District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-11974

#1

Apr 30, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11713513 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Leonardo Castro Mendoza. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Category Form, # 3 IJ Order, # 4 Order of Supervision)(Song, Yong Ho) (Entered: 04/30/2026)

#2

Apr 30, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. EMERGENCY ORDER CONCERNING STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (CM) (Entered: 04/30/2026)

#3

May 01, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Judge Allison D. Burroughs assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Jessica D. Hedges. (SP) (Entered: 05/01/2026)

#4

May 01, 2026

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ORDER entered. Order Concerning Service of Petition and Stay of Transfer or Removal. The answer or responsive pleading is due no later than May 15, 2026.(CAM) (Entered: 05/01/2026)

#5

May 01, 2026

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (CAM) (Entered: 05/01/2026)

#6

May 01, 2026

Copy re 4 Service Order - 2241 Petition, 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), emailed to Duty AUSA O'Connor and mailed to respondents on 5/1/2026. (CAM) (Entered: 05/01/2026)

May 01, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

May 01, 2026

Copy Mailed

#7

May 13, 2026

Amended Complaint

#8

May 15, 2026

Notice of Appearance

#9

May 15, 2026

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#10

May 18, 2026

Status Report

#11

May 18, 2026

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. APPROVING 10 Joint Status Report Petitioner may file a reply to Respondent's response no later June 1, 2026; andRespondents may file a sur-reply and a status report on the screening interview no later than June 8, 2026. (CAM) (Entered: 05/18/2026)

May 18, 2026

Order AND ~Util - Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings

#12

Jun 01, 2026

Response - not related to a motion

#13

Jun 08, 2026

Status Report

#14

Jun 09, 2026

Hearing

#15

Jun 10, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Hearing.Hearing set for 6/17/2026 01:00 PM in Courtroom 17 (In person only) before Judge Allison D. Burroughs. (KF) (Entered: 06/10/2026)

#16

Jun 10, 2026

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 14 Motion for Hearing. (KF) (Entered: 06/10/2026)

Jun 10, 2026

Notice of Hearing

Jun 10, 2026

Order on Motion for Hearing

#17

Jun 17, 2026

Electronic Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Allison D. Burroughs: Hearing held on 6/17/2026. Court hears counsel on the issues and takes matter under advisement. (Court Reporter: Kelly Mortellite at mortellite@gmail.com.)(Attorneys present: Song, McMahon) (KF) (Entered: 06/17/2026)

Jun 17, 2026

Hearing - Other

#18

Jun 23, 2026

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Before the Court is Petitioner Leonardo Castro Mendoza’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. [ECF No. 7 ]. For the following reasons, the petition is GRANTED.On December 17, 2014, Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, was ordered removed but granted withholding of removal to Guatemala. [ECF No. 7-1]. On December 30, 2014, he was released under an order of supervision, which stated that he was released “[b]ecause the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Detention and Removal has not effected your deportation or removal during the period prescribed by law.” [ECF No. 7-2 at 1]. One of the conditions of his release was that he not commit any crimes. [Id. at 2]. On December 30, 2017, Petitioner was arrested on charges of negligent operation of a motor vehicle, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, operating under the influence, possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle, and child endangerment while operating under the influence. [ECF No. 12-3 at 1]. The child-endangerment charge was dismissed, and, in October 2019, following a bench trial, Petitioner was found not guilty of all remaining criminal charges except unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, of which he was found guilty. [Id. at 2–3]. Six-and-a-half years later, on April 30, 2026, the federal government detained Petitioner during a routine ICE check-in, and revoked his release on an order of supervision. [ECF No. 7 ¶ 20]. On the revocation notice issued to Petitioner, three boxes had been checked: the first stated that Petitioner’s release had been revoked “pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)”; the second noted that he had been ordered removed to Guatemala but granted withholding of removal to Guatemala and that his “case [was] under review for removal to an alternate country”; and the third indicated that his “conduct, or other circumstance, indicate[d] that release [was] no longer appropriate,” stating that “[o]n or about 1/2/2018, [he was] arrested for and charged with operating under the influence.” [ECF No. 7-3 at 1]. The government also served a notice of removal to a third country, Mexico, on Petitioner, which he refused to sign. [ECF No. 7-4]. After initial briefing before this Court, an asylum officer conducted a third country screening interview of Petitioner and concluded that he had not established that it was more likely than not that he would be persecuted or tortured in Mexico. [ECF No. 12-5]. The Court held a hearing on the Petition on June 17, 2026. [ECF No. 17 ].Petitioner raises several challenges to the legality of his detention, but the Court focuses on his argument that the government violated applicable regulations, and specifically 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, when it revoked his order of supervision. [ECF No. 7 ¶¶ 56–62]. The regulation in question governs the detention of noncitizens for whom DHS has made “a determination... that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b)(1). DHS may re-detain noncitizens released under this regulation only if they have violated the conditions of their release, id. § 241,13(i)(1), or “if, on account of changed circumstances, [it] determines that there is a significant likelihood that [they] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future,” id. § 241.13(i)(2). Under First Circuit precedent, the latter path requires “an individualized determination” that the noncitizen’s removal “has become significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 619–20 (1st Cir. 2023). Federal courts may review the sufficiency of that determination in light of the factors set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f). Id. at 620.Here, the government’s revocation of Petitioner’s release did not comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, so its re-detention of Petitioner was unlawful. Based on the evidence provided by the government, three weeks before Petitioner’s re-detention, “an ICE officer reviewed [his] case for potential third country removal and revocation of the order of supervision.” [ECF No. 9-1 ¶ 14]. On the day of his arrest, “[i]t was determined that the Petitioner is amenable to removal from the United States” and “ICE identified the country of Mexico as a third country of removal... contemporaneously with the decision to arrest Petitioner.” [Id. ¶ 15]. This evidence—and the government’s claims about what ICE officers “routinely” do, [id. ¶ 14]; [ECF No. 9 at 11]—does not indicate any meaningful individualized consideration of the likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future prior to Petitioner’s re-detention. See Van Tran v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 3724853, at *3–4 (D. Mass. Dec. 24, 2025) (“ICE’s analysis under § 241.13(i) must be ‘individualized.’” (quoting Kong, 62 F.4th at 619)). Although the government states that third country removals to Mexico are currently ongoing, [ECF No. 9-1 ¶ 22], there is no indication that this was the case when Petitioner was re-detained; nor does there appear to have been any ongoing effort to remove Petitioner. Because the government has not shown that it had made any individualized determination about Petitioner’s likelihood of removal or taken any concrete steps to remove Petitioner when it re-detained him, Petitioner’s re-detention exceeds the government’s regulatory authority under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.The government’s principal response is that Petitioner’s release and re-detention were governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, rather than 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. [ECF No. 9 at 8–10]. Whether this is correct depends on whether Petitioner’s release in 2014 was based on a determination that he “would not pose a danger to the public or a flight risk” or on a determination that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b)(1), a question on which the order of supervision is silent. It seems “very possible, if not likely,” however, “that Petitioner was released because it was determined that his removal was not foreseeable.” Phommachak v. Wesling, 816 F. Supp. 3d 201, 213 (D. Mass. 2026). When petitioner was released, he had been granted withholding of removal to the country specified in his order of removal, [ECF No. 7-1 at 1], which suggests that the government released him because it could not remove him in the reasonably foreseeable future. He also had a lengthy criminal record, see [ECF No. 9-3], and had been either in state custody, serving a prison sentence, or held without bond during the pendency of his removal proceedings, [ECF No. 9-1 ¶¶ 9–11], which would appear to make it unlikely that the government determined, less than two weeks after he was ordered removed, that he would not pose a danger to the public. Moreover, although the government purported to invoke § 241.4 in revoking Petitioner’s release (based on the more-than-six-year-old arrest on a charge that resulted in an acquittal on that charge), it also referred to its review of his case “for removal to an alternate country,” [ECF No. 7-3 at 1 (checking sub-box indicating review for removal to an alternate country without first checking box indicating that ICE has the ability to effectuate removal)], and the language in the government’s declaration likewise more naturally tracks the reasons for revocation contained in § 241.13, [ECF No. 9-1 ¶¶ 13–15]; see Vo v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-00533, 2026 WL 323133 at *4 (D.N.H. Jan. 27, 2026) (“[W]hile the Notice of Revocation... cites § 241.4, it also cites ‘changed circumstances in [Vo's] case’ as a basis for revocation, which is language that more naturally tracks the text and logic of § 241.13.”). The government suggests that Petitioner could not have been released under § 241.13 because, at the time of his release, his removal order was not yet administratively final and, thus, the removal period had not yet begun. [ECF No. 13 at 4–5], see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a) (providing for release “after the expiration of the removal period”). That same fact, however, would also appear to preclude release under § 241.4, which governs the continued detention of noncitizens beyond the removal period. In sum, based on the record before it, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention, and, thus, the government’s authority to re-detain Petitioner, was governed by § 241.13, not § 241.4. Accordingly, Petitioner’s petition, [ECF No. 7 ], is GRANTED. Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner pursuant to the order of supervision that was in effect prior to his detention. Respondents are ORDERED to file a status report within 7 days of this order.(CAM) (Entered: 06/23/2026)

#19

Jun 23, 2026

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ORDER entered. JUDGMENT in favor of the Petitioner. (CAM) (Entered: 06/23/2026)

#20

Jun 23, 2026

Reconsideration

Jun 23, 2026

Order AND ~Util - Set Deadlines

#21

Jun 24, 2026

Opposition to Motion

#22

Jun 29, 2026

Status Report