District of Massachusetts • 1:25-cv-10763

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Apr 03, 2025

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number BMADC-10932362 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Guilherme Batista Armondes. (Attachments: # 1 Category Form, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(Caron, Timothy) (Entered: 04/03/2025)

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Apr 03, 2025

NOTICE of Case Assignment. Magistrate Judge Donald L. Cabell assigned to case. Plaintiff's counsel, or defendant's counsel if this case was initiated by the filing of a Notice of Removal, are required to submit a form indicating whether the parties consent to proceed before a U.S. Magistrate Judge. The submission of the form is mandatory. Completed forms shall be filed promptly. The parties are directed to the Notice and Procedures regarding Consent to Proceed before the Magistrate Judge which can be downloaded here. These documents will be mailed to counsel not receiving notice electronically. Pursuant to General Order 09-3, until the Court receives for filing either a consent to the Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction or the reassignment of the case to a District Judge, the initial assignment of a civil case to the Magistrate Judge is a referral to the Magistrate Judge under 28 USC 636(b) for all pretrial non-dispositive matters and Report and Recommendations, but not for the Rule 16(b) scheduling conference. (SEC) (Entered: 04/03/2025)

Apr 03, 2025

Notice of Case Assignment to a Magistrate Judge

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Apr 04, 2025

Standing order re: 2241 Alien Detainees

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Apr 04, 2025

General Order 19-02

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Apr 04, 2025

Service Order-2241 Petition

Apr 04, 2025

Order

Apr 04, 2025

Notice of Case Assignment

Apr 07, 2025

Copy Mailed

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Apr 11, 2025

Notice of Appearance

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Apr 14, 2025

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

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Jun 24, 2025

Notice - Other

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Jun 24, 2025

Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. The Court is receipt of the government's notice, filed today, of its intention of removing Petitioner to his native Brazil. D. 13. The government attaches the EOIR's upholding of the denial of Petitioner's asylum petition, D. 13-1. Given the government's response to the Petition, D. 12, and the filing of the notice today, D. 13, and the absence of a reply by Petitioner to D. 12, it may be that Petitioner does not intend any further filings for the Court's consideration in light of the legal bases cited by the government for Petitioner's removal. Since the Court's Order, D. 7, required that Petitioner not be removed for at least 48 hours from the time of the docketing of the notice of the government's intent to do so, Petitioner has until June 26, 2025 to make any further filing for the Court's consideration. (LMH) (Entered: 06/24/2025)

Jun 24, 2025

Order

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Jun 26, 2025

Temporary Restraining Order

Jun 27, 2025

Order

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Jun 30, 2025

Opposition to Motion

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Jul 01, 2025

Reply to Response to Motion

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Jul 03, 2025

Chief Judge Denise J. Casper: Having considered the emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Petitioner Guilherme Batista Armondes ("Armondes" or "Petitioner"), D. 15, the opposition of Respondent Antone Moniz ("the government"), D. 17, and Armondes' reply, D. 18, the Court DENIES the motion because Petitioner has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims asserted in his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the "Petition"), D. 1 . Standard of Review. "[A]llowance of a TRO, as with a preliminary injunction, is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never awarded as of right." Allscripts Healthcare, LLC v. DR/Decision Res., LLC, 592 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D. Mass. 2022) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To obtain any form of preliminary injunctive relief, including a TRO, a plaintiff "must demonstrate: 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, 2) a significant risk of irreparable harm if the injunction is withheld, 3) a favorable balance of hardships, and 4) a fit (or lack of friction) between the injunction and the public interest." Chiang v. Skeirik, 529 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172 (D. Mass. 2007) (citing Nieves–Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003)). The likelihood of success on the merits is the "critical" factor in the analysis. Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).Background. Armondes is a Brazilian citizen. D. 1 ¶ 2; D. 12 at 6. On January 29, 2016, Armondes, then a minor, and his mother and sister were deemed inadmissible to the United States but were paroled from custody due to his mother "indicat[ing] a fear of return to Brazil." D. 12 at 5. On March 15, 2021, Armondes was convicted of two counts of possession with intent to distribute Class A controlled substances, id. at 5–6, a conviction that later was vacated on May 8, 2025. D. 15-2 at 3; D. 17 at 5. On March 18, 2025, Armondes was detained on a I-200 warrant by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") "[b]ecause of his criminal record and his lack of admission to the United States." D. 12 at 6; see D. 1 ¶ 3. Armondes filed the Petition on April 3, 2025, D. 1, alleging that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted "without a warrant and without probable cause," D. 1 ¶ 29; Id. ¶¶ 25–31, and his detention violates his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because "there is no reason to justify Petitioner's detention," Id. ¶ 24; Id. ¶¶ 22–24, which the government opposes, D. 12 . Following his arrest, ICE referred Armondes' case to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") which conducted a credible fear interview of Armondes and determined that Armondes did not have a credible fear of removal. D. 12 at 6; D. 12-1 ¶¶ 11-12. Armondes requested a review of this determination by an immigration judge. Id. ¶ 13. The immigration judge conducted such review and affirmed the USCIS's determination on April 16, 2025. D. 13 at 2; D. 13-1. Armondes moved for injunctive relief on June 26, 2025, D. 15, claiming that he is a member of the Calderon settlement class and the government failed to comply with its pre-removal obligations under the terms of the settlement, D. 15-2 at 2–4. The government filed its opposition to this motion on June 30, 2025, D. 17, and Armondes has now replied, D. 18 . Discussion. Armondes' motion for injunctive relief fails because he has failed to show likelihood of success on the merits of the claims of his Petition.Armondes' detention does not violate the Due Process Clause, particularly given his immigration status at the time of the detention, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (providing that such applicant "shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed"); see alsoAmanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that the petitioners were lawfully detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) in the first instance and lawfully held thereafter"), even as the government had the “discretion to grant or deny parole” to him as it has done in the past. Id. Armondes was lawfully detained following arrest pursuant to I-200 warrant, D. 12 at 6; D. 12-1 ¶ 10; D. 12-2 (warrant for Armondes' arrest based upon a probable cause finding that he is removable from the United States), and, given Armondes' status as an inadmissible applicant for admission, ICE could lawfully detain him pursuant to § 1225(b). SeeDept. of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 138 (2020); Franco-de Jerez v. Burgos, 876 F.2d 1038, 1043–44 (1st Cir. 1989). Thus, Armondes' due process claim fails on the merits.Notably, these legal issues are largely uncontested as Armondes' motion for injunctive relief and reply to the government's opposition do not engage with the merits of these claims. D. 15-2; D. 18 . For the reasons stated above, Armondes cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on his claims and, accordingly, cannot succeed on a motion for preliminary injunction. Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2005) (expressing that "[t]he sine qua non of this four-part inquiry is likelihood of success on the merits: if the moving party cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed in his quest, the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).Moreover, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review ICE's decision to execute Armondes' removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) provides that "no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter." SeeD.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 25-cv-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 953074, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2025) ("8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) displaces courts' power to hear cases arising from the decision or action... to... execute removal orders"). In essence now, Armondes seeks judicial review of ICE's decision to execute his removal order. D. 15-2 at 4. This claim falls squarely in § 1252(g)'s jurisdictional bar.In addition to not showing likelihood of success on the merits of the Petition, Armondes has not shown that he is entitled to any further relief under the Calderon settlement. The Calderon settlement, entered on January 16, 2025 by another session of this Court, Calderon Jimenez v. Mayorkas et al., No. 18-cv-10225-MLW (D. Mass. Jan. 16, 2025), provides protections for a class of U.S. citizens and their noncitizen spouses with final orders of removal. D. 15-2 at 2; D. 17-1 at 2. Class members include U.S. citizens and their noncitizen spouses within Massachusetts and the other New England states who have a final order of removal, are beneficiaries of a pending or approved I-130 Petition for Alien Relative filed by their U.S. spouse, and are not ineligible for a provisional waiver under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(i) or (vi) and reside here or is detained here. D. 17-1 at 3. Even assuming that Armondes is within this class, see D. 15-2 at 2, he has not shown that he is entitled to additional relief. Section III(A) of the settlement prevents ICE from taking "Enforcement Action" against class members without first "(a) considering the Form I-130 visa petition filed on their behalf by their U.S. citizen spouse, the noncitizen's eligibility to file a Form I-212, and their eligibility to file a Form I-601A, and (b) determining, in good faith and based on the facts in the Noncitizen Class Member's case, that the Noncitizen Class Member poses a threat to public safety or threat to national security." D. 17-1 at 5–6. Under the terms of this agreement, ICE "will consider subsections (a) and (b) under this paragraph at each Enforcement Action for a known Class Member." Id. at 6. Further, any decision to arrest or detain a noncitizen class member must be approved by a "Deputy Field Office Director, Field Office Director, or someone with higher or equivalent authority" ("DFOD-level Officer") after the determination required under Section III(A). Id. at 3, 6 (Section III(E)). A Section III(A) consideration and determination are required both before removal from the United States and transfer out of the covered jurisdictions for the purpose of removal from the United States. Id. at 6 (Section III(C) and III(G)). Under Section VI, if parties cannot resolve a compliance dispute under the conflict resolution procedures outlined in the agreement, "Class Members may move to enforce this Agreement through a Motion to Enforce brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts" before Judge Wolf. Id. at 7 (Sec. VI(A)); Calderon Jimenez v. Mayorkas, et al., D. Mass. No. 1:18-cv-10225-MLW, at *2. In reply, Armondes "acknowledges that disputes as to compliance with the Calderon Settlement Agreement should be filed with Judge Wolf." D. 18 at 1; see D. 17-1 at 7. But even assuming arguendo that the Section III(A) compliance claim was properly raised here, the government has shown compliance. On April 23, 2025, the government communicated to Armondes' counsel that a DFOD-level Officer "has fully considered Mr. Guilherme BATISTA Armondes, A208 658 959, immigration and criminal histories and has also considered the I-130 visa petition filed by his USC spouse, and his eligibility to file a Form I-601A and an I-212 waiver" and "determined that BATISTA poses a threat to public safety and has decided to effectuate BATISTA's order of removal from the United States" in compliance with Section III(A)(a)–(b) and Section III(E). D. 15-4 at 2–3; D. 15-2 at 3. In making its determination, the DFOD-level Officer specifically noted its consideration of Armondes' December 5, 2019 arrest and conviction for "offenses of possession to distribute Class A drug, to wit: morphine; possession to distribute Class A drug, to wit: oxycodone; unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle; failure to stop for police; negligent operation of a motor vehicle; and speeding," D. 15-4 at 2–3; Armondes' October 5, 2020 arraignment and dismissal for "the offenses of assault and battery on a family/household member," Id. at 3; and Armondes' August 4, 2022 arrest for "the offenses of operating a motor vehicle with license suspended and failure to drive in the right lane" which were later amended to a civil penalty with a $100 fine, Id. Moreover, several days after Armondes filed the present motion, a DFOD-level Officer again "fully considered Mr. Guilherme BATISTA Armondes'... immigration and criminal histories and [] also considered the I-130 visa petition filed by his USC spouse, and his eligibility to file a Form I-601A and an I-212 waiver" and "determined that BATISTA poses a threat to public safety" in compliance with Section III(A)(a)–(b) and Section III(E). D. 17-2 at 1. The government's new consideration acknowledged that Armondes' December 5, 2019 conviction was vacated in May, but noted that it was vacated "based on a procedural defect [] unrelated to the underlying facts of his arrest" and that "charges are now pending." Id. Given these sequences of events, it appears that the government has fulfilled its pre-transfer and pre-removal obligations under the Calderon settlement. D. 17 at 11–12. Although Armondes contends that questions remain as to whether the "DFOD determination encompassed all of the materials that Petitioner had filed in support of his Renewed Request for Release on May 16, 2025" in compliance with subsection III(A)(a), D. 18 at 4; D. 18-3, the government noted on June 27, 2025 that ICE's determination would include consideration of these materials. D. 17-2 at 1–2. At any rate, Armondes has not shown that he has a reasonable likelihood of success on receiving any further relief under the Calderon settlement even assuming this issue was probably raised before this session.For all of these reasons, the Court DENIES Armondes' motion for injunctive relief. D. 15 .(SEC) (Entered: 07/03/2025)

#20

Jul 03, 2025

Judgment

Jul 03, 2025

Order on Motion for TRO