability to pay a bond must be considered in determining the appropriate conditions of release.

32. To justify prolonged immigration detention, the government must bear the burden of proof detention in other contexts; it has relied on the fact that the Government bore the burden of proof at least by clear and convincing evidence. *See United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 750, 752 (1987) (upholding pre-trial detention where "full-blown adversary hearing," requiring "clear and convincing evidence" and "neutral decisionmaker"); *Foucha v. Louisiana*, 504 U.S. 71, 81-83 (1992) (striking down civil detention scheme that placed burden on the detainee); *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 692 (finding post-final-order custody review procedures deficient because, *inter alia*, they placed burden on detainee).

32. The requirement that the government bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence is also supported by application of the three-factor balancing test from *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). First, prolonged incarceration deprives noncitizens of a "profound" liberty interest. *See Diouf II*, 634 F.3d at 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2011). Second, the risk of error is great where the government is represented by trained attorneys and detained noncitizens are often unrepresented and frequently lack **English proficiency**. *See Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (requiring clear and convincing evidence at parental termination proceedings because "numerous factors combine to magnify the

***(37) Notably, “aliens should [not] be punished for pursuing avenues of relief and appeals.” Sopo, 825 F.3d at 1218 (citing *Ly*, 351 F.3d at 272). Thus, courts should not count a continuance against the noncitizen when he obtained it in good faith to prepare his removal case. Instead, only “[e]vidence that the alien acted in bad faith or sought to deliberately slow the proceedings”—for example, by “[seeking] repeated or unnecessary continuances, or [filing] frivolous claims and appeals”—“cuts against” providing a bond hearing. *Id.*; see also *Chavez-Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 476; *Ly*, 351 F.3d at 272.**

risk of erroneous factfinding” including that “parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups” and “[t]he State’s attorney usually will be expert on the issues contested”). Moreover, detainees are incarcerated in prison-like conditions that severely hamper their ability to obtain legal assistance, gather evidence, and prepare for a bond hearing. *See infra* ¶ 39. Third, placing the burden on the government imposes minimal cost or inconvenience, as the government has access to the noncitizen’s immigration records and other information that it can use to make its case for continued detention.

33. Due process also requires consideration of alternatives to detention. The primary purpose of immigration detention is to ensure a noncitizen’s appearance during removal proceedings. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 697. Detention is not reasonably related to this purpose if there are alternative conditions of release that could mitigate risk of flight. *See Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). ICE’s alternatives to detention program—the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program—has achieved extraordinary success in ensuring appearance at removal proceedings, reaching compliance rates close to 100 percent. *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 991 (9th Cir. 2017) (observing that ISAP “resulted in a 99% attendance rate at all EOIR hearings and a 95% attendance rate at final hearings”). It follows that alternatives to detention must be considered in determining whether prolonged incarceration is warranted.

34. Due process likewise requires consideration of a noncitizen's ability to pay a bond.

"Detention of an indigent 'for inability to post money bail' is impermissible if the individual's 'appearance at trial could reasonably be assured by one of the alternate forms of release.'" *Id.* at 990 (quoting *Pugh v. Rainwater*, 572 F.2d 1053, 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)). It follows that—in determining the appropriate conditions of release for immigration detainees—due process requires "consideration of financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release" to prevent against detention based on poverty. *Id.*

35. Evidence about immigration detention and the adjudication of removal cases provide further support for the due process right to a bond hearing in cases of prolonged detention.

36. Each year, thousands of noncitizens are incarcerated for lengthy periods pending the resolution of their removal proceedings. *See Jennings*, 2018 WL 1054878 at *27 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Among a class of immigration detainees in the Central District of California held for at least six months ("*Rodriguez* class"), the average length of detention was over a year, with many people held far longer. In numerous cases, noncitizens are incarcerated for years until winning their immigration cases. *Id.* (identifying cases of noncitizens detained for 813, 608, and 561 days until winning their cases). For noncitizens who have some criminal history, their immigration detention often dwarfs the time spent in criminal custody, if any. *Id.* ("between one-half and two-thirds of the class served sentences less than six months").

37. Noncitizens are detained for lengthy periods because they pursue meritorious claims. Among the *Rodriguez* class, 40 percent of noncitizens subject to Section 1226(c) won their cases, and two-thirds of asylum seekers subject to Section 1225 won asylum. *See id.* Detained noncitizens are able to succeed at these dramatically high rates despite the challenges of litigating in detention, particularly for the majority of detainees who lack counsel. *See Ingrid V. Eagly &*

Steven Shafer, *A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court*, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 36 (2015) (reporting government data showing that 86% of immigration detainees lack counsel).

38. Immigration detainees face severe hardships while incarcerated. Immigration detainees are held in lock-down facilities, with limited freedom of movement and access to their families: “the circumstances of their detention are similar, so far as we can tell, to those in many prisons and jails.” *Jennings*, 2018 WL 1054878 at *28 (Breyer, J., dissenting); accord *Chavez–Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 478; *Ngo v. INS*, 192 F.3d 390, 397-98 (3d Cir. 1999); *Sopo*, 825 F.3d at 1218, 1221. “And in some cases the conditions of their confinement are inappropriately poor.” *Jennings*, 2018 WL 1054878 at *28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), *DHS OIG Inspection Cites Concerns With Detainee Treatment and Care at ICE Detention Facilities* (2017) (reporting instances of invasive procedures, substandard care, and mistreatment, e.g., indiscriminate strip searches, long waits for medical care and hygiene products, and, in the case of one detainee, a multiday lock down for sharing a cup of coffee with another detainee)).

**CLAIMS FOR RELIEF: FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF VIOLATION OF
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION**

39. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

40. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the government from depriving any “person” of liberty “without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V.

41. To justify Petitioner's ongoing prolonged detention, due process requires that the government establish, at an individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, that Petitioner's detention is justified by clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or danger, even after consideration whether alternatives to detention could sufficiently mitigate that risk.

42. For these reasons, Petitioner's ongoing prolonged detention without a hearing violates due process.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

43. Petitioner re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above.

44. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "[e]xcessive bail." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

45. The government's categorical denial of bail to certain noncitizens violates the right to bail encompassed by the Eighth Amendment. *See Jennings*, 2018 WL 1054878 at *29 (Breyer, J, dissenting).

46. For these reasons, Petitioner's ongoing prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates the Eighth Amendment.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

- 1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter;
- 2) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus; hold a hearing before this Court if warranted; determine that Petitioner's detention is not justified because the government has not established by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of flight or danger in light of available


alternatives to detention; and order Petitioner's release, with appropriate conditions of supervision if necessary, taking into account Petitioner's ability to pay a bond.

3) In the alternative, issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus and order Petitioner's release within 30 days unless Defendants schedule a hearing before an immigration judge where: (1) to continue detention, the government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of flight or danger, even after consideration of alternatives to detention that could mitigate any risk that Petitioner's release would present; and (2) if the government cannot meet its burden, the immigration judge order Petitioner's release on appropriate conditions of supervision, taking into account Petitioner's ability to pay a bond.

4) Issue a declaration that Petitioner's ongoing prolonged detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment;

5) Award Petitioner his costs and reasonable attorneys' fees in this action as provided for by the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, other statute; and

6) Grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.




Smirnov Victor

03/20/2025
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
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I, **Cerron Richard Colley**, The Movant In This Matter Certify That On October 7th 2024, I
Handed The Aforementioned Petition ***WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS*** To The Mailroom At
KROME SPC 18201 SW. 12th Street Miami, Florida 33194, Pursuant To HOUSTON V. LACK
(Citations Omitted) To Be Delivered To The...

Miami Division; Clerk, U.S Court (400 N. Miami Ave #8N09 Miami FL 33128)



Smirnov Victor
18201 Sw 12th Street
Miami, Florida 33194
(Petitioner)


Victor Smirnov,
Krome Services Processing Center
18201 Sw. 12TH St,
Miami FL 33194



United States District Court Of Florida

Miami, Florida

Clerk Of Court

400 N. Miami Ave #8N09 Miami FL 33128