District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-13014

#1

Jun 30, 2026

Emergency PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11855746 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Evaldo Pereira Pinto Junior. (Attachments: # 1 Category Form, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(Cerretani, Gabriela) (Entered: 06/30/2026)

#2

Jun 30, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge M. Page Kelley. (FGD) (Entered: 06/30/2026)

#3

Jun 30, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (EZG) (Entered: 06/30/2026)

Jun 30, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

#4

Jul 01, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. ORDER CONCERNING SERVICE OF PETITION AND STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (EZG) (Entered: 07/01/2026)

#5

Jul 08, 2026

Notice of Appearance

#6

Jul 14, 2026

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#7

Jul 16, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), filed by Evaldo Pereira Pinto Junior. Having reviewed the petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the "Petition") filed by Petitioner Evaldo Pereira Pinto Junior ("Petitioner"), D. 1, and Respondents' response to same, D. 6, the Court ALLOWS the Petition insofar as it sought a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), at which the government bears the burden of proving Petitioner poses a danger to the community or flight risk, see Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021), which the Court ORDERS within seven (7) days of this Order. Respondents are also ENJOINED from denying Petitioner bond on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within ten (10) days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial.Factual Background. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Brazil currently detained in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") in Burlington, Massachusetts. D. 1 ¶¶ 1, 6, 14, 19. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection several years ago and, following an encounter with the Department of Homeland Security, was released from immigration custody on conditions. Id. ¶¶ 2, 15-16, 35-36. On June 30, 2026, during a scheduled check-in with ICE, Petitioner was taken into custody. Id. ¶¶ 2, 17-18.Petitioner alleges that his detention is not authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and that his custody is properly governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. ¶¶ 3, 22. Petitioner contends that his detention without a bond hearing is, therefore, unlawful, including because it violates his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, id. ¶¶ 23-31, and is contrary to statute, id. ¶¶ 32-38. Discussion. The Petition challenges Petitioner's detention in this district and seeks relief from same. Id. at 7-8. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition as it concerns relief that Petitioner seeks challenging his continued detention. Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 614 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting that "we have held that district courts retain jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detention in the immigration context").Consistent with this Court's prior rulings, including and not limited to Da Silva v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-12672, 2025 WL 2969163, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 2025), and Dias de Carvalho v. Hyde, 25-cv-12677-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 2025), D. 14, the Court agrees with Petitioner that his custody is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (which allows for discretionary determinations of custody before an immigration judge) and not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (which provides for mandatory detention for "applicants for admission"), as Respondents contend, see D. 6 at 1 n.2; see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (discussing the distinction). Although Respondents "note that it does not appear that Petitioner disclosed his prior criminal history," D. 6 at 1 n.2, they do not suggest that any such history affects the Court's analysis of the Petition, but instead submit that this Court's decision in Dias de Carvalho is likely dispositive here, see id. at 1. Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2026) (affirming that petitioner's detention "is governed by Section 1226 and that he is entitled to a bond hearing . . . consistent with the decisions of . . . over ninety percent of district court judges"). Accordingly, the Court ALLOWS the Petition, D. 1, insofar as it sought a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), at which the government bears the burden of proving Petitioner poses a danger to the community or flight risk, see Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41, which the Court ORDERS within seven (7) days of this Order. Respondents are also ENJOINED from denying Petitioner bond on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within ten (10) days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial. (SEC) (Entered: 07/16/2026)

Jul 16, 2026

Order

#8

Jul 27, 2026

Status Report

#9

Jul 31, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. In light of the recent status report, D. 8, and prior relief granted by the Court, the Court DISMISSES the Petition and closes this case. (SEC) (Entered: 07/31/2026)

#10

Jul 31, 2026

Order Dismissing Case

Jul 31, 2026

Order

#11

Aug 10, 2026

MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Evaldo Pereira Pinto Junior. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - DHS' Bond Evidence, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Petitioner's Bond Evidence, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Bond Order)(Cerretani, Gabriela) (Entered: 08/10/2026)

#12

Aug 19, 2026

Opposition to Motion

#13

Sep 09, 2026

Expedite

#14

Oct 05, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re 11 Motion to Enforce Judgment AND 13 Motion to Expedite.The Court has reviewed Petitioner's "motion to enforce judgment," D. 11, in which he contends that the bond hearing provided to him by Respondents, see D. 8, pursuant to this Court's Order, D. 7, did not comport with the due process requirements elucidated in Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), because the immigration judge ("IJ") did not "hold [the government] to its burden" or "consider alternatives to detention." D. 11. Having reviewed Petitioner's papers, D. 11, Respondents' opposition, D. 12, and the audio recording of Petitioner's bond hearing, D. 12-1, the Court DENIES the motion, D. 11. Given the Court's disposition of the motion to enforce, the Court also DENIES the pending motion to expedite, D. 13, as moot. As a preliminary matter, the government argues that the Court should deny Petitioner's motion to enforce judgment on the ground that "Petitioner does not allege that he has exhausted administrative remedies." D. 12 at 2. Because the Court concludes that Petitioner's claim fails on the merits, the Court proceeds to the merits of Petitioner's challenge.At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk." Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. "[C]ourts in the First Circuit have reviewed immigration judges' bond determinations for compliance with this constitutionally mandated burden of proof [of a preponderance of evidence]" for flight-risk determinations. Hernandez-Azuaje v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-13224-ADB, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2026); see, e.g., Loja Loja v. Moniz, No. 26-cv-11826-MJJ (D. Mass. Apr. 28, 2026), D. 10; see also Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 142 (D. Mass. 2019) (noting that a court retains habeas jurisdiction to review compliance with its prior order conditionally granting habeas relief). "To show that an immigration judge failed to apply the correct standard, a noncitizen must either 'point to the language of the immigration judge's opinion or demonstrate that "the evidence itself could not–as a matter of law–have supported" the immigration judge's decision to deny bond.'" Hernandez-Azuaje, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (quoting Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (internal citation omitted)). "Given the highly circumscribed nature of judicial review in this context, courts cannot override an immigration judge's bond decision simply because they 'might have reached a different result if considering the issue de novo or in the context of a bail review in a criminal case.'" Id. (quoting Massingue v. Streeter, No. 19-cv-30159-KAR, 2020 WL 1866255, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 14, 2020)). "Rather, habeas relief is appropriate only if the immigration judge's 'exercise of discretion in denying bond was so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process.'" Id. (quoting Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 144).Here, the Court concludes that Petitioner's challenge to the IJ's flight-risk determination fails on the merits. At the bond hearing, the government submitted evidence that Petitioner was "charged with leaving the scene of property damage in April 2023" and "arraigned for operating on a suspended license in July 2023, August 2024, October 2024, and June 2026," and that Petitioner had "failed to appear for" three of those arraignments, resulting in warrants for his arrest. D. 11-3 at 3-4; D. 11-1. As the IJ noted, at the time of his bond hearing, Petitioner had no pending applications for relief from removal. D. 11-3 at 4. The IJ's written decision acknowledged the evidence in Petitioner's favor–that Petitioner had appeared at his ICE check-ins and had "significant community support, a sponsor, [and] a fixed address with his wife and U.S. citizen child"–but the IJ ultimately found, based on Petitioner's "fail[ure] to appear three times at state court," "history of disregard for traffic laws," "disregard for the immigration laws of the United States" and lack of pending applications for relief, that the government had carried its burden to show Petitioner posed a risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. "Even though the Court might, on direct review (and with the benefit of more information and context), weigh this evidence differently, it cannot say that the immigration judge's conclusion that it amounted to" a preponderance of evidence of a risk of flight "was 'so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process.'" Hernandez-Azuaje, 2026 WL 221833, at *2 (quoting Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 144); cf. Vaca Espinoza v. Moniz, No. 26-cv-11472-DJC (D. Mass. May 17, 2026), D. 15 (allowing motion to enforce when, among other things, IJ "failed to consider probative evidence submitted by Petitioner and the lack of same submitted by the government").As to alternatives to detention, the IJ acknowledged Petitioner's "sponsor"–a legal permanent resident who agreed to help "ensur[e] his compliance with all requirements imposed by immigration authorities," D. 11-2 at 29–but found that "there are no conditions or combination of conditions that would reasonably assure [Petitioner's] attendance at future hearings," D. 11-3 at 3-4. Again, the question is not whether this Court would have reached the same conclusion on this record; it is whether the IJ afforded Petitioner due process. Hernandez-Azuaje, 2026 WL 221833, at *2. On this record, the Court cannot say the IJ's conclusion was so arbitrary as to offend principles of due process.Accordingly, Petitioner's motion to enforce, D. 11, is DENIED. Petitioner's motion to expedite, D. 13, is DENIED AS MOOT. (EZG) (Entered: 10/05/2026)

Oct 05, 2026

Order on Motion to Enforce Judgment AND Order on Motion to Expedite