District of Massachusetts • 1:25-cv-13455

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Nov 19, 2025

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11367884 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Eddie Santiago Santillan. (Attachments: # 1 Category Form, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet, # 3 Exhibit 2012 DACA Approval Notice, # 4 Exhibit 2015 DACA Approval Notice)(Shaw, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/19/2025)

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Nov 19, 2025

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Paul G. Levenson. (LBO) (Entered: 11/19/2025)

Nov 19, 2025

Notice of Case Assignment

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Nov 20, 2025

Service Order-2241 Petition

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Nov 21, 2025

Notice of Appearance

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Dec 04, 2025

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

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Dec 22, 2025

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Having reviewed the petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the "Petition") filed by Petitioner Eddie Santiago Santillan ("Petitioner"), D. 1, and Respondents' response to same, D. 5, the Court ALLOWS the Petition insofar as it sought a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which the Court ORDERS within seven (7) days of this Order. Respondents are also ENJOINED from denying Petitioner bond on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within ten (10) days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial.Factual Background. Petitioner is a thirty-three-year-old noncitizen from Mexico currently detained at Plymouth County Correctional Facility. D. 1 ¶¶ 2-3, 17, 22. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in approximately 2001 and has resided in this country for over twenty-four years. Id. ¶¶ 3, 27. Petitioner was granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") in 2012, which was renewed in 2015. Id. ¶¶ 3, 28; D. 1-3; D. 1-4. The renewal was valid through June 14, 2017. D. 1-4 at 2. Petitioner contends that he "submitted a timely renewal" and that he responded to a Notice of Intent to Deny earlier this year. D. 1 ¶ 28. As alleged, Petitioner survived labor trafficking between ages nine and twenty-one. Id. ¶¶ 4, 29. He is in the process of seeking T nonimmigrant status. Id. On November 5, 2025, Petitioner was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") following his arrest at a state detention facility. Id. ¶¶ 3, 31. The immigration court set a master calendar hearing for November 20, 2025, id. ¶ 3. Petitioner alleges that his detention is not authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and that his custody is properly governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 33, 35. Petitioner contends that his current detention is unlawful, including because it violates his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, id. ¶¶ 34-45, and is contrary to statute, id. ¶¶ 46-47.Discussion. The Petition challenges Petitioner's detention in this district and seeks relief from same. D. 1. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition as it concerns relief that Petitioner seeks challenging his continued detention. Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 614 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting that "we have held that district courts retain jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detention in the immigration context").Consistent with this Court's prior rulings, including and not limited to Da Silva v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-12672, 2025 WL 2969163, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 2025), and Dias de Carvalho v. Hyde, 25-cv-12677-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 2025), D. 14, the Court agrees with Petitioner that his custody is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (which allows for discretionary determinations of custody before an immigration judge) and not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (which provides for mandatory detention for "applicants for admission"), as Respondents contend, see D. 5 at 1 n.1; see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (discussing the distinction). As alleged, Petitioner was already residing in the United States for over twenty-four years before ICE detained him and had previously been granted deferred action under DACA. D. 1 ¶¶ 27-28; D. 1-3; D. 1-4. Respondents submit that this Court's decisions in Dias de Carvalho and Da Silva are likely dispositive here. See D. 5 at 1. Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). To the extent Petitioner separately contends that his detention offends due process because he is in the process of seeking a T visa, see D. 1 ¶¶ 8-11, 36-37, 39-44, the Court notes that Petitioner had not yet filed a T visa application when ICE detained him or when the Petition was filed, id. ¶¶ 4, 29. Moreover, Petitioner has not provide a legal basis for his contention that he is entitled to a stay of proceeding where he is in the process of seeking a T visa. Rather, Petitioner's argument seems to include a significant number of quotations that do not appear in the cases cited, see id. ¶¶ 11 (quoting passages from United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2004); Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011); and Sierra v. I.N.S., 258 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001) that do not appear to be from those respective cases), 35 (same), 44 (same as to Copeland and Sierra) and misstate the statutory and regulatory cites he invokes. For example, Petitioner has also erroneously argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1227 mandates a stay of removal for a noncitizen "who is a bona fide applicant for T nonimmigrant status," see id. ¶ 40 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(2)), whereas that provision contains no such language and instead provides that the Secretary of DHS "may" stay a final order of removal for a person whose application "sets forth a prima facie case for approval," 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(1). Moreover, subsection (d)(2) merely provides that a denial of such a discretionary stay of removal "shall not preclude the alien from applying for a stay of removal, deferred action, or a continuance or abeyance of removal proceedings under any other provision of the immigration laws of the United States." Id. § 1227(d)(2). Petitioner's further quotation that "under 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(d)(9), 'DHS will automatically stay removal of an alien who is prima facie eligible for T nonimmigrant status,'" D. 1 ¶ 40, is also a quotation that is not found in that provision of regulation, which, additionally, is no longer in effect (as of August 28, 2024). 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(d)(9); cf. 8 C.F.R. § 214.204(b)(2)(i) (providing that "[f]iling of an Application for T Nonimmigrant Status has no effect on DHS authority or discretion to execute a final order of removal, although the applicant may request an administrative stay of removal").For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes as follows. The Court ALLOWS the Petition, D. 1, insofar as it sought a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which the Court ORDERS within seven (7) days of this Order. Respondents are also ENJOINED from denying Petitioner bond on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within ten (10) days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial. (LMH) (Entered: 12/22/2025)

Dec 22, 2025

Order

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Dec 23, 2025

Status Report