District of Massachusetts • 1:26-cv-10290

#1

Jan 23, 2026

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241) Filing fee: $ 5, receipt number AMADC-11492452 Fee status: Filing Fee paid., filed by Samoueth Som. (Attachments: # 1 Category Form, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet, # 3 Exhibit 1)(Klein, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/23/2026)

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Jan 23, 2026

Judge Myong J. Joun: EMERGENCY ORDER CONCERNING STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. ORDER entered. (PK) (Entered: 01/23/2026)

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Jan 23, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Donald L. Cabell. (CM) (Entered: 01/23/2026)

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Jan 23, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. ORDER CONCERNING SERVICE OF PETITION AND STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL. (SEC) (Entered: 01/23/2026)

Jan 23, 2026

Notice of Case Assignment

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Jan 24, 2026

Temporary Restraining Order

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Jan 24, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE Setting Hearing on Motion 5 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order requesting immediate release : This hearing will be conducted by video conference. Counsel of record will receive a video conference invite at the email registered in CM/ECF. If you have technical or compatibility issues with the technology, please notify the courtroom deputy of the session as soon as possible.Audio access to the hearing may be available to the media and public. Please check the Court schedule. In order to gain access to the hearing, you must sign up at the following address: https://forms.mad.uscourts.gov/courtlist.html.For questions regarding access to hearings, you may refer to the general orders and public notices of the Court available on www.mad.uscourts.gov or contact the session here. Motion Hearing set for 1/26/2026 11:00 AM in Courtroom 11 (Remote only) before Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper. (CM) (Entered: 01/24/2026)

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Jan 24, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Given that the TRO motion, D. 5, was filed today and the Court wants the benefit of the government's expedited response, the Court supersedes D. 6 and sets January 26, 2026 as the deadline for the government's response to the motion that was filed today. If the Court determines that a hearing is warranted, the Court will consult with counsel for the parties about setting an in-person hearing after January 26, 2026. This Order supersedes the prior entry at D. 6.(LMH) (Entered: 01/24/2026)

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Jan 24, 2026

ELECTRONIC NOTICE Canceling Hearing. In light of D. 7 the hearing set for 1/26/26 is canceled. (LMH) (Entered: 01/24/2026)

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Jan 24, 2026

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Eleni R. Bakst Filing fee: $ 125, receipt number AMADC-11496589 by Samoueth Som.(Klein, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/24/2026)

Jan 24, 2026

Notice Cancelling Hearing

Jan 24, 2026

Order

Jan 24, 2026

Notice Setting or Resetting Hearing on Motion

#10

Jan 25, 2026

AMENDED COMPLAINT against Kristi L. Noem, Todd Lyons, David Wesling, Pamela Bondi, filed by Samoueth Som. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Klein, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/25/2026)

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Jan 26, 2026

Response to Motion

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Jan 27, 2026

Notice of Appearance

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Jan 28, 2026

Reply to Response to Motion

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Jan 29, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re: 5 Motion for TRO. Having considered the motion of Samoeuth Som ("Petitioner") for a temporary restraining order ("TRO"), D. 5, the government's opposition to same, D. 11, and Petitioner's reply, D. 13, the Court DENIES the motion to the extent it seeks immediate release from detention. As the government has taken the position that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is thus entitled to a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination, D. 11 at 4, 6-7, the Court ORDERS a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination within seven (7) days of this Order. The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within ten (10) days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if her request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial. As Petitioner has raised serious concerns regarding her access to counsel, the Court also ORDERS the government to file a status report within five (5) days of this Order explaining how Respondents have facilitated visitation between this specific Petitioner and her counsel.Factual Background. Petitioner is a noncitizen from Thailand who has been living in the United States since 1984. D. 10 ¶ 16. On or around December 5, 2025, Petitioner was placed in immigration removal proceedings in the Chelmsford Immigration Court in Chelmsford, Massachusetts. Id. ¶ 18. That day, the Department of Homeland Security served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear ("NTA") which stated that she "ha[d] been admitted to the United States, but [is] removable" under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") because "after admission, you have been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, and offense relating to the illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, as described in Section 102 of the Controlled Substance Act, including a drug trafficking crime, as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18, United States Code." D. 11-2 at 1; see D. 11-1. Petitioner also has a pending, criminal matter at the Lowell District Court. D. 10 ¶ 21. Petitioner was initially detained at the Cumberland County Jail ("CCJ") in Maine following her placement in immigration proceedings. Id. ¶ 1. On January 22, 2026, Petitioner's counsel learned that CCJ was no longer holding immigration detainees and that all detainees were being transferred to an unknown location out-of-state. Id. ¶ 24; see D. 10-1. That day, Petitioner was transferred to the United States Immigration Customs and Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ICE ERO") Office in Burlington, Massachusetts ("ICE Boston Field Office"). D. 10 ¶ 1. ICE did not provide notice of Petitioner's transfer or the location of the transfer. Id. ¶ 25. The hold room at the ICE Boston Field Office is a short-term, temporary space to hold detainees, pending processing, transfer, or release. D. 11-3 ¶ 6. Typically, "ICE utilizes the hold room to detain an alien on a temporary basis, until it can identify bedspace and logistics to effectuate the transfer into a facility that is equipped to house detainees on a permanent basis." Id. ¶ 7. Petitioner alleges that while she has been detained at the ICE Boston Field Office, detainees have been subject to overcrowding, lack of sufficient food and unsanitary conditions. D. 10 ¶ 22; see D. 10-2 ¶¶ 3-4, 6, 8. On January 23, 2026, Petitioner's counsel attempted to visit her at the ICE Boston Field Office and was told that while Petitioner remained in custody there, "access to her would be impossible, even through their existing [video conferencing] system." D. 10 ¶ 23; see D. 10-3 ¶¶ 2-9; see also D. 10-4 ¶ 13. There are currently no ICE detention centers in Massachusetts that are contracted to detain females. D. 10 ¶ 1. On January 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. D. 1. On January 24, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant TRO motion requesting immediate release. D. 5. Petitioner filed the operative, amended Petition on January 25, 2026. D. 10.Standard of Review. "[A]llowance of a TRO, as with a preliminary injunction, is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never awarded as of right." Allscripts Healthcare, LLC v. DR/Decision Res., LLC, 592 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D. Mass. 2022) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To obtain any form of preliminary injunctive relief, including a TRO, a plaintiff "must demonstrate: 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, 2) a significant risk of irreparable harm if the injunction is withheld, 3) a favorable balance of hardships, and 4) a fit (or lack of friction) between the injunction and the public interest." Chiang v. Skeirik, 529 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172 (D. Mass. 2007) (citing Nieves–Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003)). The likelihood of success on the merits is the "critical" factor in the analysis. Id.; Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Discussion. Petitioner brings this Petition to challenge her detention in this district and seeks relief from same. D. 10. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition as it concerns relief that Petitioner seeks challenging her continued detention. Kong v. United States, 62 F. 4th 608, 614 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting that "we have held that district courts retain jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detention in the immigration context"). In her amended Petition, Petitioner alleges that her detention and potential out-of-state transfer violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Count I), the INA (Count II), the First Amendment (Count III) and the Administrative Procedure Act (Count IV). D. 10 ¶¶ 51-71. In her TRO motion, Petitioner moves for injunctive relief only on the basis of her Fifth Amendment and INA claims. D. 5 at 5-10. Accordingly, the Court analyzes only these claims for purposes of deciding the TRO motion.As a preliminary matter, the government contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review ICE's decision to detain Petitioner. D. 11 at 10-11. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) provides that "[t]he Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review," challenges to "the extent of the Government's detention authority" are not precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018). Here, Petitioner is not challenging the ICE's authority to detain her but instead arguing that her detention violates her rights under the INA and the Fifth Amendment. D. 5 at 4-10. These claims "'fall[] outside of the scope of § 1226(e)' because it is not a matter of the [ICE's] discretionary judgment." See Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 689 (D. Mass. 2018) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 295); see also Campbell v. Chadbourne, 505 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D. Mass. 2007) (stating that Congress did not express an intent in § 1226(e) to preclude judicial review of constitutional challenges to detention). The government also contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review ICE's decision to transfer her from the ICE Boston Field Office under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1). D. 11 at 7. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1) provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall arrange for appropriate places of detention for aliens detained pending removal or a decision on removal," "the First Circuit has explained that 'section 1231(g) fails to "specify" that individualized transfer decisions are in the Attorney General's discretion.'" Savino v. Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317, 324 (D. Mass. 2020) (citing Aguilar v. U.S. ICE, 510 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2007)). Still, Petitioner's motion for injunctive relief requesting immediate release from detention fails because Petitioner has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of her INA and Fifth Amendment claims as to her requested relief of immediate release. Petitioner argues that "[her] ongoing detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to due process and the [INA], 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)." D. 5 at 5. Petitioner alleges that she has been denied access to counsel since being detained at the ICE Boston Field Office. D. 10 ¶ 23; see Baltazar-Alcazar v. I.N.S., 386 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that "[t]he right to counsel in removal proceedings is derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and a statutory grant under 8 U.S.C. § 1362"). Petitioner submits affidavit from counsel indicating that she was denied a meeting with Petitioner on January 23, 2026 and that officers at the ICE Boston Field Office told them that they would be unable to meet or videoconference with Petitioner until she was transferred to a detention facility. D. 10-3 ¶¶ 2-9; see D. 10-4 ¶ 13. In response, the government submits a declaration from the Assistant Field Director for ICE Boston averring that detainees in the ICE Boston Field Office can call their attorneys and attorneys can coordinate in-person meetings with detainees, "depend[ing] on the availability of ICE personnel to facilitate the meeting" and "subject to limitations during shift changes, transfers of detainees into or out of the ICE Boston Field Office, or other times when on-site staffing is limited or handling emergent issues." D. 11-3 ¶¶ 16-18. As alleged, Petitioner spoke with her counsel while she was detained at the ICE Boston Field Office on January 25, 2026. D. 10 ¶ 22. On this record, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner has shown that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her denial of counsel claim as to her current detention. Petitioner additionally advances arguments as to how the conditions of her present detention violate her due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. D. 5 at 6-7; see D. 13 at 2. Challenges to conditions of confinement, however, are not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Koehn v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 25-cv-11175-AK, 2025 WL 3194742, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 22, 2025); see Garcia v. Spaulding, 324 F. Supp. 3d 228, 233 (D. Mass. 2018). Petitioner thus cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits on this basis and the Court need not address the other requisite elements required for injunctive relief.To the extent Petitioner also advances these claims as to her impending transfer, see D. 5 at 8; see also D. 10 ¶¶ 1, 31-35, Petitioner has also failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. While some courts have concluded that, under certain circumstances, a petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that their out-of-state transfers violates their statutory and constitutional right to assistance of counsel in removal proceedings, see Phetsadakone v. Scott, No. 25-cv-01678-JNW, 2025 WL 2579569, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 2025) (noting that "[c]onduct by ICE, including detention transfers away from counsel, may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship in contravention of a noncitizen's constitutional and statutory right to counsel") (citing Rios-Berrios v. I.N.S., 776 F.2d 859, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1985)); Chang Barrios v. Shepley, No. 25-cv-00406-JAW, 2025 WL 2280453, at *1-3 (D. Me. Aug. 8, 2025); Bolanos v. Arnott, No. 25-cv-3380-MDH, 2025 WL 3641577, at *1-2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2025), those cases involved circumstances where a petitioner was subject to "repeated transfers of [their] physical person and corresponding transfers of [their] immigration proceedings," id. at *1, transfer outside the country, Phetsadakone, 2025 WL 2579569, at *1-4, and the government's refusal to help their counsel "locate and communicate with [the petitioner]," and to disclose where the petitioner was being held, Chang Barrios, 2025 WL 2280453, at *3. The circumstances as presently alleged here do not rise to the same level. Moreover, Petitioner has not established that she is likely to succeed on these claims as to her impending transfer with respect to her requested relief of immediate release. Whereas other courts have concluded that petitioners were likely to succeed on such claims with respect to a requested stay order preventing an out-of-district transfer, see Chang Barrios, 2025 WL 2280453, at *3; Bolanos, 2025 WL 3641577, at *2, here, Petitioner requests immediate release, not a stay of transfer. Petitioner has also not established that ordering her immediate release from detention would "restore the status quo ante litem" where she was lawfully detained pending her removal proceedings before the "current controversy." Cf. Phetsadakone, 2025 WL 2579569, at *5 (granting release from detention on basis of denial of access to counsel claim where "[t]he last uncontested status here was [petitioner's] release on supervision" and the government's "re-detention—allegedly without following required procedures—created the current controversy"). Given these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of her INA and Fifth Amendment claims as to her transfer with respect to her requested relief of immediate release and the Court does not reach the other prongs of the requested injunctive relief in the absence of a showing of likelihood of success. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to injunctive relief on the basis of her INA and Fifth Amendment claims to the extent she seeks immediate release from detention. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court DENIES the TRO motion to the extent it seeks immediate release from detention. D. 5. As the government has taken the position that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and Petitioner can seek a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination, D. 11 at 4, 6-7, the Court ORDERS a bond hearing/individualized custody redetermination within seven (7) days of this Order. The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within seven (7) days of this Order stating whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if her request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial. As Petitioner has raised serious concerns regarding her access to counsel, the Court also ORDERS the government to file a status report with five (5) days of this Order explaining how Respondents have facilitated visitation between this specific Petitioner and her counsel. (LMH) (Entered: 01/29/2026)

Jan 29, 2026

Order on Motion for TRO

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Feb 03, 2026

Status Report

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Feb 03, 2026

Miscellaneous Relief

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Feb 03, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 16 Assented-To Motion to Transfer by Pamela Bondi, Todd Lyons, Kristi L. Noem, David Wesling. (LMH) (Entered: 02/03/2026)

Feb 03, 2026

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief

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Feb 06, 2026

Status Report

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Feb 18, 2026

Notice - Other

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Feb 18, 2026

Response - not related to a motion

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Feb 19, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 9 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Added Eleni R. Bakst. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must have an individual PACER account, not a shared firm account, to electronically file in the District of Massachusetts. To register for a PACER account, go the Pacer website at https://pacer.uscourts.gov/register-account. You must put the docket number under ADDITIONAL FILER INFORMATION on your form when registering or it will be rejected.Pro Hac Vice Admission Request Instructions https://www.mad.uscourts.gov/caseinfo/nextgen-pro-hac-vice.htm.A Notice of Appearance must be entered on the docket by the newly admitted attorney. (SEC) (Entered: 02/19/2026)

Feb 19, 2026

Order on Motion for Leave to Appear

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Feb 20, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. On January 29, 2026, the Court denied the motion of Petitioner Samoeuth Som ("Petitioner") for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to the extent it sought release from detention, but ordered Respondents to conduct a bond hearing and to file a status report explaining (1) whether Petitioner has been granted bond, and, if her request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial; and (2) how Respondents have facilitated visitation between this specific Petitioner and her counsel. D. 14. On February 3, 2026, the government filed a status report on attorney facilitation in the ICE Boston Field Office attesting that Petitioner had a telephone call with her attorney that day, D. 15 at 2, and separately filed an assented-to motion to transfer Petitioner to a detention facility in Rhode Island, D. 16, which the Court granted, D. 17. On February 6, 2026, the government filed a status report on Petitioner's bond hearing which indicated that Petitioner had a bond hearing on February 5, 2026 and the Immigration Judge denied bond on the grounds that Petitioner (1) "was subject to mandatory detention pursuant to INA 236(c) based on her criminal conviction" and (2) "had been shown to be a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence." D. 18 at 2; see D. 18-1 at 1. On February 18, 2026, the government filed a notice of intent to transfer Petitioner to Texas consistent with the Court's order concerning stay of transfer. D. 19; see D. 4. Although Petitioner opposes her intended transfer to Texas, citing many of the same grounds as advanced in her TRO motion and amended complaint, D. 20 at 2-6; see D. 5; D. 10, Petitioner has not identified any authority under which this Court must prevent her transfer to Texas. As noted in the Court's TRO ruling, D. 14, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1) provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall arrange for appropriate places of detention for aliens detained pending removal or a decision on removal." "To the extent section 1231(g)(1) grants transfer authority," Savino v. Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317, 324 (D. Mass. 2020), Petitioner has not provided grounds for the Court to interfere with such. As previously explained, D. 14, while some courts have preliminarily enjoined a petitioner's transfer where they have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that their out-of-state transfers violates their statutory and constitutional right to assistance of counsel in removal proceedings, see Phetsadakone v. Scott, No. 25-cv-01678-JNW, 2025 WL 2579569, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 2025) (noting that "[c]onduct by ICE, including detention transfers away from counsel, may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship in contravention of a noncitizen's constitutional and statutory right to counsel") (citing Rios-Berrios v. I.N.S., 776 F.2d 859, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1985)); Chang Barrios v. Shepley, No. 25-cv-00406-JAW, 2025 WL 2280453, at *1-3 (D. Me. Aug. 8, 2025); Bolanos v. Arnott, No. 25-cv-3380-MDH, 2025 WL 3641577, at *1-2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2025), those cases involved circumstances where a petitioner was subject to "repeated transfers of [their] physical person and corresponding transfers of [their] immigration proceedings," id. at *1; see Chanaguano Caiza v. Scott, No. 25-cv-00500-JAW, 2025 WL 2806416, at *2 (D. Me. Oct. 2, 2025), transfer outside the country, Phetsadakone, 2025 WL 2579569, at *1-4, and the government's refusal to help their counsel "locate and communicate with [the petitioner]," and to disclose where the petitioner was being held, Chang Barrios, 2025 WL 2280453, at *3. As the Court previously concluded, Petitioner has not established that the circumstances here "rise to the same level," D. 14, particularly in light of the status update from Respondents, D. 15, and the further provisions of this Order. Respondents' transfer notice complies with the Court's order concerning stay of transfer. D. 19; see D. 4. Further, in their transfer notice, Respondents have indicated that "after this transfer, the Petitioner will not be transferred from the Houston Contract Detention Facility... without advance notice and a basis of such transfer." D. 19 at 2. Respondents further agree that the Court will retain jurisdiction of Petitioner's habeas petition. Id.Accordingly, to the extent that Petitioner sought to block the transfer, D. 20, the Court DENIES that relief. Given, however, the imminent transfer of Petitioner to a new facility and the concerns Petitioner has raised regarding her access to counsel there and access to her pending criminal and immigration proceedings here, D. 20 at 2-3, 5, the Court ORDERS Respondents to file a new status report within five (5) days of this Order explaining (1) how Respondents have facilitated visitation between this specific Petitioner and her counsel at the Houston facility; (2) how Respondents have facilitated this specific Petitioner's access to her criminal proceedings here; and (3) how Respondents have facilitated this specific Petitioner's participation in her immigration proceedings in the Chelmsford Immigration Court, including a hearing scheduled for March 16, 2026.(LMH) (Entered: 02/20/2026)

Feb 20, 2026

Order

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Feb 23, 2026

General Order 19-02

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Feb 25, 2026

Status Report

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Feb 27, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Having considered the recent status report, D. 24, the Court understands that Respondents withdraw their notice of transfer, D. 19. Accordingly, the Court's Order, D. 22, as to provide a status report regarding that facility is moot and requires no further status report at this time.(LMH) (Entered: 02/27/2026)

Feb 27, 2026

Order

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Mar 02, 2026

Notice - Other

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Mar 31, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. Having considered the amended Petition of Samoeuth Som ("Petitioner") for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, D. 10, Respondents' response to same, D. 11, and Petitioner's reply, D. 13, the Court DENIES the Petition.On January 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") seeking release from detention, D. 1, and filed the operative amended Petition on January 25, 2026, D. 10. On January 29, 2026, the Court denied the TRO motion but ordered Respondents to conduct a bond hearing based on the government's position in its TRO briefing that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). D. 14; see D. 11 at 4, 6-7. On February 3, 2026, the government filed an assented-to motion to transfer Petitioner to a detention facility in Rhode Island, D. 16, which the Court granted, D. 17. On February 6, 2026, the government reported that Petitioner was denied bond on the grounds that she (1) "was subject to mandatory detention pursuant to INA 236(c) based on her criminal conviction" and (2) "had been shown to be a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence." D. 18 at 2; see D. 18-1 at 1. The government has since filed a notice of intent to transfer Petitioner to a detention facility in Texas, D. 19, which was subsequently withdrawn, D. 24, and filed a new notice of intent to transfer Petitioner to the Eloy Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona, D. 26. Sec. 2241 provides federal courts with jurisdiction to order the release of "any person who is held in the custody of the United States in violation of the 'laws... of the United States' or the United States Constitution." Vasquez v. Moniz, 788 F. Supp. 3d 177, 180 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)). The Petitioner has the burden to prove her detention is unlawful. Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009). Having considered the parties' filings, the Court concludes that the Petition must be denied for several reasons. First, given that Petitioner has since been transferred from the ICE Boston Field Office, D. 16-17, to the extent that her claims challenge her detention there, and, relatedly, denial to access to counsel while there, D. 10 ¶¶ 51-71, are moot. See Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Becker v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 230 F.3d 381, 386 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, Petitioner has failed to establish that she is entitled to release from detention based on her arguments that a transfer outside of New England would violate her rights under the Fifth Amendment, the INA, the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). D. 10 ¶¶ 51-71.As the Court previously noted, D. 14, Petitioner's Notice to Appear specifies that she has been placed in removal proceedings under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which states that "[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable." D. 11-2 at 1. Here, the record shows that Petitioner has been convicted of "an aggravated felony," D. 11-2 at 1; see D. 11-1, thus 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) applies. Detention of noncitizens under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). Although Petitioner received a bond hearing based on Respondent's position that she was detained pursuant to § 1226(a), at her bond hearing, the immigration judge denied bond on the grounds that Petitioner (1) "was subject to mandatory detention pursuant to INA 236(c) based on her criminal conviction" and (2) "had been shown to be a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence." D. 18 at 2; see D. 18-1 at 1."Section 1226(c), often called the mandatory detention provision, 'carves out a statutory category of aliens who may not be released' during removal proceedings, outside of certain limited circumstances." Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018) (emphasis in original)). "The statute allows release of a noncitizen properly subject to mandatory detention under section 1226(c) 'only for witness protection purposes and only [then] if the alien shows [s]he is not a danger to the community or a risk of flight.'' Id. (citations omitted). Here, Petitioner has not shown that she falls into any of these "limited circumstances." Reid, 17 F.4th at 4. As to Petitioner's arguments that a transfer outside of New England would violate her rights under the Fifth Amendment, the INA, the First Amendment and the APA, D. 10 ¶¶ 51-71, as previously noted as to her INA and Fifth Amendment claims, D. 14, she has failed to establish an entitlement to release from detention on these grounds. Habeas petitions “can be used only to request release from custody” and are "not appropriate vehicles to challenge the circumstances of confinement... including a prisoner's location of custody." Vasquez, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 182 (citing Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004); Dowey v. Maine, No. 15-cv-138-NT, 2015 WL 6123530, at *6 (D. Me. Oct. 16, 2015)). For the aforementioned reasons, the Court DENIES the Petition. D. 1.(LMH) (Entered: 03/31/2026)

#28

Mar 31, 2026

Chief District Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. ORDER DISMISSING CASE(LMH) (Entered: 03/31/2026)

Mar 31, 2026

Order