District of Massachusetts • 3:26-cv-12148

#1

May 12, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11738919 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Category Form)(Miller, Jacob) Modified on 5/12/2026 to remove duplicate text (LBO). (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#2

May 12, 2026

Case transferred to Western Division (Springfield) (LBO) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#3

May 12, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Judge George A. OToole, Jr assigned to case. (MPZ) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#4

May 12, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (FGD) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#5

May 12, 2026

Judge George A. OToole, Jr: ORDER entered. SERVICE ORDER re 2241 Petition. Order entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2243 governing Section 2241 cases for service on respondents. The answer or responsive pleading is due no later than 14 days from receipt of this order. (FGD) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#6

May 12, 2026

Copy re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), 5 Service Order - 2241 Petition, emailed to Duty AUSA and mailed to Respondents and USAO on 5/12/2026. (FGD) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

May 12, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

May 12, 2026

Case Transferred Out - Divisional Transfer

May 12, 2026

Copy Mailed

#7

May 26, 2026

NOTICE of Appearance by Vincent Engingro, III on behalf of Patricia Hyde, Michael Krol, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin (Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 05/26/2026)

#8

May 26, 2026

RESPONSE/ANSWER to Petitioner's 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), by Patricia Hyde, Michael Krol, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 05/26/2026)

#9

Jun 02, 2026

Judge George A. OToole, Jr: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(h), I direct the Clerk to return this case for random assignment to a new district judge. (FGD) (Entered: 06/02/2026)

#10

Jun 02, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Reassignment. Judge Mark G. Mastroianni added. Judge George A. OToole, Jr no longer assigned to case. (MPZ) (Entered: 06/02/2026)

Jun 02, 2026

Notice of Reassignment

Jun 02, 2026

Order Reassigning Case

#11

Jun 09, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order entered granting 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241). The court grants the petition ("Petition") in so far as it seeks a bond hearing before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(a). The court orders the bond hearing, which must be constitutionally adequate pursuant to Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), to be held by June 18, 2026. The court further orders Respondents to file a status report by June 23, 2026, stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Columbia who Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained and took into custody on May 12, 2026. Petitioner asserts that ICE is detaining him without cause and in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. He further states that he has filed for asylum and that he has his next asylum hearing on September 30, 2026. Respondents allege that Petitioner was arrested on November 5, 2025, and charged with rape and a liquor-related offense in Berkshire County, Massachusetts. (Dkt. No. 8, n. 1.) Respondents do not allege nor does their attached exhibit indicate that Petitioner was convicted of any charges. This court has jurisdiction over the Petition as it concerns relief that Petitioner seeks challenging his continued detention. See Kong v. United States, 62 F. 4th 608, 614 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting that "we have held that district courts retain jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detention in the immigration context" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court finds 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c) is not applicable to Petitioner and finds that Petitioner's continued detention violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226, non-citizens may generally be "released on bond during the pendency of their immigration proceedings." Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(a)). Sec. 1226(c), however, creates "'a statutory category of aliens who may not be released' during removal proceedings, outside of certain limited circumstances." Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)) (emphasis in original). "Under Section 1226(c), the government 'shall take into custody' any noncitizen who is inadmissible or deportable based on, among other things, a conviction for certain crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled substance offenses, aggravated felonies, certain firearm offenses, or certain acts associated with terrorism." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)). In addition, the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), added a new subparagraph which is not at issue here. In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this mandatory detention provision, holding that criminal noncitizens can be detained for a "brief period necessary for their removal proceedings" without being provided with an "individualized determination as to whether [they] [present] [a] flight risk." Id. However, "[i]n upholding the constitutionality of [S]ection 1226(c)'s mandatory detention procedure in Demore,... the Court explained that that section specifically applies to a class of noncitizens who had already been convicted (beyond a reasonable doubt) of committing certain serious crimes." Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 35. Here, by contrast, Petitioner had been arrested and charged with rape and a liquor-related offense before ICE detained him. It appears likely, but there were no definitive details provided, that Petitioner was, at some point, released from pretrial detention in state court. The government is not alleging that Petitioner has been "convicted of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor [that he has] received 'the full procedural protections' of the criminal justice system, including a trial by a jury of his peers." Alcantara Guerrero v. Wesling, No. 1:26-CV-10928-JEK, 2026 WL 931503, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 6, 2026) (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 513); Rincon v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 101, 114 (D. Mass. 2025) (finding Sec. 1226(c) inapplicable where "Petitioner has not been convicted of any crime"); see also Felipe de Paula Ataide Almeida v. Moniz, et al., No. 26-CV-12207-AK, 2026 WL 1602119, at *1 (D. Mass. June 4, 2026). Thus, Petitioner is not in the same "class of noncitizens who ha[ve] already been convicted (beyond a reasonable doubt) of committing certain serious crimes." Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 35. Because Petitioner does not appear detainable under Sec.1226(c) pursuant to Demore, the court now turns to the three-part test laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), to assess the due process challenge raised by Petitioner. See, e.g., Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 27-35 (applying the Mathews factors to a detainee held pursuant to Sec. 1226(c)); Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 14748 (2d Cir. 2024) (concluding that procedural due-process challenges to detention under Sec. 1226(c) should be analyzed under Mathews, and noting "[t]he Supreme Court has also, in other contexts, applied Mathews to examine the adequacy of procedures provided to individuals in custody, including noncitizens legally present in the United States" (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 52829 (2004)); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 42533 (1979)); Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 216; Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *4; Tenemasa-Lema v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 244, 257 (D. Mass. 2025); Rincon, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 114. The Mathews factors consist of: (1) "'the private interest that will be affected by the official action'; (2) 'the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards'; and (3) 'the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.'" Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 28 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). Acknowledging the limited factual record the court has before it, the first Mathews factor nevertheless strongly favors Petitioner as "[u]ndoubtedly, the private interest at stake here 'is the most elemental of liberty interests -- the interest in being free from physical detention.'" Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 216 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection."). Petitioner has already been detained for weeks in a situation "where the [g]overnment controls his daily activities and keeps him from his family, community, and work." Felipe de Paula Ataide Almeida, 2026 WL 1602119, at *2. The court finds this enough to be a "substantial deprivation of liberty." Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 28. Likewise, the second factor also weighs in favor of relief. "The risk of erroneous deprivation is high" because Petitioner has pending state court charges for which he appears to be on release in the state system, there is no indication of a subsequent criminal process, including a conviction, and he is presumed innocent of those charges. Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *5 (finding high risk of deprivation where Petitioner was detained based solely on an arrest and charge); see also Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 216-17 (finding high risk of deprivation of Petitioner's liberty in part due to his detention being based solely on an arrest with no accompanying charges and where the underlying conduct did not indicate dangerousness or flight risk). Finally, the public interest factor advantages Petitioner because, like in Hernandez-Lara, 10 F. 14th at 32, here "the government fail[ed] to explain why its proffered interest in securing appearance at removal proceedings and for deportation holds sway where a noncitizen is not a flight risk." Id. (citation omitted). The government cannot meet its burden based on a reference to an arrest and criminal charges without anything else. The government also does not address why a bond hearing, which would "evaluate whether [Petitioner] poses a risk of flight or danger to the community," would be insufficient to address any public interest concerns. Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *5 (citing Hernandez-Lara, 10 F. 14th at 41). Moreover, "[c]ourts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively minimal." Tenemasa-Lema, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 1158841, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025) (citing cases). Consistent with other courts' rulings, "the public interest is not well served where, as here, a noncitizen is detained without a bond hearing... simply because he was arrested for, and charged with, an offense under Sec. 1226(c)." Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *5; see also Black, 103 F.4th at 154 (finding public interest "in minimizing the enormous impact of incarceration in cases where it serves no purpose".... "[w]here the noncitizen poses no danger and is not a flight risk" (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 217. (TF) (Entered: 06/09/2026)

Jun 09, 2026

Order

#12

Jun 15, 2026

Emergency MOTION to Enforce Judgment by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz.(Miller, Jacob) (Main Document 12 replaced on 7/2/2026) (TF). (Additional attachment(s) added on 7/2/2026: # 1 Exhibit) (TF). Modified on 7/2/2026 Motion and Exhibits were incorrectly filed as one document (TF). (Entered: 06/15/2026)

#13

Jun 16, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order entered re 12 Emergency Motion to Enforce Judgement. The respondents shall respond to this motion by June 26, 2026. This order supersedes the court's June 9, 2026, order requiring the respondents to file a status report regarding the bond hearing by June 23, 2026. (TF) (Entered: 06/16/2026)

Jun 16, 2026

Order

#14

Jun 26, 2026

Opposition re 12 Emergency MOTION to Enforce Judgment for Immediate Release or to Enforce the Habeas Order filed by Patricia Hyde, Michael Krol, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin. (Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 06/26/2026)

#15

Jun 28, 2026

NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz re 14 Opposition to Motion (Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 06/28/2026)

#16

Jul 03, 2026

REPLY to Response to 12 Emergency MOTION to Enforce Judgment filed by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz. (Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 07/03/2026)

#17

Jul 10, 2026

Emergency MOTION to Expedite by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz.(Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 07/10/2026)

#18

Jul 15, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order denying 12 Emergency Motion to Enforce Judgment by Darwin A. Gordon Ruiz; and granting 17 Emergency Motion to Expedite by Darwin A. Gordon Ruiz. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Columbia who Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detained and took into custody on May 12, 2026. On November 5, 2025, Petitioner was arrested and charged with rape and a liquor-related offense in Berkshire County, Massachusetts. On June 9, 2026, this court granted Petitioner's petition insofar as it sought a bond hearing before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(a) and ordered a bond hearing, compliant with Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), by June 18, 2026. On June 15, 2026, an Immigration Judge ("IJ") timely held a bond hearing and found clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to society. According to Respondent, as is custom pursuant to the Immigration Court Practice Manual, the IJ has not issued a written decision explaining the basis for her denial because Petitioner has not filed an appeal of the decision with the Board of Immigration Appeals. (See Dkt. No. 14 at 1-2, n. 1 (citing Immigration Court Practice Manual, Chapter 9 Detention and Bond, Section 9.3 Bond Proceedings, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1052736/dl?inline)). On June 15, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant motion arguing that the bond hearing he received was constitutionally inadequate, and thus not in accordance with Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 19, because the IJ erroneously relied on Petitioner's pending criminal charges in finding him, by clear and convincing evidence, to pose a danger to the community. (Dkt. No. 12.) This determination, Petitioner argues, violates this court's order in which it stated that an arrest and criminal charges are insufficient to detain a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c). In support of his argument, Petitioner attaches what the government submitted to the IJ (state court proceedings-related documents), Petitioner's motion requesting bond, and the supporting documents for that motion. (Dkt. No. 12-1.) Respondent argues that the court should deny Petitioner's motion because 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e) prohibits judicial review of the IJ's discretionary bond decision and because Petitioner should first exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the IJ's decision to the BIA. (Dkt. No. 16.) Petitioner filed a reply brief in which he argued that the court has jurisdiction despite 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e), pending charges alone are insufficient to constitute convincing evidence of dangerousness, and administrative exhaustion does not bar relief. (Dkt. No. 17.) Alternatively, Petitioner requests that the court order Petitioner's production for state criminal proceedings. (Id.) As there is no statutory requirement for administrative exhaustion nor a need to decide the issue, the court addresses the merits of Petitioner's arguments. There is nothing indicating that Petitioner's bond hearing did not constitutionally comply with Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 4344 (finding that "[a]ll that is required is that [the adjudication of requests for release under Section 1226] comport with the minimum standards of the constitution"). By statute, "the Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of [8 U.S.C. Sect. 1226] shall not be subject to review," and "[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the... denial of bond or parole" of any noncitizen. 8 U.S.C. Sec.1226(e). Section 1226(e) precludes the court from exercising judicial review over the IJ's discretionary dangerousness determination. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003) (explaining that 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e) bars a noncitizen's challenge to "a discretionary judgment by the Attorney General or a decision that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention or release" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hernandez-Azuaje v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-13224-ADB, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2026); Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 144 (D. Mass. 2019); Massingue v. Streeter, No. 3:19-CV-30159-KAR, 2020 WL 1866255, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 14, 2020); see also Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 688 (D. Mass. 2018) ("Congress has eliminated judicial review of discretionary custody determinations."). Accordingly, where a petitioner merely "disagrees with the immigration judge's weighing of the evidence and exercise of discretion with respect to dangerousness, [t]he [c]ourt does not have jurisdiction to hear such a challenge." Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (citing 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e)). However, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e) does not deprive courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to "'the extent of the Government's detention authority under the 'statutory framework' as a whole.'" Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 3334 (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295-296 (2018)). Accordingly, where courts in the First Circuit have previously entered a conditional grant of habeas relief, including in the form of granting a bond hearing, they have exercised jurisdiction limited to reviewing compliance with that prior order. See, e.g., Orozco Mazariegos v. Moniz et al., 26-cv-10902-DJC, Dkt. No. 15 (April 17, 2026); Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 142; see also Hernandez-Azuaje, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (explaining that "courts in the First Circuit have reviewed immigration judges' bond determinations for compliance with th[e] constitutionally mandated burden of proof [of clear and convincing evidence]"). Accordingly, while this court lacks jurisdiction to review the IJ's weighing of the evidence and exercise of discretion as to dangerousness, the court has jurisdiction to review the IJ's decision to the extent that Petitioner is arguing that the IJ failed to comply with this court's previous order. "[T]he nature of the [district] courts review at this context is 'highly circumscribed.'" Orozco Mazariegos, 26-cv-10902-DJC, Dkt. No. 15 (quoting Hernandez-Azuaje, 2026 WL 221833, at *1); see also Dos Reis v. Vitello, No. CV 25-10497-RGS, 2025 WL 1043434, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2025) (discussing Hernandez-Lara for the proposition that "a court may intervene where an immigration bail determination is ultra vires or facially unconstitutional" (citing Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33)); see also Pratt v. Doll, No. 17-cv-01020, 2019 WL 722578, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2019) (holding that habeas relief is appropriate only if the immigration judge's "exercise of discretion in denying bond was so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process") (citation omitted).Succinctly put, "[t]he [c]ourt's task is therefore simply to ascertain whether the immigration court's discretion was exercised in a manner consistent with due process." Miti v. Moniz, No. 26-11327-BEM, 2026 WL 884639, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2026). To show that the denial of his bond violated his due process rights, "Petitioner must either 'point to the language of the immigration judge's opinion or demonstrate that 'the evidence itself could not -- as a matter of law -- have supported' the immigration judge's decision to deny bond.'" Hernandez-Azuaje, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (quoting Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 143). Petitioner does not dispute Respondent's summary, based on the audio file, of the bond hearing: "[T]he IJ states there is no evidence the criminal charges have been dismissed or dropped. The audio reveals the IJ weighed the totality of the evidence and stated the elements of the crime are inherently dangerous to the community at large." (Dkt. No. 14 at 6, n.3). Rather, Petitioner asserts that the IJ, after reviewing only state-court related documents but no corroborating evidence to support the criminal allegations, found him to be dangerous. (Dkt. No. 12, paras. 12, 17.) The court has reviewed the government's state court-related documents, including arrest records, booking records, charging documents, and court docket materials. See Lee v. Barr, 975 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2020) (explaining that "even charges that do not result in a conviction can form the basis for denial of relief"); see also Miti, 2026 WL 884639, at *67; Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 143. Upon review, the court finds there is no plausible argument that the IJ erred in weighing the evidence as a matter of law, violated the court's order, or acted in a facially unconstitutional manner. Petitioner's argument, despite framing his challenge to the IJ's dangerousness finding as "a purely legal question" to enforce the courts prior order, amounts to a disagreement based on the IJ's weighing of the evidence and her exercise of discretion with respect to dangerousness. In arguing that the IJ should not have considered the state court-related documents, Plaintiff relies on this court's June 9, 2026, order in which the court cited and relied on Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 19, to find that Petitioner cannot be mandatorily held under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c) solely on the basis of pending criminal charges. (Dkt. No. 12 at 12-15.) Petitioner, without providing legal authority, assumes that if an arrest and criminal charges are insufficient to subject him to mandatory detention under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c), then they must also be insufficient in showing that there is clear and convincing evidence that he poses a danger to the community under 18 U.S.C. Sec.1226(a). This court, however, rejects this analogy because the manner in which an arrest and criminal charges are considered for the purposes of mandatory detention under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c) and for the purposes of an IJ's bond determination under 18 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) differ. Contrast Alcantara Guerrero v. Wesling, No. 1:26-CV-10928-JEK, 2026 WL 931503, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 6, 2026) and Rincon v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 101, 114 (D. Mass. 2025) (finding Sec. 1226(c) inapplicable where "Petitioner has not been convicted of any crime"), with Miti, 2026 WL 884639, at *6 ("The mere fact that the assault charge against Petitioner was dismissed does not automatically cancel out its evidentiary value, 'as even charges that do not result in a conviction can form the basis for denial of relief.'" (quoting Lee, 975 F.3d at 76)). Accordingly, by merely arguing as to the weight that the IJ should have given the arrest and charges, the court finds Petitioner has not demonstrated the type of error which this court has jurisdiction to review. See Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 142,144 (finding that it had jurisdiction to review "compliance with its earlier order conditionally granting habeas relief," but not as to petitioner's disagreements "with the immigration judge's weighing of the evidence and exercise of discretion with respect to dangerousness"). Even if this court were to disagree with IJ's finding, "[district] courts cannot override an immigration judge's bond decision simply because they might have reached a different result if considering the issue de novo or in the context of a bail review in a criminal case." Hernandez-Azuaje v. Hyde, 2026 WL 221833, at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the court cannot say that "'the exercise of discretion in denying bond was so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process.'" Massingue v. Streeter, 2020 WL 1866255, at *5 (quoting Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 144). As to the alternative relief sought in Petitioner's reply brief (Dkt. No. 16), the request for Petitioner's Production for Criminal Proceedings is denied without prejudice, as it was raised for the first time in a reply brief, lacks any supporting legal authority, and is an underdeveloped argument. See United States v. Williams, 630 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that an issue is waived when a party frames an argument in the "most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones" (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is the litigant's "obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly." United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Coons v. Indus. Knife Co., 620 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that "the district court was 'free to disregard' the state law argument that was not developed in Coon's brief" (quoting Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 260 (1st Cir. 1999)); see Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 121-22 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Passing reference to legal phrases and case citation without developed argument is not sufficient to defeat waiver.... Instead, a party has a duty to incorporate all relevant arguments in the papers that directly address a pending motion." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also De La Cruz v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 17, 23 n.3 (1st Cir. 2025) (explaining that "argument[s]... raised for the first time in reply [are] waived"). (TF) (Entered: 07/15/2026)

Jul 15, 2026

Order on Motion to Enforce Judgment AND Order on Motion to Expedite

#19

Jul 16, 2026

NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz re 18 Order on Motion to Enforce Judgment, Order on Motion to Expedite (Miller, Jacob) Modified on 7/17/2026 (TF). (Entered: 07/16/2026)

#20

Jul 17, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order entered construing 19 NOTICE by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz re 18 Order on Motion to Enforce Judgment, Order on Motion to Expedite as a motion. 19 is granted. Petitioner shall file his motion for leave to amend his petition and a motion for an order directing his production for state criminal proceedings by July 27, 2026. Respondent shall file a response by August 10, 2026 . (TF) (Entered: 07/17/2026)

Jul 17, 2026

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief

#21

Jul 26, 2026

MOTION to Amend by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz.(Miller, Jacob) (Entered: 07/26/2026)

#22

Aug 10, 2026

Assented to MOTION for Extension of Time to August 18, 2026 to File Response/Reply as to 21 MOTION to Amend by Patricia Hyde, Michael Krol, Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin.(Engingro, Vincent) (Entered: 08/10/2026)

Aug 11, 2026

Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply

#24

Aug 18, 2026

Response to Motion

#25

Aug 19, 2026

Notice - Other

#26

Aug 19, 2026

Notice - Other