District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-12304

#1

May 20, 2026

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#2

May 20, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Judge Myong J. Joun assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Donald L. Cabell. (NMC) (Entered: 05/20/2026)

#3

May 20, 2026

General Order 19-02

#4

May 20, 2026

Service Order-2241 Petition

#5

May 20, 2026

Copy re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), 4 Service Order - 2241 Petition, mailed to All Respondents on 5/20/2026. (SP) (Entered: 05/20/2026)

May 20, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

May 20, 2026

Copy Mailed

#6

May 26, 2026

NOTICE of Appearance by Vincent Engingro, III on behalf of Antone Moniz, David Wesling (Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 05/26/2026)

#7

May 26, 2026

RESPONSE/ANSWER to Petitioner's 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) by Antone Moniz, David Wesling. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 05/26/2026)

#8

May 26, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. In their Response to Habeas Petition, Doc. No. 7, Respondents acknowledge that the legal issues presented in this petition are similar to those resolved in prior cases in this district. Given this, and in light of the record before me, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. Respondents are ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) by June 2, 2026. The Respondents are ENJOINED from denying bond to Petitioner on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Unless Petitioner was provided a bond hearing, Respondents shall release Petitioner by 6 PM on June 2, 2026. The Respondents are further ORDERED to file a status report within 24 hours of the bond hearing, stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial, or whether he has been released, and if so, the date, time, and location of his release.(SP) (Entered: 05/26/2026)

May 26, 2026

Order

#9

Jun 02, 2026

Status Report

#10

Jun 03, 2026

Response - not related to a motion

#11

Jun 18, 2026

Miscellaneous Relief

#12

Jun 22, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. In response to the Motion to Enforce Judgment at Doc. No. 11, Respondents are ORDERED to file their response, an official transcript of the bond hearing held in Immigration Court, and the evidentiary record before the Immigration Judge at the bond hearing by June 26, 2026.(SP) (Entered: 06/22/2026)

Jun 22, 2026

Order

#13

Jun 26, 2026

Extension of Time to File Response/Reply

#14

Jun 29, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. GRANTING 13 Assented to MOTION for Extension of Time to June 30, 2026 to File Response/Reply as to 12 Order, by Antone Moniz, David Wesling. Replies due by 6/30/2026. (SP) (Entered: 06/29/2026)

Jun 29, 2026

Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply

#15

Jun 30, 2026

Opposition to Motion

#16

Jul 01, 2026

Notice - Other

#17

Jul 01, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. On 6/18/2026, Petitioner filed a motion to enforce this Court’s 5/26/2026 order granting habeas relief. See Doc. No. 11 . Petitioner alleges the Respondents failed to provide a constitutionally adequate bond hearing. [Id.]. On 6/22/2026, I ordered Respondents to file a response to the motion, together with the official transcript of the bond hearing conducted in Immigration Court and the evidentiary record presented to the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) at that hearing. See [Doc. No. 12]. Respondents filed a response on 6/30/2026, arguing judicial review of the IJ’s bond decision is prohibited, and Petitioner’s recourse is to exhaust administrative remedies. Doc. No. 15 at 1.This Court has jurisdiction to review whether the bond hearing it ordered comported with constitutionally mandated burdens of proof. See, e.g., Massingue v. Streeter, No. 19-cv-30159, 2020 WL 1866255, at *3 (D. Mass. Apr. 14, 2020) (“[A] district court retains jurisdiction to review compliance with its earlier order conditionally granting habeas relief.” (quoting Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 142 (D. Mass. 2019))); Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2021). Specifically, the First Circuit has held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that the government prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a noncitizen is a flight risk before a noncitizen may be denied release on bond on that basis. Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. To show that an immigration judge failed to apply this standard, a noncitizen must either “point to the language of the immigration judge’s opinion or demonstrate that ‘the evidence itself could not—as a matter of law—have supported’ the immigration judge’s decision to deny bond.” Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (quoting Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 240 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)). The Court’s review in this context is extraordinarily limited: Habeas relief is appropriate only if the immigration judge’s “exercise of discretion in denying bond was so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process.” Id. at 144 (internal citation omitted).Here, the IJ failed to apply this standard. While the IJ noted for the record that “the Department has met its burden to show that the respondent is a flight risk by preponderance of the evidence,” the reasons given for that flight risk determination were that “the respondent has been previously ordered removed” and former “applications for relief have been previously denied.” [Doc. No. 15-1 at 5]. This conflates securing appearance at removal proceedings with flight risk, which are separate inquiries. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 32 (citing Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017)) (noting that the government in that case “fail[ed] to explain why its proffered interest in securing appearance at removal proceedings and for deportation holds sway where a noncitizen is not a flight risk.”). Indeed, while “[t]he government has legitimate interests in protecting the public and in ensuring that noncitizens in removal proceedings appear for hearings,... any detention incidental to removal must ‘bear[ ] [a] reasonable relation to [its] purpose.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 990 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)). The record before the IJ demonstrated that Petitioner owns a home with his spouse, where they are raising five children together. [Doc. No. 15-1 at 4]. Petitioner has appeared for all immigration court hearings. [Id.]. Petitioner held stable employment before detention, and the record indicates he seeks to return to employment upon release so he can support his wife and children. [Id.]. None of these factors indicate flight risk. The IJ’s reliance on the mere fact of Petitioner’s removal proceedings is insufficient as a matter of law.Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner immediately, no later than 6pm today, July 1, 2026. This order is without prejudice to Respondents requiring Petitioner to comply with reasonable conditions of supervision upon release, provided that such conditions are imposed, and written notice to Petitioner is provided, within seven days of this order. Respondents are ORDERED to file a status report by 10:00 a.m. on July 6, 2026, confirming their compliance with this Order.(SP) (Entered: 07/01/2026)

Jul 01, 2026

Order

#18

Jul 08, 2026

Status Report