District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-14300

#1

Sep 21, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-12049858 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Geovani A Gutierrez. (Attachments: # 1 Category Form, # 2 Civil Cover Form)(Estrada, Carlos) (Entered: 09/21/2026)

#2

Sep 21, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. District Judge Leo T. Sorokin assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Paul G. Levenson. (SP) (Entered: 09/21/2026)

#3

Sep 21, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (FGD) (Entered: 09/21/2026)

#4

Sep 21, 2026

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ORDER entered. ORDER CONCERNING SERVICE OF PETITION AND STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (FGD) (Entered: 09/21/2026)

#5

Sep 21, 2026

Copy re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), 4 Service Order - 2241 Petition emailed to Duty AUSA and mailed to Respondents and USAO on 9/21/2026. (FGD) (Entered: 09/21/2026)

Sep 21, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

Sep 21, 2026

Copy Mailed

#6

Sep 24, 2026

NOTICE of Appearance by Vincent Engingro, III on behalf of Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David Wesling (Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 09/24/2026)

#7

Sep 24, 2026

Entry filed in error. (Entered: 09/24/2026)

#8

Sep 24, 2026

RESPONSE/ANSWER to Petitioner's 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) by Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David Wesling. (Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 09/24/2026)

#9

Sep 24, 2026

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. The Court has reviewed the petition, filed by Geovani Gutierrez, as well as the response, in which Respondents acknowledge that “the legal issues presented in this Petition are similar to those recently addressed by this Court in Arevalo v. Moniz”—a case in which Respondents acknowledged the petitioner was eligible for a bond hearing conducted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) under the binding decision in Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, No. 25-2152, 2026 WL 2352042 (1st Cir. Aug. 13, 2026). Doc. Nos. 1, 8; see alsoArevalo v. Moniz, No. 26-cv-13733-LTS (D. Mass. Sep. 8, 2026), Dkt. No. 15. In light of the foregoing, the Court construes—and ORDERS the respondents to likewise construe—the pending petition as conveying a request for a bond hearing before an immigration judge. The Court further ORDERS that such a hearing shall be scheduled (if it has not already been scheduled) to occur by October 1, 2026; that the legal standard governing such hearing is as established by the First Circuit in Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons; that, in determining whether the government has met its burden of proof as to risk of flight or danger, the immigration judge shall consider whether any condition, combination of conditions, or less-restrictive alternative to detention would ameliorate such risk; and that the respondents shall not retaliate against Petitioner for the filing of this action. The parties shall file a joint status report by October 6, 2026, notifying the Court of whether a bond hearing has occurred and, if so, its outcome. The merits of the habeas petition remain under advisement pending receipt and review of that status report.(FGD) (Entered: 09/24/2026)

Sep 24, 2026

Stay

Sep 24, 2026

Order AND ~Util - Set Deadlines

#10

Oct 06, 2026

STATUS REPORT by Geovani A Gutierrez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Estrada, Carlos) (Entered: 10/06/2026)

#11

Oct 07, 2026

MOTION to Compel by Geovani A Gutierrez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Estrada, Carlos) (Entered: 10/07/2026)

#12

Oct 08, 2026

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. The response to the pending motion (Doc. No. 11 ) is due by October 15, 2026. Respondents shall also submit (1) a transcript or digital audio recording of the bond hearing and (2) any evidence submitted to the IJ beyond that already provided by petitioner (Doc. No. 11-1). (FGD) (Entered: 10/08/2026)

Oct 08, 2026

Order AND ~Util - Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings

#13

Oct 15, 2026

RESPONSE to Motion re 11 MOTION to Compel filed by Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David Wesling. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 10/15/2026)

#14

Oct 15, 2026

Assented to MOTION to Seal Exhibits by Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David Wesling.(Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 10/15/2026)

#15

Oct 16, 2026

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered: re 14 Assented to MOTION to Seal Exhibits. ALLOWED. (SED) (Entered: 10/16/2026)

Oct 16, 2026

Order on Motion to Seal

#16

Nov 04, 2026

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. On September 24, 2026, the Court ordered respondents to provide petitioner Geovani Gutierrez a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days. Doc. No. 9 . Following the October 1 bond hearing, the immigration judge (“IJ”) denied bond after finding that Gutierrez posed a “danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence,” that he was a “flight risk,” and that “no amount of bond or alternatives to detention would mitigate [his] risk of flight.” Doc. No. 10-1. Contending his bond hearing was constitutionally inadequate and violated the Court’s order, Gutierrez moved the Court to order his immediate release. Doc. No. 11 . The Court has jurisdiction to hear this constitutional challenge and to ensure compliance with its orders. See, e.g., Castro Soc v. Moniz, No. 26-cv-13376-JEK (D. Mass. Aug. 17, 2026), Dkt. No. 19 . As respondents acknowledge, Doc. No. 13 at 1, administrative exhaustion (i.e., appealing the bond decision to the BIA) is not statutorily required, and the Court declines to insist on common-law exhaustion where, among other things, the bond hearing was conducted pursuant to this Court’s order. See, e.g., Castro Soc, No. 26-cv-13376-JEK, Dkt. No. 19 .On the merits, the Court concludes that IJ’s findings of danger and unmitigated flight risk were so arbitrary as to violate due process. See Hernandez-Azuaje v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-13224-ADB, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2026) (quoting Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 144 (D. Mass. 2019)). To continue detaining Gutierrez based on a finding of dangerousness, due process requires the government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that [he] poses a danger to the community.” Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). “The clear and convincing standard is a demanding standard to satisfy.” Miti v. Moniz, 827 F. Supp. 3d 206, 218 (D. Mass. 2026) (quoting United States v. Anonymous Appellant, 85 F.4th 576, 580 (1st Cir. 2023)). The IJ concluded that Gutierrez had a “lengthy criminal history” that “displayed a disregard for the laws of the United States.” Doc. No. 10-1 at 4–5. But the “lengthy criminal history” to which he referred was a series of juvenile charges brought against Gutierrez between 2003 and 2006—that is, when he was 14 to 17 years old—none of which had resulted in a conviction. See Doc. No. 13-3 at 4–7. The IJ made no finding as to the reliability of these twenty-plus-year-old police reports. The IJ also did not mention, in this context, Guiterrez’s pertinent “record” of law-abiding behavior: the two decades between 2006 and August 2026 in which he had no documented law-enforcement interactions, received an employment authorization, started and operated a trucking business, purchased a home, paid taxes, married a United States citizen, and raised their United States–citizen children and niece. Id.; Doc. No. 11-1 at 6; Doc. No. 13-4 at 8–16; see also Atariguana-Buele v. Warden, Plymouth Corr. Facility, No. 26-cv-12168-LTS, 2026 WL 1825934, at *2 (D. Mass. June 25, 2026) (“Adjudicating whether to detain or release another person is one of the most serious tasks judges are asked to perform. It requires conscientious review and consideration of all relevant and available information.” (emphasis in original)). The IJ otherwise relied on a September 2026 police report documenting an alleged domestic dispute between Gutierrez and his wife, which resulted in two pending charges (which Gutierrez’s wife planned to dismiss before Gutierrez was apprehended by ICE at the courthouse). Doc. No. 10-1 at 4–5; Doc. No. 13-4 at 17. But this single uncorroborated police report, containing material allegations disputed by Gutierrez’s wife, could not alone establish danger by clear and convincing evidence. See Castro Soc, No. 26-cv-13376-JEK, Dkt. No. 19 (collecting cases). Moreover, the IJ did not discuss whether “any condition, combination of conditions, or less-restrictive alternative to detention” would ameliorate the risk of danger, as this Court’s order required that he consider. Compare Doc. No. 10-1, with Doc. No. 9 . In summary, the IJ failed to make threshold reliability findings as to Gutierrez’s juvenile police reports, placed undue substantial weight on an uncorroborated police report, failed to engage with Gutierrez’s submissions regarding the domestic allegations, failed to address evidence of Gutierrez’s law-abiding conduct, and failed to explain or even mention whether conditions or alternatives could mitigate the risk of danger.To continue detaining Gutierrez based on flight, due process requires the government to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. Here, the IJ concluded Gutierrez posed a flight risk, which no bond or alternatives to detention could mitigate, because he “has had default warrant [sic] issued against him” and a “history of disregarding official court orders.” Doc. No. 10-1 at 5. This finding is unsupported by the record. As counsel for DHS acknowledged at the bond hearing, Gutierrez was detained by ICE at the courthouse before he could be arraigned, and he was defaulted as a result. Plainly this “default” has no bearing on Gutierrez’s risk of flight from future proceedings. To the extent the IJ relied on default warrants that were issued more than twenty years ago, these cannot bear the weight the IJ would place on them: they were issued decades ago, when Gutierrez was fourteen years old; each was resolved in a matter of days; and their explanatory power is destroyed by the subsequent two decades of law-abiding behavior—including, most recently, Gutierrez’s release on $40 bond and appearance at the courthouse for his arraignment. Nothing in the record before the IJ or this Court suggests that, as an adult, Gutierrez has fled or attempted to flee criminal or immigration authorities. Though, as the IJ noted, Gutierrez has not submitted a Form I-485 and relief from removal is not guaranteed, he is the beneficiary of an approved Form I-130, and the record suggests he has every incentive to remain in Massachusetts and participate in his immigration proceedings: his employment authorization, his business, his home, his substantial community support (evidenced by more than 50 letters of support attesting to his character), and his United States–citizen family. For all these reasons, the IJ’s detention decision was so arbitrary as to violate both the guarantee of due process and this Court’s prior order. Accordingly, the motion for immediate release (Doc. No. 11 ) is ALLOWED IN PART. Respondents SHALL RELEASE Gutierrez on $1,500 bond and subject to reasonable conditions of release. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A). Respondents shall process this Order forthwith and shall release Gutierrez promptly after he posts bond. The Court expects the foregoing will be completed by the close of business on Thursday, November 5, 2026. Respondents SHALL submit a status report, by Friday, November 6, 2026, detailing their compliance with this Order.(FGD) (Entered: 11/04/2026)

Nov 04, 2026

Order AND ~Util - Set Deadlines AND ~Util - Terminate Motions

#17

Nov 06, 2026

STATUS REPORT by Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David Wesling. (Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 11/06/2026)