District of Nevada • 2:26-cv-00252

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Feb 03, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Filing fee $ 5 receipt number ANVDC-8348528) by Mohammad Rafi Omari. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Exhibit) (Jones, Marti) (Entered: 02/03/2026)

Feb 03, 2026

Case randomly assigned to Chief Judge Andrew P. Gordon and Magistrate Judge Brenda Weksler. Nature of Suit: 463 - Habeas Immigration (AMMi)

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Feb 04, 2026

NOTICE TO COUNSEL PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE IA 11-2. Counsel Adam L. Crayk, Marti L. Jones to comply with completion and filing of the Verified Petition and Designation of Local Counsel. The form is available on the Court's website - www.nvd.uscourts.gov. Counsel is required to register for the court's electronic filing system at PACER www.pacer.gov to register Attorney. Verified Petition is due by 2/18/2026. (no image attached) (AMMi) (Entered: 02/04/2026)

Feb 04, 2026

Notice Desig of Local Counsel & VP

Feb 04, 2026

Assign Judges in Civil Case

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Feb 05, 2026

Motion Permission to Practice Pro Hac Vice - Verified Petition

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Feb 06, 2026

Order on Verified Petition for Permission to Practice Pro Hac Vice

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Feb 06, 2026

Proposed Summons to be issued

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Feb 09, 2026

Order

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Feb 17, 2026

Notice Appearance of Counsel

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Feb 19, 2026

USM Return

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Feb 23, 2026

Motion Extend/Shorten Time

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Feb 25, 2026

Motion Permission to Practice Pro Hac Vice - Verified Petition

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Feb 26, 2026

Order on Verified Petition for Permission to Practice Pro Hac Vice

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Feb 27, 2026

Response

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Mar 02, 2026

Order

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Mar 02, 2026

CLERK'S NOTICE that this case is directly reassigned to Judge Richard F. Boulware, II for all further proceedings. All further documents must bear the correct case number 2:26-cv-00252-RFB-BNW. (no image attached) (RJDG) (Entered: 03/02/2026)

Mar 02, 2026

Clerks Notice Reassign Judge

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Mar 05, 2026

Reply

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Mar 06, 2026

MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS of the Honorable Judge Richard F. Boulware, II on 3/6/2026. In light of the information included in Petitioner's 15 Traverse, i.e., that "on March 4, 2026, Petitioner was provided with a bond hearing by the Las Vegas, Nevada Immigration Court," and at said hearing, "[t]he Immigration Judge granted him a bond, and it has been posted," though it is uncertain "whether Petitioner remains in custody or has been released," the Court HEREBY ORDERS parties provide the Court a joint status report on or before March 9, 2026, confirming whether or not Petitioner has been released from detention.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents' 9 Motion to Extend Time in GRANTED nunc pro tunc. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - CMB) (Entered: 03/06/2026)

Mar 06, 2026

Minute Order AND Order on Motion to Extend/Shorten Time

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Mar 09, 2026

Status Report

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Mar 09, 2026

MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS of the Honorable Judge Richard F. Boulware, II on 3/9/2026.The Court has received notice that Petitioner received a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and been granted release on bond by the immigration judge ("IJ"). However, while the immediate demand by Petitioner for physical release is moot, the underlying controversy regarding the lawfulness of Petitioner's potential re-detention is not.While Petitioner was provided with a bond hearing by the Las Vegas, Nevada Immigration Court on March 4, 2026, and the Immigration Judge granted him release on bond, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") may appeal that decision. If DHS pursues an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") and the IJ's bond order is stayed or reversed, there is a high likelihood that Petitioner will be immediately subject to the same prolonged, unlawful detention that necessitated his filing of the original 1 Petition. Therefore, while a noncitizen's release from ICE custody generally moots a habeas petition challenging the legality of that detention, see Abdala v. I.N.S., 488 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007), in this instance, the established exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review" applies here. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).Therefore, this Court retains its jurisdiction over the instant matter. Consistent with its prior decisions, the Court rejects Respondents' and Hurtado's statutory interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) as applied to noncitizens like Petitioner, who was arrested by ICE far from any border or port of entry after years of residence in this country, for the reasons discussed in detail in this Court's previous decisions, which the Court incorporates and adopts by reference in this case. See, e.g., Escobar Salgado v. Mattos, ---- F.Supp.3d ---, No. 2:25-CV-01872-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3205356 (D. Nev. Nov. 17, 2025); Jacobo Ramirez v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-CV-02136-RFB-MDC, 2025 WL 3270137, at *7-11 (D. Nev. Nov. 24, 2025).In addition, the Court finds any continued detention of Petitioner by Respondents after an IJ has determined he presents neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and granted bond accordingly violates his procedural and substantive due process rights. The procedural due process factors under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), weigh heavily in favor of Petitioner because (1) the private interest affected is his fundamental liberty interest in being free from imprisonment; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation is extraordinarily high where ICE and DHS agency officials have sole, unguided, and unreviewable discretion to detain Petitioner despite the immigration court's determination that his detention is not warranted, nor any process for Petitioner to challenge the exercise of that discretion; (3) the government's interest in enforcing immigration laws is served by the individualized determination by an immigration court, based on a review of evidence presented by the government and the noncitizen, as to whether an individual is dangerous or at risk of fleeing removal proceedings, under existing, well-established procedures, and the government has no interest in the unjustified deprivation of a person's liberty. Id. at 334-35; see also Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) (collecting cases and applying the Mathews test to a constitutional challenge to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).The federal habeas corpus statute "does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge of the applicant from physical custody." Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). "Its mandate is broad with respect to the relief that may be granted." Id. "It provides that '[t]he court shall... dispose of the matter as law and justice require.'" Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243).IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from detaining Petitioner during the pendency of his current removal proceedings unless and until it is determined that his detention is warranted under § 1226(a) after a constitutionally adequate bond hearing.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from invoking 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) to continue Petitioner's detention, as the Court has already found the regulatory automatic stay is facially unconstitutional and adopts that finding here. See Herrera v. Knight, 798 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (D. Nev. 2025).IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).(Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - CMB) (Entered: 03/09/2026)

Mar 09, 2026

Minute Order