District of Massachusetts • 1:25-cv-13796

Perez Lopez v. Lyons

Terminated

Case Information

Filed: December 10, 2025
Assigned to: Denise Jefferson Casper
Referred to:
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa
Terminated: February 03, 2026
Last Activity: February 03, 2026
Parties: View All Parties →

Docket Entries

#1
Dec 10, 2025
PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11410952 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Carmelina Perez Lopez. (Attachments: # 1 Category Form, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(Pomerleau, Todd) (Entered: 12/10/2025)
Main Document: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241
#2
Dec 10, 2025
ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Paul G. Levenson. (LBO) (Entered: 12/10/2025)
#3
Dec 10, 2025
NOTICE of Appearance by Nicole E. Dill on behalf of Carmelina Perez Lopez (Dill, Nicole) (Entered: 12/10/2025)
Main Document: Notice of Appearance
#4
Dec 10, 2025
Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. ORDER CONCERNING SERVICE OF PETITION AND STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (SEC) (Entered: 12/10/2025)
Main Document: Service Order-2241 Petition
Dec 10, 2025
Notice of Case Assignment
#5
Dec 11, 2025
General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (SEC) (Entered: 12/11/2025)
Main Document: General Order 19-02
#6
Dec 16, 2025
Notice of Appearance
Main Document: Notice of Appearance
#7
Dec 17, 2025
Notice - Other
Main Document: Notice - Other
#8
Dec 19, 2025
Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. D. 7: The Court is in receipt of the government's notice of its intent to move the Petitioner from this District to Arizona given the need for bed space for female detainees. This notice (unlike other notices from the government that the Court has received in other cases) does not indicate whether the parties agree that this Court would maintain jurisdiction given that the Petitioner was in the district at the time the Petition filed. The government has until 3 pm to amend its notice in this regard. In the interim, the Court's prior Order, D. 4, remains in effect.(LMH) (Entered: 12/19/2025)
#9
Dec 19, 2025
Notice - Other
Main Document: Notice - Other
#10
Dec 19, 2025
Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. In light of the government's further notice, D. 9, that it takes the position that even with the transfer of the Petitioner to Arizona, D. 7, this Court will retain jurisdiction over the Petition and the Petitioner, D. 9, and in the absence of any objection by Petitioner, the Court ALLOWS the transfer of Petitioner to Arizona.(LMH) (Entered: 12/19/2025)
#11
Dec 19, 2025
Reconsideration
Main Document: Reconsideration
#12
Dec 19, 2025
Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER re 11 Emergency MOTION for Reconsideration of Allowance of Transfer. The Court has considered Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, D. 11, of the Court's Order, D. 10, and DENIES it. First, there has been no violation of D. 4 where the government provided advance notice of its intent to transfer, D. 7 . Moreover, the Court retains jurisdiction over the Petition and Petitioner even after this transfer, D. 9 at 1; D. 10, and the Court's original Order, D. 4, remains in effect. To extent that Petitioner was seeking other relief at this juncture, it is denied. (SEC) (Entered: 12/19/2025)
Dec 19, 2025
Order
Dec 19, 2025
Order on Motion for Reconsideration
#13
Dec 24, 2025
Response - not related to a motion
Main Document: Response - not related to a motion
#14
Feb 03, 2026
Order
Main Document: Order
#15
Feb 03, 2026
Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Having reviewed the petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the "Petition") filed by Petitioner Carmelina Perez Lopez ("Petitioner"), D. 1, and Respondents' response to same, D. 13, the Court ALLOWS the Petition to the extent that it ORDERS Petitioner released on the same conditions previously imposed on her in the OSUP.Factual Background. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Guatemala currently detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). D. 1 ¶¶ 1, 11, 23. Petitioner was removed from the United States pursuant to a removal order on March 11, 2007. D. 13-1 at 1. Petitioner reentered the United States without authorization on or around April 12, 2008, and the Department of Homeland Security reinstated the 2007 removal order on April 28, 2008. Id. On November 25, 2008, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United States at the conclusion of withholding-only proceedings. D. 13 at 3; D. 13-3 at 1; see D. 1 ¶ 15. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal of the removal order on June 21, 2010. D. 1 ¶ 16. At some point thereafter, ICE placed Petitioner under an Order of Supervision ("OSUP"), id. ¶¶ 17-18 (suggesting this occurred in 2009); D. 13-2 at 1, 4 (indicating OSUP was served in 2012), and she has complied with the terms of the OSUP. D. 1 ¶¶ 18, 30. On December 10, 2025, during a routine check-in with ICE, Petitioner was detained and taken into custody. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Petitioner was subsequently served with a Notice of Revocation of Release ("Notice"), which appears to have been executed and provided to her after the Petition was filed. D. 13-2 at 1-2. The Notice indicates that the OSUP was revoked because of unspecified "changed circumstances," based on ICE's determination "that the purposes of release have been served, and it is appropriate to enforce the removal order." Id. at 1. The same day, ICE also conducted an informal interview of Petitioner regarding the revocation, during which she apparently indicated she did not wish to make any statements. Id. at 3. Petitioner alleges that her detention is unlawful because ICE did not properly revoke the OSUP. See D. 1 ¶ 21. She alleges that "ICE has not shown or even claimed that Petitioner is a danger to the community or flight risk." Id. ¶ 22. Petitioner contends that her current detention violates her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, id. ¶¶ 25-28, regulations governing OSUP, id. ¶¶ 29-30, and 8 U.S.C. § 1231, id. ¶¶ 34-42. She requests release on bail pending adjudication of the Petition. Id. ¶¶ 31-33.Discussion. Although Respondents previously submitted notice that they intended to transfer Petitioner from an ICE facility in this District to a facility in Arizona, D. 7, they agreed that this Court would retain jurisdiction over the Petition and Petitioner, D. 9; D. 10. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition as it concerns relief that Petitioner seeks challenging her continued detention. Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 614 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting that "we have held that district courts retain jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detention in the immigration context"). Petitioner first argues that her detention offends due process because the "government has not demonstrated that Petitioner must be detained." D. 1 ¶ 27. Without more, this argument is unpersuasive because 8 U.S.C. § 1231 envisions both mandatory detention, § 1231(a)(2)(A), and discretionary detention limited "to a period reasonably necessary to bring about [a noncitizen's] removal from the United States." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (discussing § 1231(a)(6)). To the extent Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the presumptively reasonable post-removal-order detention period discussed in Zadvydas is relevant to the Petition, see D. 13 at 6-7, the Court disagrees, because the Petition challenges Petitioner's re-detention despite an OSUP rather than arguing her detention is unreasonably prolonged. See Cherisme v. Moniz, No. 25-cv-13690-MJJ, 2025 WL 3759531, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 30, 2025) (concluding Zadvydas was inapplicable in such circumstances); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 386-87 (D. Mass. 2017) (noting that "the issue before the Court [was] whether [petitioner's OSUP] was properly revoked"); cf. Siguenza v. Moniz, No. 25-cv-11914-ADB, 2025 WL 2734704, at *2 n.1 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2025) (applying Zadvydas in case involving revoked OSUP where petitioner's detention was already prolonged and both parties agreed that the case could be resolved under Zadvydas alone).To explain the decision to revoke the OSUP, the Notice states that "the purposes of release have been served" and that "it is appropriate to enforce the removal order." D. 13-2 at 1; see 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)(i), (iii). "The undisputed purpose of [the notice] requirement is to give the non-citizen an opportunity to respond to or otherwise contest the reasons for the revocation." Zhang v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-06781 (NRM), 2025 WL 3733542, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2025). While there have been varying interpretations of the contours of the notice requirement, see, e.g., Doe v. Smith, No. 18-cv-11363-FDS, 2018 WL 4696748 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 2018) (concluding advance notice of informal interview is not required and citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3)); Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-13035-NMG, 2025 WL 3719656, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2025) (denying habeas petition after concluding that under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, "ICE could properly revoke petitioner's OSUP to enforce its prior removal order" without making "a finding that, due to changed circumstance, there is a significant likelihood of petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future"), the Court is at least persuaded that such notice must enable a noncitizen to meaningfully respond to the revocation, and that such was not the case here. As another session of this Court concluded when faced with a substantially similar Notice, "ICE's conclusory explanation for revoking Petitioner's release did not offer [her] adequate notice of the basis for the revocation decision such that [she] could meaningfully respond at the post-detention 'informal interview.'" Perez-Escobar v. Moniz, 792 F. Supp. 3d 224, 226 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1)); see Valentine Romero Marroquin de Rodriguez v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-13210-AK, 2026 WL 220416, at *3-4 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2026) ("Romero") (similar). Accordingly, the Court will direct Respondents to release Petitioner.Given that the Court has concluded that release is warranted for the reasons stated above, the Court does not reach the Petitioner’s other arguments for release. For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS the Petition, D. 1, to the extent that it ORDERS Petitioner released on the same conditions previously imposed on her in the OSUP. See Perez-Escobar, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 226-27 (ordering same); Cherisme, 2025 WL 3759531, at *3 (same); Romero, 2026 WL 220416, at *4 (same). (LMH) (Entered: 02/03/2026)
#16
Feb 03, 2026
Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re: 14 Motion for Order to Order the Release of Petitioner by Carmelina Perez Lopez. Given the Courts ruling today allowing D. 1, the Court DENIES D. 14, the motion for immediate release, as moot. (LMH) (Entered: 02/03/2026)
#17
Feb 03, 2026
Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. ORDER DISMISSING CASE(LMH) (Entered: 02/03/2026)
Main Document: Order Dismissing Case
Feb 03, 2026
Order on Motion for Order
Feb 03, 2026
Order