District of Massachusetts • 1:25-cv-13934

#1

Dec 22, 2025

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#2

Dec 22, 2025

Appear Pro Hac Vice

#3

Dec 22, 2025

Show Cause

#4

Dec 22, 2025

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Paul G. Levenson. (SEC) (Entered: 12/22/2025)

#5

Dec 22, 2025

Service Order-2241 Petition

#6

Dec 22, 2025

General Order 19-02

Dec 22, 2025

Notice of Case Assignment

#7

Dec 23, 2025

Notice of Appearance

#8

Dec 23, 2025

Notice - Other

#9

Jan 05, 2026

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#10

Jan 07, 2026

Response - not related to a motion

#11

Jan 08, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 2 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Added Lauren Anselowitz. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must have an individual PACER account, not a shared firm account, to electronically file in the District of Massachusetts. To register for a PACER account, go the Pacer website at https://pacer.uscourts.gov/register-account. You must put the docket number under ADDITIONAL FILER INFORMATION on your form when registering or it will be rejected.Pro Hac Vice Admission Request Instructions https://www.mad.uscourts.gov/caseinfo/nextgen-pro-hac-vice.htm.A Notice of Appearance must be entered on the docket by the newly admitted attorney. (SEC) (Entered: 01/08/2026)

Jan 08, 2026

Order on Motion for Leave to Appear

#12

Jan 14, 2026

Response - not related to a motion

#13

Jan 22, 2026

Assented to MOTION for Leave to File Reply by Pamela Bondi, Todd M Lyons, Kristi L. Noem, David Wesling.(Fitzgerald, Michael) (Entered: 01/22/2026)

#14

Jan 23, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 13 Motion for Leave to File Reply by Pamela Bondi, Todd M Lyons, Kristi L. Noem, David Wesling; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include - Leave to file granted on (date of order)- in the caption of the document. (LMH) (Entered: 01/23/2026)

Jan 23, 2026

Order on Motion for Leave to File Document

#15

Jan 27, 2026

Brief - not related to a motion

#16

Jan 30, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re: 3 Motion for Order to Show Cause. Having reviewed Petitioner's motion for order to show cause, D. 3, it is DENIED in light of this Court's Order, D. 5, concerning service of the habeas petition on Respondents. (LMH) (Entered: 01/30/2026)

#17

Jan 30, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Having reviewed the petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the "Petition") filed by Petitioner Davit Yeghoyan ("Petitioner"), D. 1, Respondents' response, D. 9, Petitioner's reply, D. 10, and the additional submissions by Petitioner, D. 12, and Respondents, D. 15, the Court DENIES the Petition.Factual Background. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Armenia currently detained in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). D. 1 ¶ 18. Petitioner has severe ulcerative colitis, first diagnosed in approximately May 2022, and he underwent three surgical procedures for same over the course of 2025. Id. ¶¶ 29-32; D. 1-5 at 2; D. 1-6 ¶¶ 2, 7-8, 16. In 2017, one year after Petitioner was convicted of a state offense in New Jersey, D. 1 ¶ 24, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United States, id. ¶¶ 26, 53; D. 1-4 at 2. In November 2021, Petitioner pled guilty in the Southern District of New York to a federal offense, and he was sentenced to forty-five months of imprisonment on August 19, 2022. D. 1 ¶ 27. In July 2023, Petitioner was reclassified to a higher level of medical care and transferred to FMC Devens. Id. ¶¶ 29, 36; D. 1-6 ¶ 4. At FMC Devens, beginning in approximately March 2025, Petitioner was housed in a one-person cell with access to a private bathroom. D. 1-6 ¶ 9. Petitioner "requires easy and frequent access to specialized care and such basic needs as access to bathroom facilities with potential urgency and frequency." D. 1 ¶ 38. He is still adjusting to his post-surgery physical needs, and he understands that it may take one to two years post-surgery to fully adjust. D. 1-6 ¶¶ 10-13. Petitioner completed his term of incarceration on December 22, 2025, after which he was taken into ICE custody pursuant to a detainer. See D. 1 ¶¶ 28, 55; D. 1-3 at 2. At the time the Petition was filed, Petitioner was detained at the ICE Boston Field Office in Massachusetts, D. 1 ¶¶ 17-18, but ICE subsequently transferred him to a facility in Florida ("Krome") for a medical bed, D. 8 at 1.Petitioner seeks release from ICE custody. D. 1 ¶ 41; D. 1-6 ¶ 18. Petitioner initially requested, alternatively, that the Court "order Respondents to detain Petitioner at a facility with access to the same level of medical care" he received at FMC Devens, "including access to a private bathroom, staffed [with] medical professionals and access to a colorectal specialist," D. 1 at 17, but he contends in his reply brief that "[r]elease is... the only means of protecting [him]," D. 10 at 3.Petitioner alleges that disruption to his "continuity of care will result in grave risk to [his] health" and that any conditions of confinement that "would prevent [him] from having . . . frequent and easy access to bathroom facilities, and frequent and easy access to a colon specialist would result in grave risk to [his] health." D. 1 ¶¶ 43-44. At the time he filed the Petition, Petitioner claimed he would not receive appropriate medical care based on "credible reporting." Id. ¶ 45; see id. ¶¶ 46-51. In a further supplemental submission dated January 14, 2026, Petitioner attests that on January 12, 2026, he was transferred out of Krome's medical unit and into a "segregation unit" where he has access to his own toilet, which has a camera above it, and where he must get permission before he can access a shower more than the allotted three times per week. D. 12-1 at ¶¶ 3-4. Petitioner reports that he saw a doctor on January 13 and 14 and complained of abdominal pain, and the "doctor said he would look into it" but did not provide other assistance at that time. Id. at ¶ 7. Petitioner reports he has only received Tylenol for his pain, most recently two days before executing his declaration, and he is also experiencing constipation as a result of being prescribed an iron pill and is "very concerned about the complications this will cause for [his] medical condition." Id. ¶ 9. In response, Respondents submitted a further declaration of Krome's clinical director, dated January 16, 2026, in which he attests that Petitioner "continues to be evaluated daily by medical providers," "continues to have access" to medical equipment and will continue to receive daily medical evaluation and unobstructed restroom access. D. 15-1 ¶¶ 3-4, 6. Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because of Respondents' deliberate indifference to his medical needs. D. 1 ¶¶ 59, 72-77. Petitioner also initially argued that his detention violates ICE detention standards, but this argument was based only on "credible reporting," id. ¶¶ 78-82, and he has not pressed it in subsequent submissions. Discussion. Respondents first contend that the Petition should be dismissed because Petitioner's challenge to the conditions of his detention is not cognizable in habeas. D. 9 at 2-4; D. 15 at 1. Respondents are correct that "a non-habeas civil action is the proper method of challenging 'conditions of confinement,' such as a claim based on inadequate medical care." Crooker v. Grondolsky, No. 12-cv-12024-RGS, 2012 WL 5416422, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 1, 2012), aff'd, No. 12-2392 (1st Cir. July 26, 2013); see Mattingley v. Spaulding, No. 18-cv-11569-ADB, 2018 WL 4778410, at *2-3 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2018); McFadden v. Burke, No. 22-cv-30062-KAR, 2023 WL 4976299, at *3-4 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 2023). Accordingly, courts have denied challenges to conditions of immigration detention contained in habeas petitions. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Moniz, No. 23-cv-11768-MJJ, 2023 WL 7017020, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2023) (concluding that ICE detainee's challenge to adequacy of his medical care fell "outside the scope of habeas corpus"), vacated as moot, No. 23-1891, 2024 WL 1776364 (1st Cir. Mar. 5, 2024); Navarro-Horta v. Warden, Mahoning Cnty. Just. Ctr., No. 26-cv-0005, 2026 WL 31184, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2026) (dismissing habeas petition from ICE detainee challenging adequacy of medical care).Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner's allegations could be considered within the scope of habeas, see Savino v. Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317, 323 (D. Mass. 2020) (declining to decide whether habeas excludes conditions-of-confinement claims where pleading was combined habeas petition and complaint and court relied upon its equitable powers to order interim injunctive relief), Petitioner has not shown that he is presently entitled to the relief he seeks. Due process protections in this context "are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner." City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (explaining that Eighth Amendment is inapplicable where there "ha[s] been no formal adjudication of guilt"); see Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 2011) (observing that "[t]he two standards are not all that far apart"). "[A]lthough protection of civilly committed persons rests on due process concepts rather than the Eighth Amendment, deliberate indifference is the familiar test for medical care." Battista, 645 F.3d at 452. The parties agree, D. 9 at 4; D. 10 at 5, that to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim in this context, Petitioner must satisfy an "objective" prong, that he has a serious medical need, and a "subjective" prong, that administrators of the ICE detention center have been deliberately indifferent to that need. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc). A serious medical need is one that is diagnosed by a physician or so obvious that a layperson would easily recognize the need for a physician's attention. Snell v. Neville, 998 F.3d 474, 495 (1st Cir. 2021). Under the objective prong, Petitioner must also show that he "has received inadequate treatment" for his serious medical need or show a "significant risk of future harm that... administrators fail to mitigate." Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 85; see Snell, 998 F.3d at 495 n.27. The subjective prong requires Petitioner to show that officials "ignore[ed] (or worsen[ed]) [his] serious medical need," providing care so inadequate that it shocks the conscience, Snell, 998 F.3d at 497. This standard "leave[s] ample room for professional judgment, constraints presented by the institutional setting, and the need to give latitude to administrators who have to make difficult trade-offs as to risks and resources." Battista, 645 F.3d at 453. Respondents do not appear to dispute that Petitioner's ulcerative colitis is a serious medical need. See D. 9 at 5. Looking to the evidence the Court has received regarding Petitioner's ulcerative colitis, a letter from his colorectal surgeon in Boston, Petitioner appears to "requir[e] easy access to a toilet" and needs "the ability to call and visit a colorectal surgeon," D. 1-5 at 2. Petitioner does not contest that he now has unimpeded access to a toilet at Krome. D. 12-1 ¶ 3; D. 15-1 ¶ 6; see Garza v. Turley, No. 09-cv-801 DAK, 2011 WL 705368, at *5-6 (D. Utah Feb. 20, 2011), aff'd on other grounds, 490 F. App'x 83 (10th Cir. 2012). Petitioner also does not challenge Respondents' assertion that Respondents made arrangements for Petitioner to see a colorectal surgeon. D. 9-1 ¶ 5; D. 10 at 4-6; D. 15-1 ¶ 5. Moreover, at the time the Petition was filed, Petitioner's claims were based on "credible reporting" about ICE detention, D. 1 ¶¶ 4, 80, and his due process claim put forth "[t]he very fact of [his] detention" as demonstrating "the functional equivalent of deliberate indifference," id. ¶ 76. In his first supplemental submission, Petitioner pressed only his due process argument regarding access to medical supplies. D. 10 at 4-6. Assuming (without deciding) that Petitioner has satisfied the objective prong of deliberate indifference with respect to these supplies, but see D. 15-1 ¶ 4, he has not shown that Respondents have been deliberately indifferent to his needs. See D. 10 at 6 (arguing only that ICE's "lack of preparation" for Petitioner's arrival evidences wanton disregard for his medical needs); cf. Zingg v. Groblewski, 907 F.3d 630, 635 (1st Cir. 2018) (explaining that subjective prong requires showing defendants "had actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable, and yet failed to take the steps that would have easily prevented that harm" (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). In his further supplemental submission, Petitioner instead argues that Respondents have shown deliberate indifference "in transferring [Petitioner] out of the medical housing unit," D. 12 at 3, but he appears to have received medical attention on multiple occasions since then, D. 12-1 ¶ 7, and Krome's clinical director attests that Petitioner is still classified as a patient of the medical housing unit and receives daily medical attention, D. 15-1 ¶¶ 3, 6. In sum, Petitioner has not shown that he is presently entitled to habeas relief in the form of release from ICE detention. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Petition, D. 1. (LMH) (Entered: 01/30/2026)

#18

Jan 30, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. ORDER DISMISSING CASE(LMH) (Entered: 01/30/2026)

Jan 30, 2026

Order

Jan 30, 2026

Order on Motion to Show Cause