District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-14366
Zhunaula Gonzalez v. Wesling
Active
Case Information
Filed: September 24, 2026
Assigned to:
Angel Kelley
Referred to:
—
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause:
28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa
Active
Last Activity:
October 02, 2026
Parties:
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Docket Entries
#1
Sep 24, 2026
Emergency PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Petition to Enforce previous court order Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-12060351 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Manuel Roberto Zhunaula Gonzalez. (Attachments: # 1 Category Form, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(Lagana, Stephen) (Entered: 09/24/2026)
Main Document:
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241
#2
Sep 24, 2026
ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. District Judge Leo T. Sorokin assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge M. Page Kelley. (SP) (Entered: 09/24/2026)
#3
Sep 24, 2026
General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (FGD) (Entered: 09/24/2026)
Main Document:
General Order 19-02
#4
Sep 24, 2026
District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ORDER entered. ORDER CONCERNING SERVICE OF PETITION AND STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (FGD) (Entered: 09/24/2026)
Main Document:
Service Order-2241 Petition
#5
Sep 24, 2026
Copy re 4 Service Order - 2241 Petition, 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), mailed to Duty AUSA and mailed to Respondents and USAO on 9/24/2026. (FGD) (Entered: 09/24/2026)
#6
Sep 24, 2026
District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Under Local Rule 40.1(g)(1), this matter is not related to Mijango Velasco v. Wesling, No. 26-cv-11355-LTS (D. Mass. filed Mar. 20, 2026), as indicated on the civil cover sheet. See Doc. Nos. 1-1, -2; see also L.R. 40.1(g)(1), (3) (providing that civil cases “shall not be deemed related to each other solely on the ground that they... involve a common question of law”). It is, however, related to an earlier case assigned to Judge Kelley, Zhunaula Gonzales v. Moniz, No. 26-cv-12699-AK (D. Mass. filed June 15, 2026). L.R. 40(g)(1). Both District Judges consent to this designation of relatedness and to the reassignment of this case. The Clerk shall reassign this case to Judge Kelley.(FGD) (Entered: 09/24/2026)
Sep 24, 2026
Order Reassigning Case
Sep 24, 2026
Notice of Case Assignment
Sep 24, 2026
Copy Mailed
#7
Sep 29, 2026
Notice of Appearance
Main Document:
Notice of Appearance
#8
Sep 29, 2026
Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241
Main Document:
Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241
#9
Sep 30, 2026
ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Reassignment. District Judge Angel Kelley assigned to case. (FGD) (Entered: 09/30/2026)
#10
Sep 30, 2026
District Judge Angel Kelley: ORDER entered. Standing Order Regarding Motion Practice. (CEH) (Entered: 09/30/2026)
Sep 30, 2026
Notice of Case Assignment
#11
Oct 02, 2026
District Judge Angel Kelley: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Before the Court is Petitioner Manuel Roberto Zhunaula Gonzalez’s Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, in which Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) bond hearing. [Dkt. 1]. Earlier this year, this Court granted a separate habeas petition filed by Petitioner requesting a bond hearing. See Zhunaula Gonzales v. Moniz, 26-CV-12699 (D. Mass. 2026). The Immigration Judge denied bond on June 25, 2026, finding that Petitioner presented a flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence and that no alternative to detention would ameliorate that risk. [Dkt. 8 at 1]. Following the bond hearing, the Court gave the parties seven days to object to the Immigration Judge’s decision, which Petitioner did not do. Instead, several months later, Petitioner filed the instant Petition on a separate docket. Respondents oppose the Petition, contending that Petitioner is barred by the doctrine of claim splitting and that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.First, in a footnote, Respondents urge the Court to dismiss the Petition under the doctrine of claim splitting. The doctrine, which arises from principles of res judicata, “prevents a party from bringing a subsequent lawsuit where it ‘had every opportunity to fully litigate its various claims against the full range of defendants in an earlier suit and made the strategic choice not to do so.’” Labranche v. United States Liberty Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp. 3d 262, 275 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting Airframe Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 601 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2010)). The rule is not jurisdictional, but rather, applied by courts in the interest of “docket management.” Id. (citing Conservation L. Found., Inc. v. Longwood Venues & Destinations, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 3d 240, 242 (D. Mass. 2019)). In the present case, there is no evidence that Petitioner’s duplicative filing is based on a deliberate “strategic choice.” Instead, it appears to be inadvertence or mistake, as Petitioner is represented by different counsel across the two cases. The Court thus declines to dismiss the Petition on this procedural basis rather than assessing the merits.Respondents next contend that Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals. However, as this Court—and multiple other sessions of this court—have held, petitioners are not required to exhaust administrative remedies in this context where their fundamental liberty interests are at stake. E.g., Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d 265, 272-73 (D. Mass. 2025); Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25-26 (D. Mass. 2025); Castro Soc v. Muniz, 26-CV-13376 (D. Mass. Aug. 17, 2026).On the merits of the Petition, the Court finds that the bond hearing provided to Petitioner was constitutionally deficient because the Immigration Judge failed to consider alternatives to detention in assessing Petitioner’s risk of flight. See Costa v. McDonald, 2026 WL 371198, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 10, 2026) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)) (explaining that the government’s burden includes explaining why less-restrictive alternatives to detention would not adequately address risk of danger or flight); Rogerio Ramos v. Moniz, No. 26-CV-11388, Dkt. 19 at 4-5 (Apr. 27, 2026); Mijango Velasco v. Wesling, No. 26-CV-11355, Dkt. 19 at 5 (Apr. 24, 2026); Atariguana-Buele v. Warden, Plymouth Corr. Facility, No. 26-CV-12168, 2026 WL 1825934, at *2-3 (D. Mass. June 25, 2026). Because neither party presented a transcript or audio recording of the bond hearing for the Court’s review, the only documentation of the Immigration Judge’s decision-making that is presently before the Court is the Immigration Judge’s Order of Denial. [See Dkt. 8-1]. The Order consists of a check-box form stating in a single sentence, without accompanying reasoning, that no alternatives to detention exist. This cursory explanation is insufficient to satisfy due process. See Ataide Almeida v. Moniz, 26-CV-12207 (D. Mass. Sep. 18, 2026) (explaining that “[r]eciting the conclusion that no alternative exists, on a check-box form, without engaging in analyzing any alternative, does not satisfy” due process).Accordingly, Petitioner’s 1 Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a new bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten (10) calendar days of this Order, subject to any requests for continuance from Petitioner. Respondents are further ORDERED to provide the Immigration Judge with a copy of this Order at Petitioner’s bond hearing. In that bond hearing, the Immigration Judge must expressly state the following findings on the record: (1) whether the government has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or by a preponderance of the evidence that he poses a flight risk; and (2) if the government has carried its burden: (a) the particular evidence by which the government carried its burden; (b) how the Immigration Judge considered and weighed the information Petitioner provided in relation to the government’s evidence; (c) the chain of reasoning connecting the evidence to the finding of dangerousness or flight risk; and (d) the reasons why less-restrictive alternatives to detention, such as GPS monitoring, would be ineffective to mitigate any risk. The parties are ORDERED to provide a status report within fourteen (14) calendar days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial.(JAM) (Entered: 10/02/2026)
Oct 02, 2026
Order
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