Eastern District of California • 1:26-cv-03277

#1

Apr 29, 2026

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

#2

Apr 29, 2026

MOTION for TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER by Kumarage Wattage Shiron Fernando. (Hussain, Sajjad) (Entered: 04/29/2026)

#3

Apr 29, 2026

IMMIGRATION NEW CASE DOCUMENTS (Deputy Clerk AJB) (Entered: 04/29/2026)

#4

Apr 29, 2026

CONSENT/DECLINE of U.S. Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(1), this document is restricted to attorneys and court staff only. Judges do not have access to view this document and will be informed of a party's response only if all parties have consented to the referral. (Anonymous) (Entered: 04/29/2026)

#5

Apr 29, 2026

CONSENT/DECLINE of U.S. Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(1), this document is restricted to attorneys and court staff only. Judges do not have access to view this document and will be informed of a party's response only if all parties have consented to the referral. (Anonymous) (Entered: 04/29/2026)

#6

Apr 30, 2026

MINUTE ORDER (Text Only Entry) issued by Relief Courtroom Deputy for District Judge Dale A. Drozd on 4/30/2026: Pending the issuance of the court's order resolving the pending 2 motion for temporary restraining order, and unless and until the court orders otherwise, the court ORDERS that respondents shall not take any action to remove petitioner from the United States or to move petitioner out of the Eastern District of California. See F.T.C. v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604 (1966) (acknowledging the court's express authority under the All Writs Act to issue such temporary injunctions as may be necessary to protect its own jurisdiction). Given the exigent circumstances present, the court finds that this order is warranted to maintain the status quo pending its forthcoming order resolving petitioner's pending 2 motion for temporary restraining order. Further, the court has conducted a preliminary review of the pending motion and petition for writ of habeas corpus and observes that this case may involve core issues that the undersigned has previously addressed in this context. Accordingly, the parties are advised that if the court concludes that petitioner is entitled to the relief that is requested in the pending motion, then the court will also rule on the merits of the underlying petition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) ("Before or after beginning the hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court may advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing."); Dzhabrailov v. Decker, No. 20-cv-03118-PMH, 2020 WL 2731966 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2020) (considering the merits of the habeas petition and motion for preliminary injunction simultaneously). Counsel for respondents has already entered Notices of Appearance, so respondents shall file a written opposition to the pending 2 motion for temporary restraining order by 5:00 PM on Friday, 5/1/2026. In that opposition, respondents shall substantively address whether any provision of law or fact in this case would distinguish it from this court's decisions in Kharitonova v. Albarran, No. 3:26-cv-01362-JSC, 2026 WL 531441 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026), Ayala Cajina v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01566-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 WL 3251083 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025); Perez v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-01540-DAD-CSK (HC), 2025 WL 3187578 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025); Chavarria v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01755-DAD-AC (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); Yang v. Warden, California City Correctional Center, et al., No. 2:26-cv-00832-DAD-DMC, 2026 WL 765027 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2026); Quichimbo-Jimenez v. Warden, California City Correctional Center, 2:26-cv-00739-DAD-EFB (HC), 2026 WL 679378 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026); Cardenas v. Chestnut, et al., No. 1:26-cv-02073-DAD-SCR (HC), 2026 WL 785871 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026); J.P.C. v. Chestnut, et al., 1:26-cv-02108-DAD-JDP, 2026 WL 788129 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026), and other similar cases previously decided by this court, or otherwise indicate that the matter is not substantively distinguishable. The court will construe failure to distinguish the above cited cases as a concession that the cases are not substantively distinguishable. If respondents oppose this court ruling on the underlying petition, then respondents are DIRECTED to indicate so and provide substantive reasons in support thereof in their opposition. (cc: Central Valley Annex) (Deputy Clerk MCF) (Entered: 04/30/2026)

Apr 30, 2026

Minute Order AND ~Util - 1 Set/Reset Deadlines and Hearings

#7

May 01, 2026

OPPOSITION by Respondents Todd Blanche, Todd M. Lyons, Markwayne Mullin, Warden Center Valley Annex to 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 2 Motion for TRO. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exh 1, # 2 Exhibit Exh 2, # 3 Exhibit Exh 3, # 4 Exhibit Exh 4, # 5 Exhibit Exh 5, # 6 Exhibit Exh 6, # 7 Exhibit Exh 7)(Rodriguez, Camilo) (Entered: 05/01/2026)

#8

May 06, 2026

MINUTE ORDER (Text Only Entry) issued by Relief Courtroom Deputy for District Judge Dale A. Drozd on 5/6/2026: On 4/29/2026, petitioner, proceeding through counsel, filed a motion for temporary restraining order seeking immediate release from Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") custody. (Doc. No. 2 .) On 5/1/2026, respondents filed an opposition to the pending motion, claiming that petitioner's detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), but: (1) petitioner has not exhausted his remedies because he has an appeal of a bond denial order pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"); and (2) petitioner's detention is entirely lawful. (Doc. No. 7 .) Respondents have conceded that this case is largely indistinguishable from Kharitonova v. Albarran, No. 3:26-cv-01362-JSC, 2026 WL 531441 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026), where the court ordered the release of a petitioner who stayed in this country past their visa authorization period and was not immediately detained by ICE officials. (Id. at 9.) However, respondents do contend that unlike the situation in Kharitonova where the petitioner did not request a bond hearing, here petitioner has received a bond hearing and has an appeal of the immigration judge's ("IJ") denial of bond pending before the BIA. (Id.) Petitioner is a native and citizen of Sri Lanka who lawfully entered the United States on or about 8/2/2015 on a B1/B2 non-immigrant visa, with authorization to remain in this country until 10/30/2015. Petitioner overstayed past the authorized period, and has remained in the United States for over 10 years. In 2020, petitioner applied for asylum, his case was referred to an Immigration Judge ("IJ") after immigration authorities began to suspect that petitioner had potentially committed human rights violations in Sri Lanka and made false statements in connection to his asylum application. Petitioner was formally placed into removal proceedings on or about 5/22/2020. Petitioner was ordered removed but has an appeal of that decision pending and is therefore not currently subject to a final order of removal. On or about 7/16/2025, petitioner was arrested by ICE with minimal explanation after attending an immigration court hearing. First, the court rejects respondents' argument that petitioner has failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. This is because in this habeas action "[p]etitioner is not challenging the decision by the IJ to deny bond. Rather, he contends that his redetention was constitutionally deficient." Luis Alberto Venega-Maltez v. Fereti Semaia et al., No. 5:26-cv-00525-JAK-AGR, 2026 WL 846035, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2026). Respondent also contend that the post-deprivation procedures outlined in § 1226(a) comported with due process under the holding in Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022). (Doc. No. 7 at 7-9.) But "[t]he Ninth Circuit did not hold in Rodriguez Diaz that noncitizens facing removal under section 1226(a) have no due process right to a pre-detention hearing." Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Here, during the nearly ten years in this country following the lapse of his lawful presence status, petitioner gained a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See Prior v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01131-JLT-EPG (HC), 2026 WL 698801, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2026). Accordingly, the court adopts the reasoning in Kalkan v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-02028-DAD-EFB, 2026 WL 788112, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026), where the undersigned held that a petitioner who overstayed their visa and was not immediately re-detained despite immigration authorities' being aware of the petitioner's presence in the United States was entitled to release from ICE custody because their re-detention violated due process. Accordingly, petitioner's motion for a temporary restraining order is GRANTED as follows: (1) Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release petitioner Kumarage Wattage Shiron Fernando, A-File No. 208-648-746, from respondents' custody; (2) Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner for any purpose, absent exigent circumstances, without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge where respondents will have the burden of establishing that petitioner is either a flight risk or danger. Under the circumstances of the case, petitioner will not be required to post bond pursuant to Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In light of the issues raised in this case, the court declines to rule on the merits of the petition at this time. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve the Central Valley Annex Center with a copy of this order. The parties are DIRECTED to meet and confer regarding the briefing schedule regarding a motion for preliminary injunction within fourteen (14) days from the date of entry of this order. (cc: ICE - Central Valley Annex.) (Deputy Clerk MCF) (Entered: 05/06/2026)

May 06, 2026

Minute Order AND Order on Motion for TRO AND ~Util - 1 Set/Reset Deadlines and Hearings