District of Massachusetts • 3:26-cv-12148

#1

May 12, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11738919 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Darwin A Gordon Ruiz. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Category Form)(Miller, Jacob) Modified on 5/12/2026 to remove duplicate text (LBO). (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#2

May 12, 2026

Case transferred to Western Division (Springfield) (LBO) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#3

May 12, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Judge George A. OToole, Jr assigned to case. (MPZ) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#4

May 12, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (FGD) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#5

May 12, 2026

Judge George A. OToole, Jr: ORDER entered. SERVICE ORDER re 2241 Petition. Order entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2243 governing Section 2241 cases for service on respondents. The answer or responsive pleading is due no later than 14 days from receipt of this order. (FGD) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

#6

May 12, 2026

Copy re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), 5 Service Order - 2241 Petition, emailed to Duty AUSA and mailed to Respondents and USAO on 5/12/2026. (FGD) (Entered: 05/12/2026)

May 12, 2026

Copy Mailed

May 12, 2026

Case Transferred Out - Divisional Transfer

May 12, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

#7

May 26, 2026

Notice of Appearance

#8

May 26, 2026

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#9

Jun 02, 2026

Judge George A. OToole, Jr: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(h), I direct the Clerk to return this case for random assignment to a new district judge. (FGD) (Entered: 06/02/2026)

#10

Jun 02, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Reassignment. Judge Mark G. Mastroianni added. Judge George A. OToole, Jr no longer assigned to case. (MPZ) (Entered: 06/02/2026)

Jun 02, 2026

Notice of Reassignment

Jun 02, 2026

Order Reassigning Case

#11

Jun 09, 2026

Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: Electronic order entered granting 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241). The court grants the petition ("Petition") in so far as it seeks a bond hearing before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(a). The court orders the bond hearing, which must be constitutionally adequate pursuant to Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), to be held by June 18, 2026. The court further orders Respondents to file a status report by June 23, 2026, stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Columbia who Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained and took into custody on May 12, 2026. Petitioner asserts that ICE is detaining him without cause and in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. He further states that he has filed for asylum and that he has his next asylum hearing on September 30, 2026. Respondents allege that Petitioner was arrested on November 5, 2025, and charged with rape and a liquor-related offense in Berkshire County, Massachusetts. (Dkt. No. 8, n. 1.) Respondents do not allege nor does their attached exhibit indicate that Petitioner was convicted of any charges. This court has jurisdiction over the Petition as it concerns relief that Petitioner seeks challenging his continued detention. See Kong v. United States, 62 F. 4th 608, 614 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting that "we have held that district courts retain jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detention in the immigration context" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court finds 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c) is not applicable to Petitioner and finds that Petitioner's continued detention violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226, non-citizens may generally be "released on bond during the pendency of their immigration proceedings." Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(a)). Sec. 1226(c), however, creates "'a statutory category of aliens who may not be released' during removal proceedings, outside of certain limited circumstances." Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)) (emphasis in original). "Under Section 1226(c), the government 'shall take into custody' any noncitizen who is inadmissible or deportable based on, among other things, a conviction for certain crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled substance offenses, aggravated felonies, certain firearm offenses, or certain acts associated with terrorism." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)). In addition, the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), added a new subparagraph which is not at issue here. In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this mandatory detention provision, holding that criminal noncitizens can be detained for a "brief period necessary for their removal proceedings" without being provided with an "individualized determination as to whether [they] [present] [a] flight risk." Id. However, "[i]n upholding the constitutionality of [S]ection 1226(c)'s mandatory detention procedure in Demore,... the Court explained that that section specifically applies to a class of noncitizens who had already been convicted (beyond a reasonable doubt) of committing certain serious crimes." Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 35. Here, by contrast, Petitioner had been arrested and charged with rape and a liquor-related offense before ICE detained him. It appears likely, but there were no definitive details provided, that Petitioner was, at some point, released from pretrial detention in state court. The government is not alleging that Petitioner has been "convicted of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor [that he has] received 'the full procedural protections' of the criminal justice system, including a trial by a jury of his peers." Alcantara Guerrero v. Wesling, No. 1:26-CV-10928-JEK, 2026 WL 931503, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 6, 2026) (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 513); Rincon v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 101, 114 (D. Mass. 2025) (finding Sec. 1226(c) inapplicable where "Petitioner has not been convicted of any crime"); see also Felipe de Paula Ataide Almeida v. Moniz, et al., No. 26-CV-12207-AK, 2026 WL 1602119, at *1 (D. Mass. June 4, 2026). Thus, Petitioner is not in the same "class of noncitizens who ha[ve] already been convicted (beyond a reasonable doubt) of committing certain serious crimes." Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 35. Because Petitioner does not appear detainable under Sec.1226(c) pursuant to Demore, the court now turns to the three-part test laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), to assess the due process challenge raised by Petitioner. See, e.g., Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 27-35 (applying the Mathews factors to a detainee held pursuant to Sec. 1226(c)); Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 14748 (2d Cir. 2024) (concluding that procedural due-process challenges to detention under Sec. 1226(c) should be analyzed under Mathews, and noting "[t]he Supreme Court has also, in other contexts, applied Mathews to examine the adequacy of procedures provided to individuals in custody, including noncitizens legally present in the United States" (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 52829 (2004)); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 42533 (1979)); Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 216; Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *4; Tenemasa-Lema v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 244, 257 (D. Mass. 2025); Rincon, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 114. The Mathews factors consist of: (1) "'the private interest that will be affected by the official action'; (2) 'the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards'; and (3) 'the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.'" Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 28 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). Acknowledging the limited factual record the court has before it, the first Mathews factor nevertheless strongly favors Petitioner as "[u]ndoubtedly, the private interest at stake here 'is the most elemental of liberty interests -- the interest in being free from physical detention.'" Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 216 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection."). Petitioner has already been detained for weeks in a situation "where the [g]overnment controls his daily activities and keeps him from his family, community, and work." Felipe de Paula Ataide Almeida, 2026 WL 1602119, at *2. The court finds this enough to be a "substantial deprivation of liberty." Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 28. Likewise, the second factor also weighs in favor of relief. "The risk of erroneous deprivation is high" because Petitioner has pending state court charges for which he appears to be on release in the state system, there is no indication of a subsequent criminal process, including a conviction, and he is presumed innocent of those charges. Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *5 (finding high risk of deprivation where Petitioner was detained based solely on an arrest and charge); see also Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 216-17 (finding high risk of deprivation of Petitioner's liberty in part due to his detention being based solely on an arrest with no accompanying charges and where the underlying conduct did not indicate dangerousness or flight risk). Finally, the public interest factor advantages Petitioner because, like in Hernandez-Lara, 10 F. 14th at 32, here "the government fail[ed] to explain why its proffered interest in securing appearance at removal proceedings and for deportation holds sway where a noncitizen is not a flight risk." Id. (citation omitted). The government cannot meet its burden based on a reference to an arrest and criminal charges without anything else. The government also does not address why a bond hearing, which would "evaluate whether [Petitioner] poses a risk of flight or danger to the community," would be insufficient to address any public interest concerns. Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *5 (citing Hernandez-Lara, 10 F. 14th at 41). Moreover, "[c]ourts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively minimal." Tenemasa-Lema, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 1158841, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025) (citing cases). Consistent with other courts' rulings, "the public interest is not well served where, as here, a noncitizen is detained without a bond hearing... simply because he was arrested for, and charged with, an offense under Sec. 1226(c)." Alcantara Guerrero, 2026 WL 931503, at *5; see also Black, 103 F.4th at 154 (finding public interest "in minimizing the enormous impact of incarceration in cases where it serves no purpose".... "[w]here the noncitizen poses no danger and is not a flight risk" (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 217. (TF) (Entered: 06/09/2026)

Jun 09, 2026

Order

#12

Jun 15, 2026

Enforce Judgment

Jun 16, 2026

Order

#14

Jun 26, 2026

Opposition to Motion

#15

Jun 28, 2026

Notice - Other

#16

Jul 03, 2026

Reply to Response to Motion