District of Massachusetts • 1:25-cv-13686

#1

Dec 04, 2025

MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Ronaldo Dos Santos. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A Redacted, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B Redacted, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C Redacted, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D Redacted, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit E Redacted, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit G Redacted, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit H)(Charles, Portia) (Entered: 12/04/2025)

#2

Dec 04, 2025

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11398286 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Ronaldo Dos Santos. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet Civil Action Cover Sheet)(Charles, Portia) (Entered: 12/04/2025)

#4

Dec 05, 2025

Service Order-2241 Petition

Dec 05, 2025

Notice of Case Assignment

#5

Dec 19, 2025

Notice of Appearance

#6

Dec 19, 2025

Extension of Time to File Response/Reply

#7

Dec 21, 2025

Opposition to Motion

#8

Dec 21, 2025

Letter/request - non-motion

#9

Dec 22, 2025

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion

#10

Dec 22, 2025

Reply to Response to Motion

#11

Dec 24, 2025

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re 6 MOTION for Extension of Time to December 22, 2025 to File Response/Reply to Habeas Petition. The Court has considered Respondents' motion for an extension of time, D. 6, and Petitioner's opposition to same, D. 8, and ALLOWS the motion for extension of time to December 22, 2025 nunc pro tunc. (SEC) (Entered: 12/24/2025)

#12

Dec 24, 2025

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re 1 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order. Having reviewed the motion for temporary restraining order by Petitioner Ronaldo Dos Santos ("Petitioner"), D. 1, Petitioner's habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ("Petition"), D. 2, Respondents' opposition, D. 9, and Petitioner’s reply brief, D. 10, the Court DENIES the motion because Petitioner has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of the claims on which he seeks such injunctive relief. Standard of Review. "[A]llowance of a TRO, as with a preliminary injunction, is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never awarded as of right." Allscripts Healthcare, LLC v. DR/Decision Res., LLC, 592 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D. Mass. 2022) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether to grant such relief, the Court must assess "(1) the [movant]'s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) whether issuing an injunction will burden the [nonmovant] less than denying an injunction would burden the [movant]; and (4) the effect, if any, on the public interest." González-Droz v. González-Colon, 573 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Bos. Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2008)). "The sine qua non of th[e] four-part inquiry" governing all motions for preliminary injunctions remains the first factor: "likelihood of success on the merits." New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002).Factual Background. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Brazil currently detained at Plymouth County Correctional Facility. D. 2 ¶¶ 2-3. Petitioner is subject to a September 2021 "in absentia removal order." D. 2 ¶ 7; D. 9-1. Petitioner unsuccessfully moved to reopen his removal proceedings in October 2021. D. 2 ¶ 9; D. 9-2; D. 9-3. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal of the denial of the motion to reopen on January 4, 2024. D. 9-4 at 3-4. A further motion to reopen is currently pending. D. 9 at 7-8; D. 10-1. Respondents do not appear to dispute that Petitioner's motion to reopen stays Petitioner's removal pending the motion's resolution. See D. 9 at 12-13; D. 1 at 2 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(C)).On or around September 4, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detained Petitioner. D. 2 ¶ 3. ICE conducted a ninety-day review of Petitioner's detention and determined not to release him from custody, D. 1-7, which Petitioner challenges, D. 1 at 2-3; D. 2 ¶¶ 13-15, 18-19. Petitioner provided materials related to the custody review to the Court, including numerous, supportive letters from members of Petitioner's community. D. 1-2.Although Petitioner does not contest that he is presently subject to a removal order and does not challenge ICE's authority to arrest and detain him after the removal order was entered, the Petition challenges his continued detention on four grounds. First, Petitioner argues his continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is unlawful under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). D. 2 ¶¶ 16-17. Second, Petitioner contends that ICE's ninety-day custody review violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Third, Petitioner argues his due process rights have also been violated because his detention is not reasonably related to a legitimate purpose. Id. ¶ 20. Finally, Petitioner claims humanitarian hardship due to the effects of his detention on his family, including his ill wife. Id. ¶ 21. In the pending motion for injunctive relief, Petitioner only advances arguments regarding the first and second claims. D. 1 at 2-3.Discussion. As an initial matter, the Court notes that neither party has addressed the four-part inquiry governing motions for preliminary injunctive relief. See D. 1; D. 9; D. 10. Regardless, Petitioner's motion fails because he has not adequately demonstrated his likelihood of success on the merits.Petitioner first presses his claim that his continued detention is unlawful under Zadvydas. See D. 1 at 2. Detention of a noncitizen who is subject to a removal order is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which provides for mandatory detention during a ninety-day "removal period" and permits continued post-removal-period detention in some circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A), (a)(6). Although the statute provides no upper limit to discretionary detention, the Supreme Court has held that continued detention is not statutorily authorized "once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. Detention is presumptively reasonable for six months, after which a detainee may "provide[] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," which the government may rebut. Id. at 701. Here, Petitioner "does not dispute that ICE possesses discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)" but rather "challenges the constitutionality of his continued detention under Zadvydas[], as applied to the specific facts of his case," because of his pending motion to reopen. D. 10 at 1. Although the Court agrees that Zadvydas does not foreclose all possibilities of relief before a six-month detention period has elapsed, Petitioner has failed to show a sufficient likelihood that relief is warranted based on the current record, where his argument is based solely on his pending motion to reopen, where a prior motion was denied and where “ICE is in receipt of or expects to receive the necessary travel documents to effectuate your removal.” D. 1-7 at 1; see D. 9 at 13; see, e.g., G.P. v. Garland, 103 F.4th 898, 902 (1st Cir. 2024) (concluding noncitizen failed to show removal was not reasonably foreseeable where he remained in detention pending conclusion of withholding-only proceedings, because pending proceedings did not present a "removable-but-unremovable limbo" situation). Petitioner next argues that emergency relief is warranted based on ICE's alleged failure to provide a "meaningful" ninety-day custody review. D. 1 at 2-3; see Jimenez v. Cronen, 317 F. Supp. 3d 626, 641-42 (D. Mass. 2018) (discussing custody review regulations). Although Petitioner has not shown that his continued detention is unlawful under Zadvydas, detention may still be unlawful where, for instance, ICE fails to follow its custody regulations. See Misirbekov v. Venegas, 796 F. Supp. 3d 436, 439 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (concluding petitioner's Zadvydas claim was premature but granting habeas relief where ICE failed to follow post-removal custody review procedures); see also Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387-89 (D. Mass. 2017) (analyzing ICE failures to follow custody regulations). Here, Petitioner argues that ICE's ninety-day custody review offended due process because ICE's post-review decision was issued in a language Petitioner does not understand, ICE failed to consider certain arguments and evidence Petitioner raised, ICE failed to do an individualized determination and Petitioner's pending motion to reopen automatically stayed removal. D. 2 ¶¶ 18-19; D. 1 at 2-3; D. 10 at 3-4. Petitioner, however, has not developed any argument as to how the challenged conduct did not comport with ICE regulations or otherwise constituted due process violations. D. 2 ¶¶ 18-19; D. 1 at 2-3; D. 10 at 3-4; compare D. 9 at 13-15 with Jimenez, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 647-56 (considering whether ICE correctly interpreted applicability of custody regulations to noncitizens first detained after expiration of removal period and deciding that even under ICE interpretation, relief was warranted because it violated regulations). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that the "extraordinary" relief he seeks is warranted.For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner's motion for injunctive relief, D. 1 . (SEC) (Entered: 12/24/2025)

Dec 24, 2025

Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply

Dec 24, 2025

Order on Motion for TRO

Jan 08, 2026

Order

#14

Jan 09, 2026

Order Dismissing Case