District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-10290

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Jan 23, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11492452 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Samoueth Som. (Attachments: # 1 Category Form, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet, # 3 Exhibit 1)(Klein, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/23/2026)

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Jan 23, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: EMERGENCY ORDER CONCERNING STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. ORDER entered. (PK) (Entered: 01/23/2026)

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Jan 23, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Donald L. Cabell. (CM) (Entered: 01/23/2026)

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Jan 23, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. ORDER CONCERNING SERVICE OF PETITION AND STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (SEC) (Entered: 01/23/2026)

Jan 23, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

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Jan 24, 2026

Temporary Restraining Order

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Jan 24, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE Setting Hearing on Motion 5 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order requesting immediate release : This hearing will be conducted by video conference. Counsel of record will receive a video conference invite at the email registered in CM/ECF. If you have technical or compatibility issues with the technology, please notify the courtroom deputy of the session as soon as possible.Audio access to the hearing may be available to the media and public. Please check the Court schedule. In order to gain access to the hearing, you must sign up at the following address: https://forms.mad.uscourts.gov/courtlist.html.For questions regarding access to hearings, you may refer to the general orders and public notices of the Court available on www.mad.uscourts.gov or contact the session here. Motion Hearing set for 1/26/2026 11:00 AM in Courtroom 11 (Remote only) before Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper. (CM) (Entered: 01/24/2026)

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Jan 24, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Given that the TRO motion, D. 5, was filed today and the Court wants the benefit of the government's expedited response, the Court supersedes D. 6 and sets January 26, 2026 as the deadline for the government's response to the motion that was filed today. If the Court determines that a hearing is warranted, the Court will consult with counsel for the parties about setting an in-person hearing after January 26, 2026. This Order supersedes the prior entry at D. 6.(LMH) (Entered: 01/24/2026)

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Jan 24, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE Canceling Hearing. In light of D. 7 the hearing set for 1/26/26 is canceled. (LMH) (Entered: 01/24/2026)

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Jan 24, 2026

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Eleni R. Bakst Filing fee: $ 125, receipt number AMADC-11496589 by Samoueth Som.(Klein, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/24/2026)

Jan 24, 2026

Notice Setting or Resetting Hearing on Motion

Jan 24, 2026

Notice Cancelling Hearing

Jan 24, 2026

Order

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Jan 25, 2026

AMENDED COMPLAINT against Kristi L. Noem, Todd Lyons, David Wesling, Pamela Bondi, filed by Samoueth Som. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Klein, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/25/2026)

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Jan 26, 2026

Response to Motion

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Jan 27, 2026

Notice of Appearance

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Jan 28, 2026

Reply to Response to Motion

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Jan 29, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re: 5 Motion for TRO. Having considered the motion of Samoeuth Som ("Petitioner") for a temporary restraining order ("TRO"), D. 5, the government's opposition to same, D. 11, and Petitioner's reply, D. 13, the Court DENIES the motion to the extent it seeks immediate release from detention. As the government has taken the position that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is thus entitled to a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination, D. 11 at 4, 6-7, the Court ORDERS a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination within seven (7) days of this Order. The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within ten (10) days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if her request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial. As Petitioner has raised serious concerns regarding her access to counsel, the Court also ORDERS the government to file a status report within five (5) days of this Order explaining how Respondents have facilitated visitation between this specific Petitioner and her counsel.Factual Background. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Thailand who has been living in the United States since 1984. D. 10 ¶ 16. On or around December 5, 2025, Petitioner was placed in immigration removal proceedings in the Chelmsford Immigration Court in Chelmsford, Massachusetts. Id. ¶ 18. That day, the Department of Homeland Security served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear ("NTA") which stated that she "ha[d] been admitted to the United States, but [is] removable" under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") because "after admission, you have been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, and offense relating to the illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, as described in Section 102 of the Controlled Substance Act, including a drug trafficking crime, as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18, United States Code." D. 11-2 at 1; see D. 11-1. Petitioner also has a pending, criminal matter at the Lowell District Court. D. 10 ¶ 21. Petitioner was initially detained at the Cumberland County Jail ("CCJ") in Maine following her placement in immigration proceedings. Id. ¶ 1. On January 22, 2026, Petitioner's counsel learned that CCJ was no longer holding immigration detainees and that all detainees were being transferred to an unknown location out-of-state. Id. ¶ 24; see D. 10-1. That day, Petitioner was transferred to the United States Immigration Customs and Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ICE ERO") Office in Burlington, Massachusetts ("ICE Boston Field Office"). D. 10 ¶ 1. ICE did not provide notice of Petitioner's transfer or the location of the transfer. Id. ¶ 25. The hold room at the ICE Boston Field Office is a short-term, temporary space to hold detainees, pending processing, transfer, or release. D. 11-3 ¶ 6. Typically, "ICE utilizes the hold room to detain an alien on a temporary basis, until it can identify bedspace and logistics to effectuate the transfer into a facility that is equipped to house detainees on a permanent basis." Id. ¶ 7. Petitioner alleges that while she has been detained at the ICE Boston Field Office, detainees have been subject to overcrowding, lack of sufficient food and unsanitary conditions. D. 10 ¶ 22; see D. 10-2 ¶¶ 3-4, 6, 8. On January 23, 2026, Petitioner's counsel attempted to visit her at the ICE Boston Field Office and was told that while Petitioner remained in custody there, "access to her would be impossible, even through their existing [video conferencing] system." D. 10 ¶ 23; see D. 10-3 ¶¶ 2-9; see also D. 10-4 ¶ 13. There are currently no ICE detention centers in Massachusetts that are contracted to detain females. D. 10 ¶ 1. On January 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. D. 1. On January 24, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant TRO motion requesting immediate release. D. 5. Petitioner filed the operative, amended Petition on January 25, 2026. D. 10.Standard of Review. "[A]llowance of a TRO, as with a preliminary injunction, is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never awarded as of right." Allscripts Healthcare, LLC v. DR/Decision Res., LLC, 592 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D. Mass. 2022) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To obtain any form of preliminary injunctive relief, including a TRO, a plaintiff "must demonstrate: 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, 2) a significant risk of irreparable harm if the injunction is withheld, 3) a favorable balance of hardships, and 4) a fit (or lack of friction) between the injunction and the public interest." Chiang v. Skeirik, 529 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172 (D. Mass. 2007) (citing Nieves–Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003)). The likelihood of success on the merits is the "critical" factor in the analysis. Id.; Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Discussion. Petitioner brings this Petition to challenge her detention in this district and seeks relief from same. D. 10. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition as it concerns relief that Petitioner seeks challenging her continued detention. Kong v. United States, 62 F. 4th 608, 614 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting that "we have held that district courts retain jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detention in the immigration context"). In her amended Petition, Petitioner alleges that her detention and potential out-of-state transfer violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Count I), the INA (Count II), the First Amendment (Count III) and the Administrative Procedure Act (Count IV). D. 10 ¶¶ 51-71. In her TRO motion, Petitioner moves for injunctive relief only on the basis of her Fifth Amendment and INA claims. D. 5 at 5-10. Accordingly, the Court analyzes only these claims for purposes of deciding the TRO motion.As a preliminary matter, the government contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review ICE's decision to detain Petitioner. D. 11 at 10-11. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) provides that "[t]he Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review," challenges to "the extent of the Government's detention authority" are not precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018). Here, Petitioner is not challenging the ICE's authority to detain her but instead arguing that her detention violates her rights under the INA and the Fifth Amendment. D. 5 at 4-10. These claims "'fall[] outside of the scope of § 1226(e)' because it is not a matter of the [ICE's] discretionary judgment." See Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 689 (D. Mass. 2018) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 295); see also Campbell v. Chadbourne, 505 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D. Mass. 2007) (stating that Congress did not express an intent in § 1226(e) to preclude judicial review of constitutional challenges to detention). The government also contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review ICE's decision to transfer her from the ICE Boston Field Office under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1). D. 11 at 7. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1) provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall arrange for appropriate places of detention for aliens detained pending removal or a decision on removal," "the First Circuit has explained that 'section 1231(g) fails to "specify" that individualized transfer decisions are in the Attorney General's discretion.'" Savino v. Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317, 324 (D. Mass. 2020) (citing Aguilar v. U.S. ICE, 510 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2007)). Still, Petitioner's motion for injunctive relief requesting immediate release from detention fails because Petitioner has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of her INA and Fifth Amendment claims as to her requested relief of immediate release. Petitioner argues that "[her] ongoing detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to due process and the [INA], 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)." D. 5 at 5. Petitioner alleges that she has been denied access to counsel since being detained at the ICE Boston Field Office. D. 10 ¶ 23; see Baltazar-Alcazar v. I.N.S., 386 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that "[t]he right to counsel in removal proceedings is derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and a statutory grant under 8 U.S.C. § 1362"). Petitioner submits affidavit from counsel indicating that she was denied a meeting with Petitioner on January 23, 2026 and that officers at the ICE Boston Field Office told them that they would be unable to meet or videoconference with Petitioner until she was transferred to a detention facility. D. 10-3 ¶¶ 2-9; see D. 10-4 ¶ 13. In response, the government submits a declaration from the Assistant Field Director for ICE Boston averring that detainees in the ICE Boston Field Office can call their attorneys and attorneys can coordinate in-person meetings with detainees, "depend[ing] on the availability of ICE personnel to facilitate the meeting" and "subject to limitations during shift changes, transfers of detainees into or out of the ICE Boston Field Office, or other times when on-site staffing is limited or handling emergent issues." D. 11-3 ¶¶ 16-18. As alleged, Petitioner spoke with her counsel while she was detained at the ICE Boston Field Office on January 25, 2026. D. 10 ¶ 22. On this record, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner has shown that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her denial of counsel claim as to her current detention. Petitioner additionally advances arguments as to how the conditions of her present detention violate her due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. D. 5 at 6-7; see D. 13 at 2. Challenges to conditions of confinement, however, are not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Koehn v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 25-cv-11175-AK, 2025 WL 3194742, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 22, 2025); see Garcia v. Spaulding, 324 F. Supp. 3d 228, 233 (D. Mass. 2018). Petitioner thus cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits on this basis and the Court need not address the other requisite elements required for injunctive relief.To the extent Petitioner also advances these claims as to her impending transfer, see D. 5 at 8; see also D. 10 ¶¶ 1, 31-35, Petitioner has also failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. While some courts have concluded that, under certain circumstances, a petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that their out-of-state transfers violates their statutory and constitutional right to assistance of counsel in removal proceedings, see Phetsadakone v. Scott, No. 25-cv-01678-JNW, 2025 WL 2579569, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 2025) (noting that "[c]onduct by ICE, including detention transfers away from counsel, may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship in contravention of a noncitizen's constitutional and statutory right to counsel") (citing Rios-Berrios v. I.N.S., 776 F.2d 859, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1985)); Chang Barrios v. Shepley, No. 25-cv-00406-JAW, 2025 WL 2280453, at *1-3 (D. Me. Aug. 8, 2025); Bolanos v. Arnott, No. 25-cv-3380-MDH, 2025 WL 3641577, at *1-2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2025), those cases involved circumstances where a petitioner was subject to "repeated transfers of [their] physical person and corresponding transfers of [their] immigration proceedings," id. at *1, transfer outside the country, Phetsadakone, 2025 WL 2579569, at *1-4, and the government's refusal to help their counsel "locate and communicate with [the petitioner]," and to disclose where the petitioner was being held, Chang Barrios, 2025 WL 2280453, at *3. The circumstances as presently alleged here do not rise to the same level. Moreover, Petitioner has not established that she is likely to succeed on these claims as to her impending transfer with respect to her requested relief of immediate release. Whereas other courts have concluded that petitioners were likely to succeed on such claims with respect to a requested stay order preventing an out-of-district transfer, see Chang Barrios, 2025 WL 2280453, at *3; Bolanos, 2025 WL 3641577, at *2, here, Petitioner requests immediate release, not a stay of transfer. Petitioner has also not established that ordering her immediate release from detention would "restore the status quo ante litem" where she was lawfully detained pending her removal proceedings before the "current controversy." Cf. Phetsadakone, 2025 WL 2579569, at *5 (granting release from detention on basis of denial of access to counsel claim where "[t]he last uncontested status here was [petitioner's] release on supervision" and the government's "re-detention—allegedly without following required procedures—created the current controversy"). Given these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of her INA and Fifth Amendment claims as to her transfer with respect to her requested relief of immediate release and the Court does not reach the other prongs of the requested injunctive relief in the absence of a showing of likelihood of success. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to injunctive relief on the basis of her INA and Fifth Amendment claims to the extent she seeks immediate release from detention. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court DENIES the TRO motion to the extent it seeks immediate release from detention. D. 5. As the government has taken the position that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and Petitioner can seek a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination, D. 11 at 4, 6-7, the Court ORDERS a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination within seven (7) days of this Order. The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within seven (7) days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if her request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial. As Petitioner has raised serious concerns regarding her access to counsel, the Court also ORDERS the government to file a status report with five (5) days of this Order explaining how Respondents have facilitated visitation between this specific Petitioner and her counsel. (LMH) (Entered: 01/29/2026)

Jan 29, 2026

Order on Motion for TRO

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Feb 03, 2026

Status Report

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Feb 03, 2026

Miscellaneous Relief

Feb 03, 2026

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief

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Feb 06, 2026

Status Report