District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-12473

#1

Jun 01, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11782252 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Theogene Nsabimana. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Detainee Locator, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet, # 3 Category Form)(Ladebush, Branden) (Entered: 06/01/2026)

#2

Jun 01, 2026

Judge Richard G. Stearns: ORDER entered. EMERGENCY ORDER CONCERNING STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (svm) (Entered: 06/01/2026)

#3

Jun 02, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Paul G. Levenson. (CAM) (Entered: 06/02/2026)

#4

Jun 02, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (EZG) (Entered: 06/02/2026)

#5

Jun 02, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. ORDER CONCERNING SERVICE OF PETITION AND STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (EZG) (Entered: 06/02/2026)

Jun 02, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

#6

Jun 03, 2026

Notice of Appearance

#7

Jun 03, 2026

Notice - Other

#8

Jun 16, 2026

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#9

Jun 17, 2026

Leave to File Document

#10

Jun 17, 2026

Response - not related to a motion

#11

Jul 02, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Having reviewed the Petition of Theogene Nsabimana ("Petitioner") for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 (the "Petition"), D.1, Respondents' response, D.8, Petitioner's motion for leave to file an amended petition, D.9, and Petitioner's reply, D.10, the Court concludes as follows. The Court ALLOWS the Petition insofar as it sought a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. §1226(a), at which the government bears the burden of proving Petitioner poses a danger to the community or flight risk, see Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021), which the Court ORDERS within seven (7) days of this Order. Respondents are also ENJOINED from denying Petitioner bond on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2). The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within ten (10) days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial. Lastly, the Court DENIES Petitioner's motion for leave to file an amended petition, D. 9, as moot.Background. Petitioner is a noncitizen who entered the United States on August 1, 2024, and has remained in the country since then. D.1 15. U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detained Petitioner on May 16, 2026, and placed him in an ICE detention facility located in Dover, NH. Id.; D. 8-1. On June 1, 2026, ICE initiated a transfer of Petitioner from the Dover facility to an ICE detention facility in Oakdale, Louisiana. D.8-1. Respondents report that the transfer began at 8:15 a.m., and that Petitioner crossed into Massachusetts at 8:45 a.m. where he later boarded a flight to Alexandria, Louisiana at 2:20 p.m.. D.8 at 2. Respondents also inform the Court that Petitioner's flight stopped in Indianapolis, Indiana from 4:20 p.m. to 5:53 p.m. before landing in Alexandria at 7:26 p.m. Id.Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire on June 1, 2026. D.1 10. That petition has been voluntarily dismissed. Nsabimana v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't & Removal Operations, 26-cv-00450-SE-TSM (D. N.H. June 5, 2026), D.6. After counsel for Petitioner "received information that Petitioner may be in transit to, or under the control of, the ICE Field Office in Burlington, Massachusetts," Petitioner filed the Petition with this Court on June 1, 2026, at 5:59 p.m. D. 1 12; D.8-3.Discussion. As an initial matter, the Court considers whether it has jurisdiction over the Petition. "In determining whether this court has jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition, it first must determine the proper respondent to the petition and, second, whether the court has jurisdiction over that respondent." McPherson v. Holder, No. 14-cv-30207-MGM, 2015 WL 12861171, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 4, 2015) (citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004)). And "not surprisingly, as a general rule, a petitioner must file a habeas petition in the district in which they are confined and must name as a respondent the petitioner's immediate custodian." Ozturk v. Trump, 777 F. Supp. 3d 26, 34 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442-47).Respondents contest this Court's jurisdiction because Petitioner was not in Massachusetts when the Petition was filed at 5:59 p.m. on June 1, 2026, D.8 at 3, and ahead of this Courts order prohibiting any transfer of the Petitioner for at least 72 hours, which was entered at 6:06 p.m. D. 2. Unbeknownst to Petitioner's counsel at the time, Petitioner "was in mid-flight between Indianapolis and Alexandria" when the Petition was filed. D.10 1. Petitioner nevertheless argues that his counsel "did not know and could not reasonably have known Petitioner's location or immediate physical custodian" when filing the Petition. D.10 2. And, Petitioner continues, under such circumstances, the Supreme Court has recognized "it is impossible to apply the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules." Id. 5 (quoting Padilla, 542 U.S. at 450 n.18).Applying Padilla, other sessions of this Court have exercised jurisdiction over petitions filed while petitioners' locations and immediate custodians were unknown during unannounced transfers, and when such petitions were filed in the petitioners' last known district naming their last known custodians and more senior respondents. Van Tran v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-12546-ADB, 2025 WL 3171210, at *3-5 (D. Mass. Nov. 13, 2025); Villegas v. Wesling, et al., No. 26-cv-10851-LTS, 2026 WL 1733663, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 20, 2026), appeal docketed, No. 26-1662. As in those cases, the immediate custodian and place of confinement rules applied here "must bend in order to preserve Petitioner's right to petition for the writ." Villegas, No. 26-cv-10851-LTS, 2026 WL 1733663, at *4 (quoting Van Tran, No. 25-cv-12546-ADB, 2025 WL 3171210, at *3-4). Petitioner filed the Petition during an unannounced transfer while his precise location was unknown to counsel beyond information that Petitioner "may be in transit to, or under the control of, the ICE Field Office in Burlington, Massachusetts." D.1 2. The Petition names the ICE Acting Boston Field Office Director and several more senior respondents as Petitioner's legal custodians. Id. 16-19. Jurisdiction, therefore, lies here.Consistent with this Court's prior rulings, including and not limited to Da Silva v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-12672-DJC, 2025 WL 2969163, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 2025), and Dias de Carvalho v. Hyde, 25-cv-12677-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 2025), D. 14, the Court agrees with Petitioner that his custody is governed by 8 U.S.C. §1226(a) (which allows for discretionary determinations of custody before an immigration judge) and not 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2) (which provides for mandatory detention for "applicants for admission"), D.10 16; see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (discussing the distinction); see also Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2026) (affirming that petitioner's detention "is governed by Section 1226 and that he is entitled to a bond hearing...consistent with the decisions of...over ninety percent of district court judges"). Respondents submit that this Court's decision in Dias de Carvalho is likely dispositive here. See D. 8 at 5. Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §1226(a).Accordingly, the Court ALLOWS the Petition, D.1, insofar as it sought "further relief this Court deems just and proper," which this Court has determined is a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination under 8 U.S.C. §1226(a), at which the government bears the burden of proving Petitioner poses a danger to the community or flight risk, see Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41, which the Court ORDERS within seven (7) days of this Order. Respondents are also ENJOINED from denying Petitioner bond on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2). The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within ten (10) days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial.As a result of the Court's ruling today, Petitioner's motion for leave to file an amended complaint, D.9, is DENIED as moot. (EZG) Modified on 7/6/2026: to correct minor formatting typos - NEF regenerated (EZG). (Entered: 07/02/2026)

Jul 02, 2026

Order on Motion for Leave to File Document

#12

Jul 10, 2026

Status Report

#13

Jul 16, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. In light of the status report, D. 12, and relief that the Court had previously granted, D. 11, the Court dismisses the Petition and closes this case. (SEC) (Entered: 07/16/2026)

#14

Jul 16, 2026

Order Dismissing Case

Jul 16, 2026

Order

#15

Jul 23, 2026

Reopen Case

#16

Aug 06, 2026

Opposition to Motion

#17

Aug 20, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re 15 MOTION to Reopen Case for the Limited Purpose of Enforcement and to Enforce the Courts July 2, 2026, Order. Having reviewed the motion to reopen the Petition of Theogene Nsabimana ("Petitioner") for the purpose of enforcing the Court's July 2, 2026 Order, D. 15; see D. 11, and Respondents' opposition, D. 16, the Court DENIES Petitioner's motion.Background. On July 2, 2026, the Court allowed the Petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, D. 1, and ordered a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), at which the government would bear the burden of proving that Petitioner posed a danger to the community or flight risk in order to continue Petitioner's detention, D. 11. As a result, a hearing was held on July 9, 2026, and an immigration judge determined that the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") had not met its burden of establishing dangerousness but concluded that Petitioner presented a flight risk and denied bond. D. 15 ¶ 2; D. 15-2 at 3.Petitioner then filed the present motion, D. 15, seeking to reopen proceedings in this Court on the basis that the Court's prior Order had not been complied with because the immigration judge did not apply the correct legal standard and the hearing itself did not satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process, id. ¶¶ 5, 19, 22. Petitioner seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a new custody redetermination hearing before a different immigration judge. Id. ¶¶ 38-39. Respondents oppose the motion, asserting that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the immigration judge's decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) and that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, specifically he has not appealed the bond decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). D. 16 at 2, 6.Discussion. Section 1226(e) provides that "[t]he Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review," and that "[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General . . . regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole." 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). The Attorney General's discretion, and by delegation, that of the immigration judge, however, is still bound by constitutional restraints. Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 34. The Court, therefore, is limited to "assess[ing] whether [the] immigration bond hearing comported with due process requirements," Reyes Vargas v. Warden, Plymouth Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 26-cv-11740-AK, 2026 WL 1453510, at *5 (D. Mass. May 22, 2026), and it cannot reweigh the evidence or address claims that the immigration judge's findings were based on "insufficient (or insufficiently articulated) evidence," Dos Reis v. Vitello, 25-cv-10497-RGS, 2025 WL 1043434, at *2 (D. Mass. April 8, 2025); see Le v. Moniz, No. 26-cv-12801-IT, 2026 WL 2209807, at *4 (D. Mass. July 13, 2026).The immigration judge's order reflects that "[a]fter full consideration of the evidence presented," with "the government bear[ing] the burden of proving [Petitioner] poses a danger to the community or flight risk . . . DHS has not established that [Petitioner] is a danger to the community. DHS has established that [Petitioner] is a significant risk of flight and that his release on bond is not warranted." D. 15-2 at 3. Counsel for Petitioner submitted a declaration stating that the immigration judge considered the following factors in reaching his decision: "Recent entry into the United States (2024); Overstaying his visa; Speculative relief (a timely filed I-589); Lack of family ties that can confer status; [and] Support letters from community members." D. 15-3 at 1. Respondents have not objected to or disputed the accuracy of Petitioner's summary of the factors considered at the bond hearing. See Reyes Vargas, 2026 WL 1453510, at *6-7 (considering petitioner's account of the immigration judge's reasoning where respondents did not dispute that account).Based on the immigration judge's order and Petitioner's submissions, the immigration judge applied the correct standard, addressed several pieces of evidence and concluded that DHS had met its burden of showing Petitioner was a flight risk. See Reyes Vargas, 2026 WL 1453510, at *6 (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)) (listing nine factors an immigration judge "may" consider in determining whether a noncitizen poses a flight risk). Thus, on the present record, the Court cannot conclude that Respondents failed to comply with its previous Order or that the immigration judge's determination that Respondents demonstrated Petitioner's flight risk was so arbitrary that it offended the notion of due process. See Le, 2026 WL 2209807, at *4-5; see also Martins v. Nessinger, No. 26-cv-252-MRD-PAS, 2026 WL 1802819, at *1 (D.R.I. June 23, 2026) (denying a motion to enforce the judgment of a prior habeas petition where the intervening bond hearing did not "offend[ ] the traditional understanding of due process").As for Petitioner's claims that the record identified by the immigration judge was "legally insufficient" to meet DHS's burden and that the immigration judge "failed to address material evidence and did not provide a reviewable rationale," D. 15 at 9-10, the Court concludes these are "precisely the type[s] of alleged error[s] committed to review by the BIA (and in most circumstances ultimately by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals)," Dos Reis, 2025 WL 1043434, at *2.Lastly, the Court addresses Petitioner's claim that the immigration judge failed to meaningfully consider conditions short of continued detention. D. 15 ¶ 37. "On this point, the First Circuit has made it clear that the Immigration Court is 'better equipped than are federal courts to determine what alternatives to detention an [immigration judge] has the authority to enforce.'" Martins, 2026 WL 1802819, at *2 (quoting Brito v. Garland, 22 F.4th 240, 256 (1st Cir. 2021)). For the reasons stated, Petitioner's motion to reopen, D. 15, is DENIED. (SEC) (Entered: 08/20/2026)

Aug 20, 2026

Order on Motion to Reopen Case