District of Massachusetts • 1:25-cv-13480

#1

Nov 20, 2025

First PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11371443 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Bianca De Souza Costa. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Category Form)(Cross, Jeremy) Modified on 11/20/2025 to correct docket text, Respondent names, and add Petitioner to docket. (MAC) (Entered: 11/20/2025)

#2

Nov 20, 2025

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Paul G. Levenson. (SEC) (Entered: 11/20/2025)

#3

Nov 20, 2025

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. ORDER CONCERNING SERVICE OF PETITION AND STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (SEC) (Entered: 11/20/2025)

Nov 20, 2025

Notice of Case Assignment

#4

Dec 02, 2025

Notice of Appearance

#5

Dec 02, 2025

Notice of Appearance

#6

Dec 04, 2025

Notice - Other

#7

Dec 04, 2025

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#8

Dec 08, 2025

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re 6 Notice (Other) Assented to Motion to Transfer filed by David Wesling, Donald J Trump, Pamela J. Bondi, Kristi L Noem, Todd Lyons. ALLOWED. (LMH) (Entered: 12/08/2025)

Dec 08, 2025

Order

#9

Dec 23, 2025

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Having considered the habeas petition (the "Petition") filed by Petitioner Bianca De Souza ("Petitioner"), D. 1, and Respondent's response to same, D. 7, the Court DENIES the Petition, D. 1. Factual Background. Petitioner is a twenty-five-year-old noncitizen from Brazil and resident of Massachusetts. D. 1 ¶ 19. Petitioner was transferred to and is currently detained at the Chittenden Regional Correctional Facility in Burlington, Vermont. D. 6 at 1; D. 7-1 ¶ 5. Respondents acknowledged that this Court would retain jurisdiction over this case despite Petitioner's relocation to Vermont. D. 6 at 1. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection on or about June 12, 2022. D. 7-1 ¶ 7. Petitioner did not present a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card or other valid entry document. Id. On the same day, United States Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") agents arrested Petitioner, and she was served with a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, Form I-860, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Id. ¶¶ 8-9. After Petitioner expressed fear of returning to Brazil, she was released on parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), which, as discussed below, is a key distinction in this case. Id. ¶¶ 10-11; D. 1 ¶ 22; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (allowing for discretionary, temporary parole by the Department of Homeland Security "on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit").On or about February 14, 2023, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") received the case for a credible fear interview. D. 7-1 ¶ 12. On or about August 22, 2024, Petitioner submitted an affirmative application for asylum and withholding of removal to USCIS. D. 1 ¶ 23. Petitioner's application was denied, and she was notified that pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.30, her "claim would be reviewed through the credible fear screening process." Id. ¶ 24. On or about November 18, 2025, Petitioner presented herself at the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ICE/ERO") Office in Burlington, Massachusetts to comply with a required check-in and was detained. Id. ¶ 25; D. 7-1 ¶ 13. ICE revoked Petitioner's parole under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) "in finding that neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warranted the continued presence of the Petitioner in the United States." D. 7-1 ¶ 13. On or about November 25, 2025, ICE referred Petitioner's case to USCIS for a credible fear interview, which was scheduled for December 5, 2025. Id. ¶ 14.Petitioner alleges that her custody is properly governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226, see D. 1 ¶ 26, and contends that her detention without a bond hearing is, therefore, unlawful because it violates her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see id. ¶¶ 15-17, 28, 30-32. She seeks immediate release or a bond hearing. Id. ¶ 27. Respondents contend Petitioner's arrest and detention are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). D. 7 at 9-10.Discussion. The Petition challenges Petitioner's detention in this district and seeks relief from same. Id. at 10. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition as it concerns relief that Petitioner seeks challenging her continued detention. Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 614 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting that "we have held that district courts retain jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detention in the immigration context")."Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due to... lack of valid documentation." Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). "Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally ordered removed 'without further hearing or review' pursuant to an expedited removal process." Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). "Applicants who indicate a fear of persecution if returned to their country of origin 'shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.'" De Andrade v. Moniz, No. 25-cv-12455-FDS, 2025 WL 2841844, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 7, 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV)). "Detention is "mandate[d]... throughout the completion of applicable proceedings and not just until the moment those proceedings begin.'" Id. (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 302). "Under the statute, applicants are not entitled to a bond hearing, nor is there a limit on the length of detention, other than whatever limit the constitution may impose." Id."Applicants detained under § 1225 may be paroled into the country 'only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. '" Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). That "authority is not unbounded," and "under the APA, DHS's exercise of discretion within that statutory framework must be reasonable and reasonably explained." Id. (quoting Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 806-07 (2022)). Parole pursuant to section 1182(d)(5)(A) "employs a legal fiction whereby non-citizens are physically permitted to enter the country but are nonetheless 'treated,' for legal purposes, 'as if stopped at the border,'" Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 216 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020)), and "[a] non-citizen paroled into the country under § 1182(d)(5)(A) is still treated as an applicant for admission subject to the expedited removal process," see De Andrade, 2025 WL 2841844, at *3. "Notably, conditional parole under § 1226(a) is distinct from 'humanitarian' or 'significant public benefit' parole into the United States under § 1182(d)(5)(A)." De Andrade, 2025 WL 2841844, at *4. "Conditional parole under § 1226(a) 'releases a non-citizen already in the country from domestic detention' pending the normal removal process, whereas parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) 'permits a non-citizen to physically enter the country, subject to a reservation of rights by the Government that it may continue to treat the non-citizen' as an applicant for admission in expedited removal proceedings." Id. (citing Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 215); see Da Silva v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-12672-DJC, 2025 WL 2969163, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 2025) (allowing bond hearing for alien released on his own recognizance where the NTA did not charge him as an arriving alien and noting the distinction between § 1226(a), which allows for discretionary determinations of custody before an immigration, and § 1225(b)(2), which provides for mandatory detention for "applicants of admission"). A detainee pursuant to section 1225 only has the "rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute," Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140, and is not entitled to the same review afforded to a section 1226 detainee "even though the [section 1225] detainee may pose no danger to the community or flight risk, and the process may be as lengthy the regular removal process," De Andrade, 2025 WL 2841844, at *4; Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 111 (noting that "[w]hether an applicant [for admission] who raises an asylum claim received full or only expedited review, the applicant is not entitled to immediate release"). Here, the Court concludes the Petitioner's detention does not violate the Due Process Clause given her immigration status at the time of the detention, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (providing that such applicant "shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed"); Shonavazrov v. Moniz, No. 25-cv-10304-MJJ (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 2025), D. 12 at 2-4 (concluding that petitioner's detention was governed by section 1225 and comported with due process where he was initially processed for expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1) and deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(7)); and that the present record before the Court suggests Respondents have proceeded with Petitioner's removal proceedings on an expedited basis pursuant 8 U.S.C. § 1225, including by arranging a credible dear interview. See Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that the petitioners were lawfully detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) in the first instance and lawfully held thereafter); cf. Bento De Souza v. Moniz, No. 25-cv-13189-LTS (D. Mass. Dec. 9, 2025), D. 19 at 3-5 & n.2 (concluding that petitioner was entitled to relief where the Court's review of the record "cause[d] it to question the reliability of the declarations submitted... on behalf of ICE," the record indicated petitioner was not always subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) because "respondents invoked, but did not follow through with, the expedited process" and the most recent removal proceedings were pursuant to a new Notice to Appear). The Petitioner's parole in the present case was pursuant to § 1182(d)(5)(A), which "does not affect an alien's statutory or constitutional rights, as it 'shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.'" See De Andrade, 2025 WL 2841844, at *3 (quoting § 1182(d)(5)(A)); see Rincon v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-12633-BEM, 2025 WL 3122784, at *4 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2025), unlike petitioners given conditional parole. See De Andrade, 2025 WL 2841844, at *1 (involving a petitioner who was "then--in apparent violation of [§ 1225(b)(1)], which requires mandatory detention–released [by the government] on conditional parole under § 1226(a)" and issued an order of release on recognizance); Da Silva v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2969163, at *1 (noting that petitioner was released on an order of recognizance).For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Petition, D. 1.(LMH) (Entered: 12/23/2025)

#10

Dec 23, 2025

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. ORDER DISMISSING CASE(LMH) (Entered: 12/23/2025)

Dec 23, 2025

Order