District of Massachusetts • 1:25-cv-12754

#1

Sep 24, 2025

Emergency PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11259343 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Allan Goncalves Da Silva. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Exhibit)(Silva, Jonatas) (Entered: 09/24/2025)

#2

Sep 25, 2025

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Judge Brian E. Murphy assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Paul G. Levenson. (NMC) (Entered: 09/25/2025)

#3

Sep 25, 2025

General Order 19-02, dated June 1, 2019 regarding Public Access to Immigration Cases Restricted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c). (NMC) (Entered: 09/25/2025)

#4

Sep 25, 2025

Service Order-2241 Petition

Sep 25, 2025

Copy Mailed

Sep 25, 2025

Notice of Case Assignment

#6

Sep 26, 2025

Notice of Appearance

#7

Oct 02, 2025

Answer/Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241

#8

Oct 07, 2025

Temporary Restraining Order

#9

Oct 30, 2025

Judge Brian E. Murphy: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. This Petition is DENIED. Petitioner seeks an order to prevent his transfer out of the District of Massachusetts. Dkt. 1 at 1. He also requests release on bond or parole pending his BIA appeal. Id.Petitioner’s first request, as to transfer, is outside the scope of this Court’s habeas jurisdiction. See Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 873 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing with approval Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a challenge to the “location” of confinement is a “challeng[e] [to] the conditions rather than the fact of... confinement” and thus must be brought “under civil rights law”)). Moreover, to the extent Petitioner seeks to challenge the lawfulness of his prospective out-of-District detention, such claim is not yet ripe for habeas review. See id. at 874 (concluding that habeas was “not yet available” for plaintiffs who sought “to preserve the status quo”); id. at 874 n.8 (stating that, “even where the odds are great” that an executive would exercise its discretion with respect to detention, such did not amount to a “legal certainty” and so was not “sufficiently inevitable to justify the use of habeas corpus”).The Court notes the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, (2025). In J. G. G., the Supreme Court held that claims “challeng[ing] the Government’s interpretation of the [Alien Enemies] Act and assert[ing] that [the challenging detainees] d[id] not fall within the category of removable alien enemies... f[ell] within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus” because such claims “‘necessarily impl[ied] the invalidity’ of their confinement.” Id. at 672 (quoting Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 168 (2022)). Thus, although the J. G. G. detainees sought to prevent their transfer, rather than obtain immediate release, see id. at 685-86 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), the Court held that the claims sounded in habeas, id. at 672-73. Notably, in concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh stated that “the use of habeas for transfer claims is not novel.” Id. at 674 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).Notwithstanding, the Court follows Gonzalez-Fuentes’s guidance for two reasons: first, “[u]ntil a court of appeals revokes a binding precedent, a district court within the circuit is hard put to ignore that precedent unless it has unmistakably been cast into disrepute by supervening authority,” Eulitt v. Maine, Dep’t of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 2004), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Carson as Next Friend of O.C. v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767, (2022); second, the claim here is distinct from those at issue in J. G. G. because, even accepting Petitioner’s argument that transfer would result in “irreparable due process violations,” Dkt. 8 at 1, that would not “‘necessarily imply the invalidity’ of his confinement,” cf. J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 672 (quoting Nance, 597 U.S. at 168). As to his second request, Petitioner has not shown an entitlement to relief. Petitioner states that his “prolonged detention,” since February 19, 2025, is “unreasonable” because his removal is not now “foreseeable.” Dkt. 8 at 3. This argument misapplies the Supreme Court’s holding in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, which the Supreme Court has expressly declined to extend in reading the pre-removal detention statutes. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 302-03, 305-06 (2018). The Court further notes that Petitioner received a bond determination on the merits in February 2025 and again in April 2025 and August 2025, Dkts. 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, although he was found ineligible in September 2025, Dkt. 7 -4 (citing, inter alia, Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)).Denying the Petition, the Court hereby VACATES its prior Order, Dkt. 4 .(MBM) (Entered: 10/30/2025)

#10

Oct 30, 2025

Judgment

Oct 30, 2025

Order