District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-13418

#1

Jul 27, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11916692 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Luis M Frias Diaz. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Category Form)(Freidel, Irene) (Entered: 07/27/2026)

#2

Jul 28, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Judge Myong J. Joun assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Donald L. Cabell. (LBO) (Entered: 07/28/2026)

#3

Jul 28, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (SP) (Entered: 07/28/2026)

#4

Jul 28, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ORDER entered. SERVICE ORDER re 2241 Petition. Order entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2243 governing Section 2241 cases for service on respondents. The answer or responsive pleading is due no later than July 31, 2026.(SP) (Entered: 07/28/2026)

Jul 28, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

#5

Jul 31, 2026

NOTICE of Appearance by Mark Sauter on behalf of Todd Blanche, Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David Venturella, David Wesling (Sauter, Mark) (Entered: 07/31/2026)

#6

Jul 31, 2026

RESPONSE/ANSWER to 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Abbreviated by Todd Blanche, Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David Venturella, David Wesling. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Sauter, Mark) (Entered: 07/31/2026)

#7

Jul 31, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. In their Response to Habeas Petition, Doc. No. 6, Respondents acknowledge that the legal issues presented in this petition are similar to those resolved in prior cases in this district. Given this, and in light of the record before me, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. Respondents are ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) by August 7, 2026. The Respondents are ENJOINED from denying bond to Petitioner on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Unless Petitioner was provided a bond hearing, Respondents shall release Petitioner by 6 PM on August 7, 2026. The Respondents are further ORDERED to file a status report within 24 hours of the Immigration Judge’s decision on bond, stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial, or whether he has been released, and if so, the date, time, and location of his release. The Respondents should include a copy of the Immigration Judge’s decision with their status report.(SKY) (Entered: 07/31/2026)

Jul 31, 2026

Order

#8

Aug 10, 2026

Status Report

#9

Aug 10, 2026

Response - not related to a motion

#10

Aug 13, 2026

Enforce Judgment

#11

Aug 13, 2026

Memorandum in Support of Motion

#12

Aug 13, 2026

Affidavit

#13

Aug 13, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Respondents shall file a response to the motion to enforce, Doc. No. 10, by Tuesday, August 18. In their response, Respondents shall include a transcript of the bond hearing conducted by the Immigration Judge. (SP) (Entered: 08/13/2026)

Aug 13, 2026

Order

#14

Aug 18, 2026

Opposition re 10 MOTION to Enforce Judgment filed by Todd Blanche, Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David Venturella, David Wesling. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Manual Filing)(Sauter, Mark) (Entered: 08/18/2026)

#15

Aug 20, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. On July 31, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Doc. No. 7 . On August 9, 2026, an immigration judge ("IJ") denied Petitioner release on bond, finding that he was a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence. [Doc. No. 12-1 at 2]. Petitioner now moves to enforce the initial habeas decision. Doc. No. 10 . This Court has jurisdiction to review whether the bond hearing it ordered comported with constitutionally mandated burdens of proof. See, e.g., Massingue v. Streeter, No. 19-cv-30159, 2020 WL 1866255, at *3 (D. Mass. Apr. 14, 2020) ("[A] district court retains jurisdiction to review compliance with its earlier order conditionally granting habeas relief." (quoting Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 142 (D. Mass. 2019))); Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) does not preclude challenges to "the extent of the Governments detention authority under the 'statutory framework' as a whole" (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018))). Specifically, the First Circuit has held that the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause requires that the government prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a noncitizen is a danger before a noncitizen may be denied release on bond on that basis. Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 23. And while "even charges that do not result in a conviction can form the basis for denial of relief," id. at *6 (quoting Lee v. Barr, 975 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2020)), the clear and convincing standard requires a heightened standard of proof. See Hernandez, 10 F.4th at 39. But see Davis v. Garland, 708 F. Supp.3d 283, 297 (W.D.N.Y. 2023) (finding that records of criminal convictions, standing by themselves, cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness).Here, based on the evidence before the IJ and the recording of the hearing, it is clear that the IJ failed to properly apply the mandated burden of proof. Petitioner does not have any history of violence; he has no criminal record no arrests and no convictions. See [Doc. No. 12-2 at 7]. The IJ relied only on an allegation of assault, contained in an unsigned police report, written by officers who did not witness the alleged incident. [Doc No. 12-1 at 4-5; Doc. No. 12-3 at 9]. Clear and convincing evidence requires much more than that. See Miti v. Moniz, 26-cv-11327, 2026 WL 884639 at *2 (D. Mass. March 31, 2026) (finding denial of bond based solely on police report in misdemeanor assault case insufficient as a matter of law to support immigration judge's finding of clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness). What is more, it is abundantly clear that the facts as alleged in the 6/27/26 police report, even if assumed to be true, cannot as a matter of law be sufficient to support the IJ's finding of dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. The officer's determination that Petitioner was the primary physical aggressor is wholly unsupported. The facts as relayed to the officers do not make clear who was the initial aggressor. The reports reflect that Petitioner and the alleged victim, his uncle, asked each other, "what happened" and a "fight began." [Doc. No.12-3 at 9]. The only support that Petitioner was the initial aggressor is his uncle telling the police Petitioner assaulted him first. [Id.]. Nothing in the report indicates that the responding officers witnessed the altercation or independently corroborated that assertion. The IJs decision also relied on factual findings that are inconsistent with the police report itself. The IJ stated that Petitioner caused his uncle to require medical treatment at a hospital, but the report states that it was Petitioner who was transported to the hospital. Compare [Doc. No. 12-3 at 9], with [Doc. No. 12-1 at 4]. The IJ further concluded that Petitioner "fled the scene." [Doc. No. 12-1 at 4]. The report, however, reflects that Petitioner returned within approximately five minutes after police contacted him. [Doc. No. 12-3 at 9]. These discrepancies further undermine the IJ's conclusion that the Government carried its heightened burden of establishing dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.Respondents do not attempt to address any of the above, instead arguing in their response that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Doc. No. 14 . That argument does not persuade because, as noted supra, this Court retains jurisdiction to ensure its ordered bond hearing complies with due process. After careful review, I conclude that the evidence in the record before the IJ could not, as a matter of law, have supported the IJs decision. The hearing afforded to Petitioner failed to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process. Accordingly, Petitioner's motion to enforce this Courts previous decision at Doc. No. 7, is GRANTED. Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner immediately, no later than 6pm today, August 20, 2026. This order is without prejudice to Respondents requiring Petitioner to comply with reasonable conditions of supervision upon release, provided that such conditions are imposed, and written notice to Petitioner is provided, within seven days of this order. Respondents are ORDERED to file a status report by 3:00 p.m. on August 21, 2026, confirming their compliance with this order. (SP) (Entered: 08/20/2026)

Aug 20, 2026

Order on Motion to Enforce Judgment

#16

Aug 21, 2026

STATUS REPORT and Request For Dismissal of Petition by Todd Blanche, Antone Moniz, Markwayne Mullin, David Venturella, David Wesling. (Sauter, Mark) (Entered: 08/21/2026)

#17

Aug 21, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ORDER entered. JUDGMENT (SP) (Entered: 08/21/2026)